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Beloved imagination, what I most like in you is your unsparing quality. The mere 
word “freedom” is the only one that still excites me. 
André Breton, First Manifesto of Surrealism 
One unbounded ocean of consciousness became light, water, and matter. And the 
three became many. In this way the whole universe was created as an unbounded 
ocean of consciousness ever unfolding within itself. 
The Upanishads 
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ABSTRACT 
Jessica Doyle 
MEDITATIVE INTERACTIVITY:  
THE POWER TO CREATE THE SELF THROUGH THE VIRTUAL 
This dissertation examines philosophical modes of understanding subject formation 
within the realm of the virtual. I primarily base the evaluations within the concepts of 
misrecognition, alienation, and purposelessness found within the virtual world. I 
discuss the strength of the mirroring image while at play in the virtual game, which 
leads players to greater heights of understanding as to who they are and who they 
might become. Interactivity within the virtual, coupled with play and forms of 
meditative reflection, offer the player unique paths to finding freedom. Drawing 
primarily on the work of Jacques Lacan, G. W. F. Hegel, Martin Heidegger, and 
Friedrich Nietzsche, I demonstrate how creation within the virtual realm holds 
promise for an improved nature of becoming autonomous creators of one’s life 
content and surrounding communities. My analysis takes Lacan’s theory of the mirror 
stage by showing how the virtual uniquely provides choice beyond the self. Hegel’s 
concepts of self-consciousness, spirit, and mind are linked in the broader sense to the 
virtual space. Nietzsche’s views on self-creation and will to power are expounded 
upon within the ability to design one’s life. Heidegger’s views on technology and 
authenticity are considered in relation to the authentic inner self found when playing. 
!vi
I argue that the emerging genre of virtual play is not as much about a personal escape, 
but that of a spiritual journey. The power of becoming self-aware is understood in 
terms of its ability to enhance what one brings back to physical reality. The virtual 
experience does not deplete life’s tangibility. Rather, it has the ability to give one’s 
life new meaning, and imbue a stronger sense of self––a new impression of reality. It 
is my contention that virtual interactivity covertly activates the cognitive mode to 
return the player to a state of authenticity that was previously veiled. 
!vii
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Chapter One 
The Medium of Virtual Play 
 To The Moon constantly had me questioning my own choices in life 
and whether I'd be happier if my life had taken a different course.   1
 There is significant promise as to how an individual can identify her authentic 
inner self through the virtual experience. With an autonomous approach, creating ex-
periences in virtual worlds can formatively alter the concept of one’s identity. New 
possibilities of consciously becoming have the ability to reshape the lives of individu-
als in a profound way. Perspectives shift as the opportunity to make decisions in an 
aesthetic virtual environment provides users the chance to explore unique ways of 
interacting socially. Within the experience of virtual play, individuals can solve psy-
chologically complex issues while in the comforts of a non-threatening environment. 
 In the following dissertation, I argue that engagement with interactive tech-
nologies can be viewed as a productive mode in forming an ideal self. By immersing 
in virtual Metaverses, the super-ego is displaced––which becomes key to authentic 
subject formation. A Metaverse, comprised of meta meaning “beyond” and verse 
standing for “universe,” relates to fictional, yet virtual worlds and communities. With-
in the Metaverse, room for free play abounds. In the virtual experience, people can 
now explore unique ways of interacting socially and individually. Within this space, a 
loss of self-conscious angst is found in a world that does not set people up for certain 
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freedom. While many people may believe they are free, in truth, the states of sur-
veillance and conformity alone close in on most possibilities of an individual creating 
an authentic sense of self. Thus, I argue, the virtual world is constitutive in making 
sense of and amends with one’s identity in the real. Through the act of meditative in-
teractivity via these experiences in the virtual, one’s sense of self can be created more 
clearly. It will be seen that, within the virtual, the automated concept of self is diluted 
by experiencing other realities where social codes, cultural norms, and ideologies are 
removed. The new self that is discovered through this interactive experience is not to 
be seen as a fantastical outlaw. The virtual experience, rather, becomes that of a 
unique tool for personal and social development in which the fullness of one’s intel-
lectual and creative potential becomes found and can be used within physical experi-
ences.  
  Digital technology is advancing so quickly that the word “video game” has 
become an ambiguous and outdated term, though it is certainly becoming more ac-
cepted and discussed with serious connotations. Well-esteemed schools such as Mass-
achusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of Southern California, and New 
York University offer undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate degree programs in 
game studies, gamification, game research, game theory, and game design, along with 
courses and specialties in ethics regarding gaming.   These examples indicate that the 2
field of virtual play is growing and gaining respect in academia. Experiencing the vir-
tual is now discussed in broad areas such as media studies, humanities, psychology, 
sociology, fine arts, and philosophy programs. Interestingly, a clear definition has not 
!2
been established as to what the actions of play in virtual worlds should be called, as 
there is not necessarily a game component in all virtual communities. As such, these 
terms in no way fit the current direction toward which the medium is headed. Thus, 
for the purposes of my project, I will refer to the acts of virtual play as “playing in the 
virtual,” “virtual games,” “gameplay,” and “the virtual.” One who plays virtual games 
will primarily be referred to as a player or gamer. When discussing play in the virtual, 
the concept will encompass interactivity between the player and another source––
computer-generated or live––on the other side of the game. This interaction through 
virtual play will be discussed as an actual––while virtual––encounter with an Other 
on the opposite side of the screen. 
 To discuss the history of the video game itself, it is relatively new in terms of 
digital technology. Video games began in the 1960s and 1970s though the history of 
games encompass the fundamental component of play from early civilizations.   The 3
video game industry today is broad and multi-faceted with a multitude of sub-genres 
lying underneath the largely outdated umbrella term “video game.” Virtual games can 
run the gamut from arcade games, game consoles, and handheld video game con-
soles––to games on smartphones, computer games inserted into the computer drive 
from a disc or portable device, and online games that are found on the internet with-
out any downloading necessary. Currently, there are new instances of virtual reality 
game systems being released. The virtual reality head-mounted screen, Oculus Rift, 
encapsulates the player’s entire view and is currently in the process of beta-testing.  4
In addition, there are various types of gameplay, that encompass action games, open 
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worlds, adventure games, interactive fiction, role-playing games (RPG), massively 
multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPG), simulation games that allow the 
player to build virtual worlds, businesses, and social situations, strategy games, and 
many more genres.    5
 Thus, in the following chapters, I will reference various modes of virtual 
gameplay, including interactive three-dimensional virtual worlds, which do and do 
not consist of competitive aspects, indie games, and interactive narrative fiction. I 
link these digitally interactive experiences to the ability to hold power of creative au-
tonomy which has the dynamic power to create an authentic self. Furthermore, I will 
use the pronoun “she” and “her” throughout the dissertation in order to ease the flow 
of reading. I will argue that the virtual game correlates to three central concepts: (1) 
misrecognition, (2) alienation, and (3) purposelessness. These modes will be funda-
mental to my claim that the virtual has the ability to create a desired self. It is my con-
tention that virtual interactivity covertly activates the cognitive mode to return the 
player to a state of authenticity that was previously veiled. By playing games without 
specific objectives and interacting in an aesthetically pleasing wonderland, the player 
experiences higher states of self-awareness.  
 The virtual game, then, can be seen as a new form of creativity with power to 
shift perspective. The passive viewer who previously participated in watching is now 
interacting and making decisions. Within the interactive virtual experience, the player 
believes, in a sense, that she is in the world, as the virtual becomes another version of 
!4
the real. Games hold deep and meaningful stories, which include philosophical con-
cepts such as free play, tragedy, inspiration, challenge, and beauty. The experience of 
entering a landscape of play can indeed be seen as a form of departure from the 
everyday, however, I view this type of liberation as something that causes one to de-
light in the freedom of play and non-consequential decision-making as opposed to an 
escape. 
 The act of gameplay can be understood in terms similar to G. W. F. Hegel’s 
master-slave dialectic, where the slave and master fight for the recognition of the 
Other. Only when the slave mentally overcomes the master and is comfortable with 
the work she has to do does she attain the highest level of self-consciousness. The 
master and slave––or lord and bondsman––dynamic can be understood in a literal 
sense or attributed within various levels of consciousness that one can attain in life. If 
the slave is working, then she slowly realizes that she indeed does have a portion of 
control, for if she ceases to work, there will be no more master. Due to the slave un-
derstanding her power, she becomes master over objects and then becomes conscious. 
The sense of freedom from slavery occurs due to the slave not holding back and risk-
ing a sense of mediocre comfort. The sense of freedom attained can also be seen as 
absolute mind or Geist.   To understand the metaphor within the virtual realm, the 6
player also removes herself from her immediate surroundings mentally and does not 
look for recognition from the Other in her physical space. She rather becomes at one 
within the virtual where she interacts and reaches higher levels of self-consciousness 
in the Metaverse. With this, it may be understood that the desire for the slave to over-
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turn the power of the master is necessary in order to achieve ultimate personhood.  7
Hegel asserts that the slave is gradually being “transformed into a truly independent 
consciousness.”    8
 Once the act of play combined with a higher level of self-consciousness is un-
derstood, the aesthetics of the game is noticed. While considering that aesthetics do 
not begin and end within the visual sense alone, the visual attributes are what initially 
propel the virtual experience into the category of art. When combined with interactive 
possibilities, the virtual can be seen as the end of art as it has been known because the 
viewer is now a participant who has stepped inside of the aesthetic experience. The 
viewer is now part of the work. The process heavily contrasts with all prior encoun-
ters with works of visual art, where the viewer remained at a physical distance when 
viewing work. Further, previous works of art did not entail the viewer making unlim-
ited conscious choices while interacting with the art piece. The virtual allows the 
viewer to be involved with the creation of a unique work of art each time it is experi-
enced, thereby making overt the understanding of the player’s power as the artist or 
creator of her own destiny. The power that the player encompasses is otherwise veiled 
in external reality due to the ego’s drive toward conformity and security. 
 Visual art allows one to behold a new state of awareness, that may or may not 
encompass an aesthetic nature, yet offers one to see a glimpse into an otherworld. 
While aesthetics, as it has been considered, is something that may be significant to the 
player, I argue that the greater desire now is to find a place of releasing––which does 
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not only rely on the power of representation or beauty per se. Therefore, contempo-
rary aesthetics can be redefined to include the awareness of the player and the alliance 
with one’s inner beauty. In games that are drawn quite crudely that resort to typing 
commands or words to create certain scenarios between user and character, a new 
sense of understanding through language is found. As an example, in the PC video 
game Façade, the player types text to create changes in an intimate social space.   The 9
characters react to the typing of the player and the whole scenario changes based on 
simple changes in sentences. The player assumes the role of a friend of a couple who 
had invited the player to their home for cocktails. There is a clear disruption between 
the couple once the player enters the house. Façade then allows the player to type 
sentences to communicate with the couple, which could lead to a myriad of scenarios 
for the player and the host and hostess. These are virtual experiences, yet they offer 
lessons and tales that may benefit one’s life––similar to literature and film––yet this 
time the player is involved and integral to the story’s path, consequences, and 
ending.   10
 Thus, while the aesthetic nature is significant, the experience is something that 
is interactive. The imagery can appear to be aesthetically pleasing though not always 
relevant. What matters now is the active play between viewer and game, which can 
result in delight, pleasure, satisfaction, and motivation. The quote at the beginning of 
this chapter brings to light the power and impact which play in the virtual has upon 
society. It can be seen that the virtual transports minds, pre-conceived notions, and 
previously held ideological concepts. 
!7
 To look at a contrasting point of view with reference to interactivity in current 
works of art aside from virtual play, the art movement called relational aesthetics can 
be seen as an example. Relational aesthetics is a term coined by French art critic, 
Nicolas Bourriaud, in his text, Relational Aesthetics.   Bourriaud discusses contempo11 -
rary artist, Rirkrit Tiravanija, and his work, which consists of inviting participants to 
engage in activities that would normally be seen as an artist’s reception. Food is 
served, and the atmosphere is hospitable. This pre-planned occurrence will happen in 
a physical space and offer interactivity between the viewers and spectators. In con-
trast, the virtual aspect of the gaming genre keeps the identity of the player anony-
mous. The spectator is now able to take more risks, due to the anonymous nature that 
does not hold the player to the same standards of being compared to the physical re-
sponses in an actual space. Relational aesthetics may seem to fulfill the same purpose 
as play in the virtual, though my argument focuses with the will of the player to “en-
ter into” a game and temporarily disengage her everyday role in life in order to inhab-
it a more authentic version of her self. Virtual games, which may seem or be purpose-
less, have the potential to create purpose in one’s life. It proves difficult to claim this 
same philosophical outlet with reference to the identity of a person in relational art, 
such as Rirkrit Tiravanija’s works attempt to do. I argue that works such as Tiravani-
ja’s, which are designed to bring people together in a physical and communal sense, 
deeply contrast virtual interactivity. Works such as Tiravanija’s hold importance in the 
physical closeness and proximity to fellow humans. Indeed, the purpose of the physi-
cal atmosphere is created to break away from the worries of isolated activities.  
!8
 It is true that Tiravanija creates a space in which people can physically com-
mune with one another and enjoy each other’s company, bringing back the physical 
aspect of communication and camaraderie. However, the act of gaming is primarily 
an individual way of approaching art, very much like the traditional artist who works 
in solitude in her studio only to be able to tap into the understanding that occurs when 
putting brush to canvas. In the dissertation, I am not discussing the act of creating or 
designing games, but likening the act of playing in the virtual space to creating a 
work of art. This introspective involvement is akin to the artist that focuses on the 
work being created and shuts out the rest of the world, if only for the momentary time 
that she experiences the act of creating. The act of gameplay in this realm parallels 
that of meditative processes. 
 While it may be impossible to fully comprehend one’s ultimate reality, the act 
of playing in the virtual brings the individual out of the spectacle of life and into the 
actuality of one's inner space––one’s authentic self. The act of virtual play can be 
seen as that which leads one to a state of understanding of knowing akin to Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of the hermeneutic way of searching and understanding. Heideg-
ger states: 
 What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to 
come into it the right way… In the circle is hidden a 
positive possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this 
possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have 
understood that our first, last and constant task is never 
to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception 
to be presented to us by fancies and popular concep-
!9
tions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by 
working out these fore-structures in terms of the things 
themselves.     12
Looking at the virtual in this manner of interpreting brings up issues of responsible 
searching and continuing to discover, even if it seems to be a circular endeavor. Hei-
degger interestingly remarks the following, “What looks like disunity and an unsure, 
“haphazard” [zufall] way of “trying things out,” is an elemental restlessness, the one 
goal of which is to understand “life” philosophically and to secure a hermeneutic 
foundation in terms of “life itself.””   The searching and “trying things out” form new 13
processes that allow the player to come to new impressions. 
  In addition to discovering new forms of knowing, the activity of play is cen-
tral to the becoming process. In the virtual play space, the player may be utilizing the 
game from a physical stance, yet the workings of the mind begin to turn to play, 
which raises the levels of self-reflection in the player. Finding and better understand-
ing the self, in effect, relates to the purpose of art. Here, we turn to an interpretation 
on the purpose of art. Stephen Houlgate discusses Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics as 
follows: 
 The principal aim of art is not, therefore, to imitate 
nature, to decorate our surroundings, to prompt us to 
engage in moral or political action, or to shock us out of 
our complacency. It is to allow us to contemplate and 
enjoy created images of our own spiritual freedom—
images that are beautiful precisely because they give 
expression to our freedom. Art's purpose, in other 
words, is to enable us to bring to mind the truth about 
!10
ourselves, and so to become aware of whom we truly 
are. Art is there not just for art's sake, but also for beau-
ty's sake, that is, for the sake of a distinctively sensuous 
f o r m o f h u m a n s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n a n d s e l f -
understanding.   14
Thus, understanding the self better can be seen as equal to the purpose of art, as it can 
equate to a higher awareness of self. In addition to the purpose of art, the concept of 
free play is critical to understand the benefits of the experience within the virtual. 
Immanuel Kant sees free play as something that causes aesthetic pleasure in hu-
mankind.   Free play for Kant has no particular reason or ending point. Kant sees free 15
play of the cognitive faculties as what sits between the imagination and understand-
ing.   When combined with aesthetic appeal of visual form––albeit virtual––the un16 -
derstanding of being becomes significantly more complex.  
 With reference to playing in the virtual, the activity can also be seen as a form 
of learning. The Greek word “illusion” translates to “to play.” Plato sees the means of 
play to be good for the society as it amuses people and puts forth a sense of freedom. 
Plato maintains: 
 The free man always has time (schole) at his disposal to 
discourse in peace at his leisure. He will pass, as we are 
doing now, from one argument to another… The orator 
is always talking against, hurried by the clock, there is 
no space (ascholia) to enlarge on any subject he choos-
es…    17
Plato sees the notion of play to be good––to a point. However, for Plato, if play is 
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taken too seriously it could be detrimental to one’s mind, as it could lead to one be-
lieving in illusions. It is clear to see that the industry of gaming is commonly blamed 
for many crimes and blight, as it is thought that players take the game too far, that is, 
that they mistake the virtual for the real. This topic constitutes larger societal issues, 
such as addiction, that will be covered later in the dissertation.  
 Today, societal life has become a game of sorts where individuals work, often 
to such a degree, that it could cause one to break down without a release.   Thus, 18
pathways to imagination can be viewed as a positive experience in obtaining a clear 
sense of self-awareness. The use of imagination––or even the ability to pretend in the 
virtual––offers a release that gives one a sense of fulfillment, as, even if for a short 
time, the individual removes herself from the world of objects. When contemplating 
the experience of physical work with little liberation, it becomes clear to see playing 
as beneficial. Thus, throughout the dissertation, it will be questioned, what does play-
ing in the virtual have to do with individual identity? 
The Virtual as a Creative Medium 
 In 1969, an exhibition opened in New York at the Howard Wise Gallery enti-
tled, TV as a Creative Medium. This exhibition prompted many visual artists to take 
the art of video to a new level of creativity. However, to contrast the difference be-
tween television and virtual games, it is important to realize that playing a game in-
volves interaction and decision-making that dictates what occurs next in the scenario. 
In reference to television and video, the moving images seen only take the viewer so 
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far––viewers are left to decipher what they saw or possibly be able to critique what 
they were shown. In the virtual game, there are reactions and decisions that involve 
the opposite side of the screen as each move that the player makes changes the expe-
rience. Whether the opposite side of the screen is computer controlled or a live human 
being, a reactive response occurs for the player. In the television viewing experience, 
live response nor decision occurs. 
 While the 1969 exhibit sparked the video art movement, it is not yet clear 
when the virtual game as creative medium will be commonplace in contemporary art 
exhibitions––as video has become. Typically, when one thinks of the term video 
game, contemporary art, academia, or philosophy are not commonly brought to mind. 
There has been hesitant, yet incremental, moves that bring the game within the realm 
of art and philosophy.   The Museum of Modern Art declared video games to be re19 -
garded as a form of art. MoMA purchased fourteen video games in November 2012 
and displayed the games in 2013 in an exhibit entitled Applied Design.   Most of the 20
games are playable, with the screen placed behind a barren wall and a joystick or con-
troller ready for the user to pick up and play. The exhibition was one of the first to 
include video games as works of art, which, in addition to the increasing number of 
academic degrees in emergent media noted earlier, offers a great deal about the future 
of the medium. Furthermore, since those early instances, more museums have pur-
chased video games for both exhibition and relic-saving purposes. It is clear that vir-
tual games are becoming more accepted and the acknowledgement by the art world 
signals promise for the medium. Marshall McLuhan comments:  
!13
 The medium, or process, of our time––electric 
technology is reshaping and restructuring patterns of 
social interdependence and every aspect of our personal 
life. It is forcing us to reconsider and re-evaluate practi-
cally every thought, every action, and every institution 
formerly taken for granted. Everything is changing: 
you, your family, your education, your neighborhood, 
your job, your government, your relation to “the 
others.” And they're changing dramatically.   21
McLuhan goes on to say, “Until writing was invented, man lived in acoustic space: 
boundless, directionless, horizonless, in the dark of the mind, in the world of emo-
tion…”   Thus, in this new virtual space, people have the capabilities to use the po22 -
tentialities of the virtual medium in a new direction, and to reclaim newly envisioned 
aspects of the vastness of that prior acoustic space. People now see horizons in the 
virtual that are not yet there in the physical. The ability to view potentials offers a 
new form of vision to the player. 
 Contemplating the aesthetic nature of art, it is seen that there are certain quali-
ties that art may hold aside from the notions of beauty and truth. In the same manner 
that Clive Bell envisions art as being that which encapsulates aesthetic emotion, 
gameplay can be understood similarly in various means within virtual scenarios. Bell 
observes that much of aesthetic work is not perceived in mainstream society. Thus, it 
can be seen that time in the virtual offers new interpretations of aesthetic forms of 
beauty and truth to more people that would not have had access to works that promote 
aesthetic emotion as easily.   
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 Essential to this argument lies the potential for virtual games to engage, in-
form, and make one think about crucial issues in one’s life and physical reality. This 
new perceptibility within the virtual has the ability to promote aesthetic emotion that 
does not necessarily need to have a purpose, as it leads one to access her thoughts. 
There is a metaphysical sensibility that hovers within the activity of gameplay vis-à-
vis the virtual. This spiritual insight clearly has the power to transcend the physical. 
Perhaps playing in the virtual can act as a passage into the noumenal world––as the 
experience encapsulates the ability to create the authentic self without all senses being 
used.   It is interesting to consider that the concept of the virtual may have even been 23
predicted centuries before the digital era. Kant relays that people could not see in a 
noumenal sense, yet perhaps the new experience within the virtual can be understood 
as a portal into understanding another way of being.   The noumena can be seen as 24
intuitive, and the more virtual play is experienced with greater frequency––the more 
intuitive a person might become. Intriguing to the world of virtual play, Kant states in 
a letter to his friend in the eighteenth century: 
 The mind, though not constantly on the stretch, must 
still, alike in its idle and in its favourable moments, lie 
uninterruptedly open to any chance suggestion which 
may present itself. Relaxations and diversions must 
maintain its powers in freedom and mobility, so that it 
may be enabled to view the object afresh from every 
side, and so to enlarge its point of view from a micro- 
scopic to a universal outlook that it adopts in turn every 
conceivable standpoint, verifying the observations of 
each by means of all the others.   25
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 Gameplay, thus, can be observed as an entertaining pastime only, though I ar-
gue that these entries into the virtual are a new component to the discovery of an un-
restricted sense of self. The virtual can be seen as a new way to come to higher 
awarenesses. 
Misrecognition 
 A renewed formation of self can occur through various measures within the 
virtual game––and it begins with misrecognition. Misrecognition occurs when the 
player retreats from her conscious and conditioned state of being and enters into an 
entirely new way of being. In order to understand misrecognition as that which bene-
fits the creation of one’s identity, Jacques Lacan’s theory of the mirror phase is con-
sidered and fits nicely within the virtual space.   Looking in the mirror, the individual 26
sees herself as an ideal “I,” an image of a constant unattainable perfection. Lacan 
states that we are always searching for this self that we can never reach, as it is, in a 
sense, only a replication of who we are. Lacan sees that this ongoing search causes a 
fragmented identity, which occurs before language and creates the ego. 
 Initially, what lures the player to enter the game experience is a yearning for 
recognition from the Other on the opposite side of the screen––the technological 
counterpart. Once involved in the virtual, the player, then utilizes new ways of think-
ing and being, which work to an advantage authentically––and the yearning for 
recognition becomes more fulfilled. The self-formation process is one of becoming, 
rather than being––and the experience in the new digital reflection offers an opportu-
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nity to become more. The actualization of who one wants to be is now attainable 
through the virtual. 
Alienation 
 Through the exploration of the virtual, many avenues are found where a per-
son can utilize the technology to any degree that she wants. Interestingly, there is still 
a space of societal disdain towards the technology of the game in the virtual. Thus, in 
order to see the beneficial aspects within the virtual, we come to the second aspect 
that helps to achieve a more authentic sense of identity––alienation. While alienation 
may not be commonly seen as beneficial to the individual, I claim that the experience 
of alienation––coupled with the sense of anonymity––can help the player to step back 
from outside reality for a time in order to step inward to the real self. When the player 
is anonymous, she is, in a sense, free. When playing the virtual game, the mode of 
anonymity allows the player to be whoever she wants to be. The player continues to 
hold a desire for recognition, which continues to circulate the need as a life drive or 
pleasure principle. These modes of alienation and anonymity are always available 
within the virtual game. 
 Karl Marx speaks of the alienation that is found commonly in a worker who 
does not live for herself, but rather for the commoditized object she creates in her 
work: 
 [H]e does not fulfill himself in his work but denies him-
self, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does 
not develop freely his mental and physical energies but 
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is physically exhausted and mentally debased. The 
worker, therefore, feels himself at home only during his 
leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless. His 
work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labour. It is 
not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for sat-
isfying other needs.    27
The concept of alienation can be changed into a positive response, where the player 
feels at home in a temporary alternate space in order to discover her real self. The ex-
perience within the virtual game not only provides an individual the entry-point into a 
space of fantasy, but it enables a person to see her freedom more clearly. To find the 
sense of freedom, the person may need to step back and momentarily distance herself 
in a state of alienation to better connect with her autonomous self. Alienation can also 
be referred to as separation or indifference, which allows for the self to observe more 
succinctly. In a juxtaposing manner, then, the alienating space can be turned around 
into a meditative experience.  
 While many thinkers and philosophers have stated so, Jacques Rancière 
claims that all humans are equal and should be treated as such. Rancière indicates the 
need for a dissensual rising against the state of conformity and fear. Rancière states, 
“The management of insecurity is the most appropriate mode of functioning of our 
consensual states/societies.”   Any person who desires to, can indeed become a con28 -
scious creator of her life. With the power of a dissensual population, life can become 
a creative journey. Dissensual is seen as the opposite to consensual. A consensual 
population will not create change or evolve into greater potential. A consensual peo-
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ple will create a balance of the same.  According to Rancière, to live past the authority 
or group consensus of democracy, the people can rise above and take over the “auto-
matic consensus, which is to say the harmonizing of the daily negotiation of pleasures 
with the collective brokerage of power and its re-distribution.”   In a similar vein, I 29
propose a paradigmatic shift whose aim is to correct a perceptual imbalance which 
regards most virtual games as mindless and pointless. For the elimination of the virtu-
al or the game in the virtual would not significantly change the course of life in any 
positive sense, as that would be a non-evolving state of being. Rancière further states: 
“An art is emancipated and emancipating when it renounces the authority of the im-
posed message, the target audience, and the univocal mode of explicating the world, 
when, in other words, it stops wanting to emancipate us.”   Thus, while the world of 30
the virtual is open to anyone, it does not shout that it is built for freedom, but rather, it 
is if used for that purpose. 
Purposelessness 
 The third and last primary component I claim that aids the player in the virtual 
is the concept of purposelessness. Purposelessness within the virtual gives one a sense 
of the timeless, which is, after all, an attribute that one often looks for in art. In Chap-
ter Five of the dissertation, I will differentiate between Eastern and Western purpose-
lessness in reference to the concept of meditative interactivity. However, to introduce 
purposelessness in reference to the virtual here, we begin with concepts of Eastern 
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thought. With this, purposelessness can further be linked to play, and it is held with 
deep thought and care. 
  
 Leela, the term used in Hinduism, means playfulness, and that is what is said 
to be important to the wise––the sense that life is a celebration and should be treated 
as such. While virtual play may not initially seem to be a path towards becoming 
above or beyond enlightened, the concept of play can certainly bring one to higher 
insight––which is a crucial point to the world of the virtual. Thus, the potential that 
the virtual game holds––offering new ways of looking, observing, and becoming––is 
not yet understood in this way, as the name “game” brings up various Western refer-
ences that are not commonly linked with the development of the self. 
Examples of Purposelessness in Virtual Games 
 In examining purposelessness, it is important to consider Kant’s notion of 
purposefulness without purpose. Kant speaks of art that is created consciously, though 
it is to look as if it was created with no effort. This indifferent state to creating on 
purpose is compelling to consider in relation to the virtual, as the technology has in-
deed been created by the designers, though the mechanisms, controls, and ease of use 
is created to be user-friendly and intuitive. Kant states, “It must have the look of na-
ture even though we are conscious of it as art.”   The concept of purposelessness re31 -
lates to Kant’s “purposefulness without purpose” concept from the Third Critique as 
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the human experience that gives the individual the ability to expand her conscious 
mind. The involvement of creating freely without specific objectives leads to an open-
ing of awarenesses, through an experience of free play. Thus, there becomes an open-
ing of perceptive and imaginative qualities, though the clarity does not begin with a 
specified purpose.   32
 The following three examples reveal purposelessness experienced in the virtu-
al realm. In these examples, it can be seen that the pleasure in discovering more about 
the self and the Other becomes more important than any object-directed incentives. 
The user-generated, community-driven virtual platform developed in 2003, Second 
Life, allows the player to become immersed in a new “world” that is outside and free 
from circumstances or limits in the physical world.   While the game is not as popular 33
as it was when it was first developed, a count of active users per month was recently 
reported to be one million.   Virtual communities without objectives such as Second 34
Life display that there is promise for individuals to experience new ways of creating 
identity. A pertinent question could be, what is this desire to create a second life?  
 The player’s avatar can be chosen from scratch, and she can become whomev-
er she wants. The player’s identity is not consciously perceived––she is anonymous. 
Clearly, when one is anonymous, one has no externally known identity. Here, in the 
virtual space, the non-identity is what gives the player a neutral tool to use to her ad-
vantage. Further, when one is anonymous, she needs no measure for being authentic, 
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true, or ethical. This opportunity will put forth a sense of relief, without concern for 
judgment.   If an individual is non-identifiable in the virtual, she can create the aes35 -
thetic semblance of who she thoughtfully wants to be. Not only does the purposeless-
ness of the experience lead to a greater sense of the real when away from the plat-
form, but the game of role-playing also becomes a framework to test boundaries safe-
ly without actual societal risk. Thus, there is a more pungent sense of the real because 
the individual is not tied to the conditioned “self.” This virtual play represents a new 
philosophical outlet for the conscious creation of identity. 
 In addition, while the game Braid is a puzzle-platform game that can be seen 
as holding a purpose, it may be more accurately seen as that which finds personal 
purpose through non-objectified purposelessness.   Braid’s website describes the 36
game as: 
 A platform game in a painterly style where you manipu-
late the flow of time to solve puzzles. Braid treats your 
time and attention as precious. Braid does everything it 
can to give you a mind-expanding experience. Journey 
into worlds where time behaves strangely; observe, 
learn from, and then master these worlds.    37
Braid takes one on an unending path, offering a new way of feeling and viewing soci-
etally structured thoughts of ending, retiring, leaving, and exiting. In the virtual, there 
are no boundaries of language or stereotypes––and this leads to non-anxious states. 
Thus, while one may begin the game with a sense of anxiety, the state is withdrawn 
while playing. For Heidegger, anxiety is necessary in order to achieve a renewed state 
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of the self, as it passes through the acknowledgement of nothing.   The virtual game, 38
then, first approaches the state of angst, and then enters into a non-optimized state, or 
as Heidegger says, indifferent state. Hubert Dreyfus discusses Heidegger’s warning of 
practices that are built upon too much efficiency and optimization. Here, he states that 
Heidegger calls for a more relaxed or insignificant mode of reality, which it seems 
would be built more upon a relaxed authenticity: 
 …we must learn to appreciate marginal practices––
what Heidegger calls the saving power of insignificant 
things––practices such as friendship, back-packing into 
the wilderness, and drinking the local wine with friends. 
All these practices are marginal precisely because they 
are not efficient. (They can, of course, be engaged in for 
the sake of health and greater efficiency). This expand-
ing of technological efficiency is the greatest danger. 
But these saving practices could come together in a new 
cultural paradigm that held up to us a new way of doing 
things, thereby focusing a world in which formerly 
marginal practices were central and efficiency marginal. 
Such a new object or event that grounded a new under-
standing of reality Heidegger would call a new god. 
This is why he holds that “only another god can save 
us.”   39
 
  Thus, it is applicable to consider the notion that better optimization is not nec-
essarily what we should be striving for in life––but rather an almost non-efficient ex-
perience would cause one to appreciate her life more. When considering play with 
purposelessness, then, it becomes clear that the virtual can serve as an authentic space 
for “naturally forming” experiences and communities. For, if we are headed towards a 
fervent state of progress without any promise for humanity, one might question, why 
work towards states of optimization? The 2011 film, Surviving Progress, touches 
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upon similar ideas, as it states that the drive for more progress will ultimately cause a 
choke hold on humanity.   Thus, the need is present to understand technology and use 40
it for greater connection to the self and the Other, rather than a certain 
“optimization”––as technology can assist the next step into a state of destruction or 
evolution. 
  With further consideration of a sense of purposelessness or journey towards 
no destination in particular, we access the state of meditative interactivity. A meander-
ing journey to nowhere in a Metaverse, which is not fast-paced nor multi-tasked, and 
brings the player into a state of calm. This form of being can then translate into physi-
cal reality when not playing. In the virtual, it is clear that there is no destination. The 
progress that is created is indeed real, though it is held in a virtual setting––it be-
comes about the now and it remains limitless. The experience of the virtual clearly 
sits within the boundaries of one’s own consciousness. The state of purposelessness, 
then, becomes an entry-point into slowing down from a fast-paced society. That is, 
there is value, but the value is not in the end––the value is intrinsic. When one does 
not need a purpose, one may simply celebrate her being and path on the way to be-
coming. By way of Eastern thought, Osho (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh), twentieth-cen-
tury Eastern philosopher, explains the beauty of purposelessness:  
 It is very difficult, particularly for the Western mind, to 
understand that life is purposeless. And it is beautiful 
that it is purposeless. If it is purposeful then the whole 
thing becomes absurd––then who will decide the pur-
pose? Then some God has to be conceived who decides 
the purpose, and then human beings become just pup-
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pets; then no freedom is possible. And if there is some 
purpose then life becomes businesslike, it cannot be 
ecstatic. The West has been thinking in terms of pur-
pose, but the East has been thinking in terms of pur-
poselessness. The East says life is not a business, it is a 
play. And a play has no purpose really, it is nonpurpose-
ful. Or you can say play is its own purpose, to play is 
enough. Life is not reaching towards some goal, life 
itself is the goal. It is not evolving towards some ulti-
mate; this very moment, here and now, life is ultimate.    41
 Thus, it can be seen that the re-thinking of purpose––and questioning the role 
of optimum efficiency in society––can function as important parts to the equation of 
discovering the inner self more authentically. There are many virtual games that offer 
this purposeless and ongoing experience where the player does have the chance to 
obtain greater emotion, and thus raise her self-consciousness to a purer level. As an 
example, the interactive fictional narrative video game, To the Moon, incorporates 
elements of the virtual and dramatic fiction. The player is taken on a journey with 
characters, shapes, stories, and a narrative, which leads to a tragic, yet cathartic end-
ing. Players have been so affected by the game that, after playing, they could not lis-
ten to the game soundtrack without feeling deeply emotional. This interrelationship 
offers evidence of the empathetic associations the virtual offers to the player’s experi-
ence. Further, as in the opening quote to this chapter, the understanding is that the vir-
tual game indeed offers new forms of self-reflection for the player. 
 Further, the virtual game can be seen from a philosophical standpoint as a 
moving image that the player can control. The game and its usability give power and 
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recognition to the player. A person can be who or what she wants to be now––even if 
it is in the mind via the virtual space. Making interactions with virtual characters 
causes one to forget her given and conditioned social roles. Certain games take the 
viewer on a journey where she is the character working with others to make assertive 
choices, which leads her to have emotional reactions towards the place and time of 
the game itself. This virtual experience does not deplete life’s tangibility. Rather, it 
can give one’s life new meaning, and imbue a stronger sense of self––a new impres-
sion of reality. It can even be observed that the clear channel to higher enlightenment 
via the virtual has been hoped for and predicted by philosophers throughout the histo-
ry of written philosophy. The virtual has become a passage that one can enter through 
the mind, and the ability to control one’s self becomes evident. The sensibility dis-
covered could be the reality that Friedrich Nietzsche hoped for humankind.  
 Nietzsche sees the world as complacent and conforming, where citizens rarely 
live to their fullest potential. He sees that humanity as a whole conduct their lives in a 
centuries-old predetermined fear-based mentality, which keeps them from becoming 
designers of their lives. Here, within the virtual game, a window has opened where 
the potential for authentic freedom of self can perpetuate. Further, the virtual game 
being situated within an aesthetic world indeed encompasses forms of art that cannot 
be denied. Aesthetic modes of representation offer the player new sensibilities when 
playing. These sensibilities are indeed visually, audibly, and mentally aesthetic, as the 
virtual is not purely words, numbers, and symbols. In addition, visual beauty can be 
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found in the virtual––even in the images of horror or terror. Awe-inspiring visual por-
trayals have the ability to affect the player in a wondrous way. Kant states that feel-
ings such as delight and pleasure can only come from the aesthetic experience, and it 
creates goodness in the world that continues to allow people to open their minds to 
new ideas.   Kant discusses the aesthetic worth of poetry, and we can look at his 42
words as a harmonious metaphor to virtual play: 
 Poetry (which owes its origins almost entirely to genius 
and is least willing to be led by precepts of example) 
holds the first rank among all the arts. It expands the 
mind by giving freedom to the imagination and by of-
fering, from among the boundless multiplicity of possi-
ble forms accordant with a given concept, to whose 
bounds it is restricted, that one which couples with the 
presentation of the concept a wealth of thought to 
which no verbal expression is completely adequate, and 
by thus rising aesthetically to ideas.   43
Thus, in the following chapters, these concepts will be exemplified and expounded 
upon, leaving room open to understand the evolution of the creation of the self. 
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Chapter Two 
Foundational Dynamics of the Virtual 
     The goal to be reached is the mind’s insight into what knowing is. Im-
patience asks for the impossible, wants to reach the goal without the 
means of getting there. The length of the journey has to be borne with, 
for every moment is necessary; and again we must halt at every stage, 
for each is itself a complete individual form, and is fully and finally 
considered only so far as its determinate character is taken and dealt 
with as a rounded and concrete whole, or only so far as the whole is 
looked at in the light of the special and peculiar character which this 
determination gives it. 
 ––G. W. F. Hegel 
 The Phenomenology of Mind 
Lacan’s Mirror As Virtual Screen 
 In the following chapter, I will examine the components that comprise the vir-
tual game as a form that allows for subject formation. To begin, I examine the concept 
of misrecognition as one of three essential components towards finding authenticity 
through the virtual. In considering misrecognition, Jacques Lacan explains that the 
mirror stage is a developmental period when the infant recognizes herself in the mir-
ror as a whole being rather than the previous loose experiential sense of boundaries 
between baby and mother. Prior to viewing the self in the mirror, the child did not 
know or understand the difference between self and other. Once the child sees herself 
in the mirror, she observes the “I.” In the current digital age, we can view the screen 
similarly to the mirror. 
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 The vision in the mirror, or more contemporarily––the screen––gives one the 
image and idea of the reflected “I” or the ideal self. The mirror stage, Lacan says, is a 
formative period of identification for the individual, and the unending process of con-
necting with the outer self––compared to the inner or spiritual self.   Lacan, being 44
highly devoted to Freud, states the revelation in the mirror creates an identity that is 
alienating––or it gives the individual the idea that her self is more unique than other 
people. Here, Lacan says the individual now becomes in search of an objectified 
“thing,” rather than “who” she is being. In the mirror, the individual sees her self as a 
form and does not recognize her inner self when she looks at her reflection. When she 
sees that she is not living up to her quality as an object, she then becomes anxious. 
With these concepts, we begin to understand individual subjectivity. Lacan states: 
 But the important point is that this form situates the in-
stance of the ego, before its social determination, in a 
fictional direction, which will always remain ir-
reducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will 
only rejoin the development of the subject asymptoti-
cally, whatever the success of the dialectical syntheses 
by which he must resolve as I his discordance with his 
own reality.   45
The forming of the outer self, then, is the birth and the development of the ego. How-
ever, Lacan states that the mirror stage does diminish and the self needs to interact 
with others. He says that this transition can become difficult for some who grow close 
to searching for their ideal “I” in the reflection. These concepts also bring up the topic 
of narcissism, which will be further addressed in Chapter Seven. Lacan asserts that 
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the process of understanding the difference between the ideal and the real creates a 
misrecognition (méconnaissance) of the “I.”   The misrecognition experienced in the 46
mirror stage causes the individual to become an Other to herself at the very moment 
of the emergence of the reflected being in the mirror. Lacan maintains that for the rest 
of the individual's life, every form of identity that she tries or person she meets will 
be a misrecognition of this initial, inadequate experience.   Lacan says further: 47
 Just as the infant is now dependent on the mirror––the 
current other––to identify himself in the image, he will 
later be dependent on language as the other to identify 
himself in “the dialectic that will henceforth link 
the I to socially elaborated situations.”   48
The screen now offers the individual innumerable worlds to enter. The person may or 
may not see her reflection each time she looks into the screen, though, now, she is 
being shown that more is reachable when looking in. Thus, Lacan’s theory of the mir-
ror stage as the starting point of falsely believing the self is an enigmatic “thing” to 
behold and search for is in favor of the open-ended notion of the virtual. For Lacan, 
the virtual could indeed function as an opening-up to the understanding that the self is 
more than the “object” the individual first notices as its reflection. While the mirror 
image is a starting point for reflecting, I claim that the new reflection in the screen 
becomes an origin for understanding. 
Truth in the Digital Mirror 
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 When looking into the screen, the image reflected magnifies what the player 
could conceivably imagine. The reflection in the screen is not always a mirror image, 
but can be any fantastical image or scene the player desires. The reflection can be 
filled in a unique way due to the virtual gameplay experience. Looking into the mirror 
(screen) can be noted as a positive stage that offers a free space of independence. To-
day, when an individual looks into the screen, she not only sees herself reflected, but 
she can view a brand new world of fantasy figures, characters, dreams, visions, and 
possibilities. 
 The concept of the mirror is quite paramount when considering the formation 
of identity. Japanese mythology refer to The Three Imperial Regalia (sanshu no jingi) 
otherwise known as The Three Sacred Treasures of Japan. In these stories of legend, 
the three main life powers are discussed. Reverence was given to the power of the 
sword, jewel, and mirror.   The origin of the myths is not accurately known, though it 49
is clear that the stories were told in the Middle Yayoi period circa 250 B.C.   The 50
three of these powers can be seen closely relating to many forms in gaming, though 
the screen can be revealed closely with this notion of the mirror. The mirror was 
thought to be the most important power of the three. Thus, it can be seen that the mir-
ror is not a type of shield or barricade from truth. It can be, instead, a passage into 
new worlds and frames of mind. The power of the mirror has the ability to focus and 
refocus to an infinite degree. In the stories, the Japanese saw the mirror as that which 
offers true self-knowledge. Fourteenth Century Japanese writer, Kitabatake Chikafusa 
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states, “The mirror reflects from its bright surface every object as it really is, irrespec-
tive of goodness or badness, beauty or the reverse. This is the very nature of the Mir-
ror which faithfully symbolizes truthfulness.”   51
 Perhaps the most critical part to consider in reference to the mirror and mis-
recognition is the power to view the self from a different vantage point. While at-
tempting to discover the ideal self in the screen, the viewer can obtain a new sense of 
recognition. While, at times, a player can see her self in the screen due to a camera 
loaded on the game device or console––the screen does, in fact, function as a mirror. 
This type of digital mirror, then, can be seen as the most potent power, as it there that 
she discovers truth and wisdom. In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses self-
consciousness reflected in the chapter entitled, The Truth of Self-Certainty: 
 With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore en-
tered the native realm of truth. We have now to see how 
the shape of self-consciousness first makes its appear-
ance. If we consider this new shape of knowing, the 
knowing of itself, in relation to that which preceded, 
viz. the knowing of an other, then we see that though 
this other has indeed vanished, its moments have at the 
same time no less been preserved, and the loss consists 
in this, that here they are present as they are in them-
selves. The [mere] being of what is merely ‘meant,’ the 
singleness and the universality opposed to it of percep-
tion, as also the empty inner being of the Understand-
ing, these are no longer essences, but are moments of 
self-consciousness, i.e. abstractions or distinctions 
which at the same time have no reality for conscious-
ness itself, and are purely vanishing essences. Thus it 
seems that only the principal moment itself has been 
lost, viz. the simple self-subsistent existence for con-
sciousness. But in point of fact self-consciousness is the 
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reflection out of the being of the world of sense and 
perception, and is essentially the return from 
otherness.   52
A person may live in unconscious fear if she does not reflect into the mirror often 
enough and connect with her inner wisdom. Here, we might understand that virtual 
play is a dynamic source of power for the individual, and the act is a revolutionary 
view into Lacan’s mirror theory. Here, the mirror is a form of power that offers one 
the chance to become. For, the greatest fear most people have is the loss of recogni-
tion from the Other. Loss of recognition causes one to stop looking in the mirror at 
who she is, who she is becoming, and internalizing her inner self. This meditative 
process of looking in the mirror is very similar to automatic writing. When one writes 
or draws automatically, new creative thoughts may open up in the mind, and the 
process of identification of the ultimate ideal self takes place. 
 Thus, creativity emerges by looking in the mirror, writing, journaling, creat-
ing, playing, interacting––as the window of the soul is opened and the authentic is 
found. It is when a person does not stop to truly look deeply into the mirror or self 
that conformity takes place. Thus, updating the mirror to the screen opens up new 
worlds of self-knowledge, and it is due to taking time to play meditatively and rumi-
nate. The entry point to higher states of awareness, however, begins first with the mis-
recognition of the ideal self. 
Illusion and Misrecognition 
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 Delving further, we look into early tracings of the term, misrecognition, with 
reference to Hegel. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Philosophie der 
Geschichte), Hegel first discusses the concept of private property––and its many con-
tradictions.   He states that possessions are universal and certain individuals turn ob53 -
jects into their own possessions. If a person, then, possesses an object, this means that 
the other cannot possess it, and vice versa. For Hegel, if all people are possessing ob-
jects, then, no one is really possesses anything. Hegel says that in order for all to have 
secure property, that all possessions should be universal.   He says that the primal 54
concept of property is not understood by the societal masses––however, private pos-
session is largely understood by all. Thus, all people who own property own it in their 
minds––as the concept is not a natural way of living. This way of believing in private 
possessions is the first part of the equation in alienating oneself from properties that 
are universal.   55
 The distorted belief in private possession, then, is a first step toward an indica-
tion of misrecognition. With this, each individual lives in their own realm of private-
ness and excludes the whole of the community to a certain extent. What is interesting 
is that people believe they are the universal and, without knowing it, live in a form of 
alienation––in a self-imposed construction of personal influence. Hegel––and later 
Marx––states that this circling of thought keeps the bourgeoisie in a sensibility where 
they believe they are in complete power and have full ownership of their possessions. 
Interesting to the studies at hand, Hegel sees this mentality similarly to one possess-
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ing a limited identity.   Hegel attempts to use the drawbacks of society and then dis56 -
closes the perceptions of isolation as a strength. As it has been said, Hegel believes 
that absolute knowledge requires two subjects of self-consciousness to recognize the 
other. An influence for Hegel was German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte and his 
theories of self-consciousness that allow freedom for the individual. Akin to the virtu-
al game, Fichte posits that people become more self-aware while they are challenged 
by another person. If one realizes that the other's actions were intended, she can then 
grasp her own actions as also being intentional.   Hegel discusses this similar theme 57
in Phenomenology of Spirit where he mentions this encounter of awareness that ends 
in a struggle of life and death.   Here, he lays out the metaphor within the chapter 58
heading, “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and 
Bondage” as follows, “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the 
fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”   59
 The master and slave metaphor discusses how people gain self-consciousness 
as autonomous subjects through the interaction with other autonomous subjects. The 
struggle against the Other, though, cannot reach a real form of recognition, as the 
truth of one’s self as a self-conscious being is only said to occur if both the master 
and the slave remain alive. Each person holds a recognition of the other and gives a 
reason for the other to live. Hegel states: 
 In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is 
as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. In immedi-
ate self-consciousness the simple ‘I’ is absolute media-
tion, and has as its essential moment lasting indepen-
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dence. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result 
of the first experience; through this there is posited a 
pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is 
not purely for itself but for another, i.e. is a merely im-
mediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of 
thinghood. Both moments are essential. Since to begin 
with they are unequal and opposed, and their reflection 
into a unity has not yet been achieved, they exist as two 
opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the indepen-
dent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for 
itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose 
essential nature is simply to live or to be for another. 
The former is lord, the other is bondsman.   60
Hence, recognition that is a mutual connection between two people can only be 
achieved through a true collective recognition. Recognition, then, depends upon ob-
servation from others. The sense of alienation felt when one is not given adequate 
feedback can be more difficult for one to understand her self and her own identity. 
Thus, recognition can be seen as a basic life need. Misrecognition might disrupt iden-
tity and self-understanding initially––due to the struggle for recognition––though it is 
a necessary experience for one to move towards a deeper understanding of her core 
being. Misrecognition should appear and last briefly––not long––as the process al-
lows one to step outside of the complacent idea of the self. For, a permanent dwelling 
in false belief hinders any positive form of self-consciousness or growth. I argue that 
the virtual opens up and silently utilizes this misrecognition to propel the individual 
to move forward to become further recognized––to proceed even above the recogni-
tion. As the slave produces works for the master, she becomes creator. While the slave 
creates more and the work becomes better and better due to her ingenious and authen-
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tic creativity, she starts to see herself reflected in what she creates––and she then real-
izes her worth. Due to this awareness, the slave has the ability to see that she was in-
deed creating her life all along. The awakening that she experiences can give her a 
very raw sensibility as the slave becomes quite cognizant of her reality at that mo-
ment. Born from this realization, the slave is no longer alienated from the work she 
was performing, and she now grows onward to a higher plane of self-understanding. 
The self-revealing process would not be possible without first dealing with misrecog-
nition. Thus, this way of behaving is a negation of a negation. While it is true that the 
master then becomes reliant on the slave, it can be said that the master must move to 
the slave level in order to become the ultimate creator, or the master will cease to ex-
ist as master. This interaction can be seen as a function of genuine self-reflection 
where the subject considers the notion that she has been held captive prior to her new 
understanding. Interestingly, Ralph Waldo Emerson, in turn, echoes these principles 
and states, “Our chief want in life is somebody who will make us do what we can.”  61
To tie together Hegel’s concept of the lord and bondsman dialectic with the virtual 
space, it can be seen that the player needs an Other to offer recognition to her. In es-
sence, these forms of virtual cognition can be used as a tool for self-awareness. 
Infinite Beauty Found in the Virtual  
 Hegel further argues that the end of art as it has been known is unavoidable––
and states that where beauty begins is not cognitively known. This idea is very inter-
esting as humanity may never understand that pure beauty exists if not exposed to the 
!37
concept or potential visualization of infinite beauty. Viewing aesthetically ideal im-
agery in the virtual offers unique visual experiences for the player. The game be-
comes a psychical place of the player’s own, with virtual characters around 
her––“real” on the other side or not. Becoming aware and expanding engagement 
with one's surroundings is the first step in learning to recognize that the world is full 
of natural beauty. Through the understanding of natural beauty at a higher level of 
comprehension, a more extreme level of aesthetic awareness can be mentally pro-
cessed. Hegel states that the artistic side of aesthetics has a true manner of speaking to 
the spirit.   Hegel says: 62
 The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit and born 
again, and the higher the spirit and its productions stand 
above nature and its phenomena, the higher too is the 
beauty of art above that of nature.    63
Thus, Hegel says that the object of art becomes even more beautiful than nature itself 
when the work is created out of spirit. We can then see play in the virtual as a form of 
post-art that leads one to a higher awareness of beauty. Hegel further claims that na-
ture will show the way to a blind person as the individual becomes ready to accept 
what nature has to offer.   Through contemplating the beauty of nature through forms 64
of art––virtual or physical––humanity can then intuitively comprehend structure be-
hind the creation. Coupled with imagination, the experience within the virtual game 
can offer an acumen that gives greater meaning to the player. 
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 Hegel states that the human soul has the freedom to wonder and make deci-
sions for itself––it is naturally free.   Since the human understanding of the soul re65 -
quires deep thought, the personification of the soul occurs as a freedom of thought 
that provides a profound communion with spirit. When the public do not have the 
freedom to decide and contemplate the beautiful due to societal conditioning, they 
then become oblivious to all of the possibilities and thus a loss of the truth of beauty 
does occur. Thus, if the ability to understand beauty is eradicated, the aesthetic truth is 
lost. However, when confronted with forms of beauty, specifically in the experience 
of virtual play, the soul will be able to become one with the human and growth will 
resume.    66
 Play in the virtual can be seen as a release from reality into a fantasy, which, 
in turn, offers the ability to stand in front of physical reality more clearly. When the 
virtual game is brought up in conversation, the concepts of illusion and fantasy are 
often discussed. The tenet of fantasy, however, can be deduced into and seen as a 
mindful world of becoming. Kant asserts that there is only one world, even though 
many believe in illusory notions.   The one world can be seen within the digital realm 67
while sitting in the space as a new form of art and philosophy. In his book, Kant, Karl 
Jaspers asserts in Kantian terms, “The world of space and time is not reality as such, 
but neither is it illusion; space and time are the conditions of the objective reality of 
all our sense experience, given in intuition.”   A conundrum can be used that Kant 68
discerns in reference to the enigmatic vessel that gaming has become: 
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  The thing that I know is not myself; what is it then? I 
am not unless I have objects, sensory data, before me; 
what indeed am I without them? I have no outside van-
tage point from which to compare the subject and ob-
ject of  thought. All I can compare is objects and a sub-
jectivity turned object.   69
Virtual play, then, gives the individual a new vantage point to reflect and compare. 
The virtual offers a quest into new sensations of time within the experience. Kant’s 
pondering on subject and object, then, can be viewed more clearly through the 
virtual.   Kant states, “Before true philosophy can arise, it is necessary that the old 70
philosophy destroy itself.”   In order to create, the past must be released. In order to 71
form new philosophies through the virtual, it is important to deconstruct past philoso-
phies to begin anew.  By using the lens of the virtual, new perspectives are available. 
The virtual world is, thus, an advanced experience for higher understanding. 
 If an individual comes to believe the idea that humans are not, in fact, their 
bodies, names, persona, identity, ego––then the potential of the virtual grows larger. If 
a human understands herself to be connected as a spiritual being (Geist), the full 
enormity of the virtual will appear to be seen as an advanced experience that has been 
disclosed to people for some time. Play in the virtual sparks childlike curiosity and 
offers a human another chance. Another life. “How many lives do you have left?” A 
common gaming question. Virtual play such as the video game opens up these possi-
bilities in the mind––which is how higher awareness manifests. The virtual, thus, be-
comes a trap-door to an improved awareness which leads to a new becoming.  
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Taoism  
 Concepts such as the Hegelian and Marxian notions of the negation of the 
negation can be found and examined in Taoism, the Chinese life philosophy.   The 72
tao––meaning, the way––is a form of living that is based upon creating and sustaining 
all that is in the universe. Within the Taoist philosophy, there are no rules––there are 
simply paths to becoming. The two main texts of Taoism––the Chuang Tzu and the 
Tao Te Ching––examine and explain universal concepts. One Taoist concept is based 
on a way of doing by not doing, which can be translated as the term, wu-wei.   The 73
concept can be seen as a negation of a negation. The doing by not doing or action 
through non-action is made clear within virtual play in various ways. Within non-ac-
tion, the player is putting herself aside. She is quieting the mind and playing. Non-
action leaves no physical trace behind. Within the game, the player has the ability to 
distance her emotions and silence her ego. The principles of Taoism encompass con-
cepts of surrender, harmony, simplicity, grounding, integrity, sagehood, transforma-
tion, immortality, and spontaneity. These life approaches co-align with ideas behind 
the content and experience of virtual play. The philosophy of Taoism is intended to be 
sacred and not expressed in words, which runs concurrently with much of virtual 
games that do not necessitate language. While there were periods in history that Tao-
ism was believed to go too far––seen as a mystical religion––the essence of the ori-
gins of the philosophy of life via Taoism is quite vital to understand in relation to the 
ephemeral transcendent quality the Taoist philosophy can convey.   When one is not 74
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connected to her physicality that represents her personality, body, or name––she can 
move forward to understand her authentic self. It is stated in Tao Te Ching, “To rec-
ognize your insignificance is enlightenment.”   Viewing Taoism in reference to the 75
creation of the self, twentieth century Taoist, Wei Wu Wei, states, “Why are you un-
happy? Because 99.9 percent of what you think, and everything you do, is for your 
self, and there isn’t one.”   Considering identity through the lens of Taoism, it is dis76 -
closed that there is not even a “self” as it is commonly known––thus, it becomes clear 
that one can create the self how she desires, as it is not fixed. 
Discovering Autonomy Through Self-Creation 
 Overturning the ego can be considered similarly through Friedrich Nietzsche. 
He stresses that every human is a creator and it is a moral right to design one’s life 
and surpass limiting ideas passed down from past generations. While Nietzsche be-
lieves that generational values––which include morality and the concept of God––
should be rescinded, it can also be seen as simply that the common concept of identity 
needs to be re-examined. Nietzsche believes that the biggest error of humankind is the 
belief in two worlds.   He contemplates the realization that if an individual lives in 77
only one world, all questioning would shift and the basic ideas of life itself would 
need to be reconstructed. Thus, Nietzsche believes that the basic concept of “man” 
needs a completely new definition. He claims the contemporary human can become 
the Superhuman (overhuman or Übermensch), and it would be imperative to discuss 
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the new being in the one world, not of a heavenly world after this earthly 
experience.   With reference to the concept of the “superhuman” Nietzsche states: 78
 There it was too that I picked up the word ‘Superman’ 
and that man is something that must be overcome, that 
man is a bridge and not a goal; counting himself happy 
for his noontides and evenings, as a way to new 
dawns. ... Truly, I showed them new stars, together with 
new nights––and over cloud and day and night I spread 
out laughter like a coloured canopy. I taught them all 
my art and aims: to compose into one and bring togeth-
er what is fragment and riddle and dreadful chance in 
man––as poet, reader of riddles, and redeemer of 
chance, I taught them to create the future, and to re-
deem by creating––all that was past.   79
The search for the actual human who relishes in the here and now has inspired the 
works of philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre who claim that each person should 
understand their own meaning for their life on earth. These concepts apply to virtual 
play quite clearly, as the experience sends the player into the mode for the search of 
self-knowledge. While the player may not be consciously aware that the discovery of 
identity is occurring, the experience of the game offers many times over the chance to 
nurture and release the free spirit that Nietzsche believed was possible. By learning 
how to hold on to an understanding as to one’s reason for existence, the process be-
comes an experience in learning to love oneself. Re-learning and action freely trans-
form the individual, according to Nietzsche.   These variables are found throughout 80
the journey via the virtual. 
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 The process of virtual play offers a person the opportunity to transform her 
life experience if she is aware and receptive. The various sections, spaces, lives, and 
challenges one might discover through the virtual offer valid, yet not always transpar-
ent, paths to arrive at spiritual development. These modes in the virtual assist the 
player by un-peeling layers of the mind, similar to a cleansing, as there is an essential 
need to create life due to each person being inherently creative. However, in order to 
grow and become, one has to first lose the concept of the self. The way to be reborn is 
to first die, in a figurative sense. Nietzsche says that humans are deaf even to the 
sounds they hear around them, which would include the sounds and echoes of their 
own being.   Nietzsche calls for a radical change where the everyday person becomes 81
the genius they are supposed to have been in the beginning. Nietzsche sees open-end-
ed ideas for human possibility. Perhaps the virtual will allow one to tap into the place 
where she can actually hear her own being––pause––and create her self in an image 
that transcends all former possibilities. Here, Nietzsche discusses the need for the su-
perman to transcend the societal mundaneness: 
 For brief moments we are truly the primordial being 
itself and we feel its unbounded greed and lust for be-
ing; the struggle, the agony, the destruction of appear-
ances, all this now seems to us necessary, given the un-
countable excess of forms of existence thrusting and 
pushing themselves into life, given the exuberant fertili-
ty of the world––Will; we are pierced by the furious 
sting of these torments at the very moment when, as it 
were, we become one with the immeasurable, primor-
dial delight in existence, and receive an intimation, in 
Dionysiac ecstasy, that this delight is indestructible and 
eternal. Despite fear and pity we are happily alive, not 
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as individuals, but as the one living being, with whose 
procreative lust we have become one.   82
The responsibility of self-creation that Nietzsche believes so deeply in can be found 
within new virtual discourse and experience. In his Human, All too Human, Nietzsche 
searches for a place where spirits can be or become free. The sense of freedom that 
could overcome idealism, he says, is to display a spirit that thinks differently from 
what would be expected and liberates itself from tradition.   There may be no better 83
place where this spiritual freedom can be found than the world of the virtual today. 
Consciously Creating The Self Through Self-Knowledge 
 While it is clear that the virtual is but one outlet in society, it can be seen as a 
portal that opens up worlds of previously closed possibilities for many. People have 
pushed naturally, while in the virtual, towards evolving forms of becoming, or even 
just experiencing anew. The virtual world is an open window available for those who 
choose to expand their perceptions. Thus, as what might be learned from Kant, it can 
be said that people need to retreat from former reality to create a new reality. It is, 
thus, necessary for one to consciously create the self if the desire is to live to one’s 
full possibilities. While Nietzsche claims that the artist can save the disappearance of 
the human, it can be seen that the virtual offers the same insight, as play keeps one 
light.   In this manner, the self-reflective player can be seen as a new creator of her 84
life. 
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 Through play in the virtual, a person can learn how to love herself through 
self-knowledge. As Nietzsche claims that the concept of “man” is something to be 
surpassed, he seeks to affirm life and sees it as a philosophy of cheerfulness, other-
wise known as a gay science. When stating that God is dead, Nietzsche seeks to claim 
that it is not just the death of the deity known as God, but the death of the so-called 
high values that have been passed down from generations. He seeks a revaluation of 
all values, which is an attempt to question the way people are accustomed to thinking 
about purpose in life. Thus, through transforming one’s thought, there is an inadver-
tent effect of this wisdom––that is, self-awareness.   Virtual play, then, can be direct85 -
ed as a spiritual replication as the player uses the character in the virtual game as a 
vessel in which she can make it do anything she intends. The experience of the spirit 
within the character can be seen as a metaphor to the spiritual within the physical 
human body. Thus, the character in the game is the body and the player is similar to 
the spirit or Geist. 
 Nietzsche wonders if people will be able to remedy the most basic problems 
of contemporary society––and further, he questions if life is even worth living at this 
point.   While his own answer to both of his questions is no––life is not worth living–86
he simultaneously says that individuals need to create the ultimate life for themselves 
since life is not as serious as one might have thought. This Nietzschean form of nega-
tive reasoning can be viewed as moving beyond optimism and pessimism. For, Niet-
zsche claims that tragedy pushes us to continue on living.   Comparing the Dionysian 87
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drive with the virtual, the origin of tragedy can be noted in ancient Greece as a strug-
gle between two drives. Nietzsche names these drives after Greek deities––Apollo 
and Dionysos. Apollo respects boundaries and offers an ethic of self-control. On the 
contrary, Dionysos represents a parting of boundaries and lives in excess. It can be 
said that the two energies exist in all human souls. Together, their friction becomes a 
creative dynamism. The two forces are needed to work productively in relation to 
each other. The creative evolution that then occurs is formed by the Apolline and 
Dionysiac. Together, they continue to provoke one another, and come together to give 
birth to art. In order for productive creativity to occur, the two parts work together––
to benefit in a synthesis. These opposite forms of life promote progression. Niet-
zsche’s Dionysian approach to looking life in the face with delight and merriment is 
akin to states achieved in the virtual. As Nietzsche claims that each person is an in-
herent creator, playing in the virtual can be seen as a gateway vessel that brings 
present society back into an imaginative state.   Nietzsche speaks of the “genius”  as 88
one who has been able to hold on to her child-like sense of awe and imagination. Fur-
ther, since imaginative properties are innate, they can always be re-learned if lost.  89
Thus, it can be said that the creative force is central to a life worth living. The virtual 
puts forth the opportunity for one to process from being into becoming. The virtual 
provides this unceasing outlet towards constant creative renewal––if desired. 
Différance and Time 
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 With reference to renewal, Jacques Derrida presents an attack on absolute 
presence, absence, and origins. These notions are important to discuss in reference to 
the virtual. As Derrida deconstructs modes of communication, he states that there is 
no truth and the subject becomes de-centered through social discourse. His claim is 
important in reference to the virtual as it takes the player into new states of interpreta-
tion where there is no supreme subject anymore. Through discourse within the virtual, 
the player is de-centered and it is for the better in order to come to a new space of un-
derstanding. Both Heidegger and Derrida discuss the circle, which is a common char-
acteristic in virtual games. Heidegger says that people are moving in a circle, and they 
follow a circle. Derrida states that people are always starting over––and never com-
plete––which is, interestingly, what he calls méconnaissance. The activity of perpetu-
al awakening can further be seen as the continual revealing of Heidegger’s aletheia. 
There is always a rhythmic uncovering and then veiling. These notions are relative to 
the description of playing in the virtual. As Derrida also discusses différance––the 
endless deferral of meaning––it can be seen that through the virtual experience, the 
player finds new impressions of meaning. Derrida asserts that meaning is not fixed, 
and contexts are always in flux. 
 We define words in terms of other words, so meaning is always deferred. 
Through these concepts, the player continually experiences the now in an intricate 
way. Derrida creates a new language, just as the artist does. The new philosophical 
language that Derrida offers can be seen as a starting point for the virtual. In this way, 
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it can be seen that Derrida is anticipating a new point in time such as the virtual and 
digital era. Furthermore, playing in the virtual is enveloped in the perception of time. 
The virtual does not reside in Newtonian time––it sits in Einstein’s theory of time. 
While Newton claims that time is absolute, Einstein sees time as connected to space, 
not separate from the other. Newtonian time is an outmoded notion that resides in a 
state of absence. Einstein’s time and space demonstrates the new awareness that it is 
us, the individual, who creates time, as all time is relative.   Playing in the virtual, 90
thus, has the ability to sit in the middle of time. 
Geist as Absolute Spirit 
 Questions in reference to time are beneficial for individuals in relation to the 
concept of spirit. Hegel discusses the notion of spirit, which he calls, Geist. Hegel 
sees Geist as that which holds absolute knowledge––as the person who dedicates her-
self to self-conscious reflectivity obtains this spiritual awareness. Hegel believes the 
concept of the ultimate self can be found, though it should not be a struggle.   The 91
search for self, he believes, should come forth purely and without forced demand.  92
Creating or discovering the self should be considered as a natural experience. Hegel 
asserts that aesthetic understanding aids in the acknowledgement of the Absolute 
Mind via the self. The process of understanding one’s being is an ongoing and recur-
sive meditation. The understanding of beauty, truth, freedom, and self is continuously 
intertwined within the process of self-creation.   Furthermore, while it can be said 93
that there is an interconnectedness between all people through a world soul, there is 
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also the understanding that each person is an individual and has the right to step away 
from the herd and follow her inner yearnings. Thus, the group consciousness is 
teamed with individual instances of free identity. Hegel describes Geist in many 
forms, though he sees it as the main approach to freedom, and the converging of “we” 
and “I” in the most pure form.   94
 Hegel sees human history as the development of Spirit. In essence, he sees 
changing times and events as the historical development of consciousness. Further-
more, Hegel views concepts of finite and infinite differently than Kant. Hegel be-
lieves in spirit and infiniteness versus Kant’s notion of the unknowable finite form. 
For Hegel, the physical and mental are not separate entities from one another. To 
quote Hegel: 
 The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, 
and we might say that the former is refuted by the lat-
ter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom 
may be explained to be a false form of the plant's exis-
tence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of 
the blossom. The ceaseless activity of their own inher-
ent nature makes these stages moments of an organic 
unity, where they not merely do not contradict one an-
other, but where one is as necessary as the other; and 
constitutes thereby the life of the whole.   95
Hegel sees the reflection that is actually an illusion to be that of a self-affirming con-
sciousness through the concept of the Other. For Hegel, nature is always “being” in 
the process of “becoming” and art brings a person closer and closer to not needing to 
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feel security with the idea of human physical embodiment. While Hegel sees the ul-
timate art that envelops Geist as a renewing discovery of human spirit, the virtual can 
be seen as an evolution of a spiritual form of art. The virtual, thus, encompasses a 
new form of metaphysical realism.   For Hegel, both thought and being are inter96 -
twined. He states that within the powers of the dialectic and the negation of the nega-
tion––without one, there is not an other. Hegel states:  
 I have my self-consciousness not in myself but in the 
other. I am satisfied and have peace with myself only in 
this other and––and I am only because I have peace 
with myself; if I did not have it, then I would be a con-
tradiction that falls to pieces. This other, because it 
likewise exists outside itself, has its self-consciousness 
only in me, and both the other and I are only this con-
sciousness of being-outside-ourselves and of our identi-
ty; we are only this intuition, feeling, and knowledge of 
our unity. This is love, and without knowing that love is 
both a distinguishing and the sublation of this distinc-
tion, one speaks emptily of it. This is the simple, eternal 
idea.   97
Twentieth century philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer further says that everything is 
continually disappearing: “For, to give an indication of where we are headed, it will 
emerge there that what remains is precisely what is real where everything is continu-
ally disappearing. The real world exists precisely as continual change, constant 
change.”   Hegel sees this in a positive sense with reference to truth, “Appearance is 98
the coming into being and passing away which itself does not come into being and 
pass away, but is rather in itself and constitutes the reality and movement of the life of 
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truth.”   Thus, it can be seen that through the Other inside of historical consciousness, 99
the self can evolve. 
 Nature, Understanding, and the Infinite 
 The attainment of ultimate understanding of the Absolute spirit is a process 
that modulates in and out of itself, states Hegel.   Hegel asserts:  100
 Absolute Spirit enters existence merely at the culminat-
ing point at which its pure knowledge about itself is the 
opposition and interchange with itself. Knowing  that 
its pure knowledge is the abstract essential reality, Ab-
solute Spirit is this knowing duty in absolute opposition 
to the knowledge which knows itself, qua absolute sin-
gleness of self, to be the essentially real.    101
The process of attaining this consciousness twists, breaks, re-forms, and grows. Con-
sciousness cannot grow unless areas break and then, essentially, disintegrate. This 
process of change can be found similarly throughout all of nature––the destructive 
steps in order to renew. What is once present recedes, and this cycle is continuous. 
Each stage of becoming destroys and negates the previous stage––only to finally 
come into the true essence of being. In the virtual, visual form and places continuous-
ly change and move into different forms in space. Here, within these moments, new 
instances of spirit are found. In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel speaks further: 
 Just because the form is as essential to the essence as 
the essence is to itself, the divine essence is not to be 
conceived and expressed merely as essence, i. e. as im-
mediate substance or pure self-contemplation of the di-
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vine, but likewise as form, and in the whole wealth of 
the developed form. Only then is it conceived and ex-
pressed as an actuality. The True is the whole. But the 
whole is nothing other than the essence consummating 
itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must 
be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end 
is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its 
nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous be-
coming of itself.”    102
Hegel suggests all forms and associations can be seen as vehicles for Spirit to grow. 
He does not look down upon the past, but he rather incorporates it in the growth and 
becoming of the Absolute.  
 In 1947, visual artist Adolph Gottlieb expressed similar thoughts in reference 
to growth and evolution of creation as a necessity to continue into spirit. While Got-
tlieb was referring to the new form of abstraction in art of the New York School at the 
time, immense similarities can be found within current thoughts and Hegelian con-
cepts. Gottlieb sees the historical evolution of change as a form of progress––not a 
detriment to society:  
 Certain people always say we should go back to nature. 
I notice they never say we should go forward with na-
ture. It seems to me they are more concerned that we 
should go back, than about nature. If the models we use 
are the apparitions seen in a dream, or the recollection 
of our pre-historic past, is this less past of nature or re-
alism, than a cow in a field? I think not. The role of the 
artist, of course, has always been that of image-maker. 
Different times require different images. Today when 
our aspirations have been reduced to a desperate at-
tempt to escape from evil, and times are out of joint, 
our obsessive, subterranean and pictographic images 
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are the expression of the neurosis which is our reality. 
To my mind certain so-called abstraction is not abstrac-
tion at all. On the contrary, it is the realism of our 
time.   103
The virtual can be likened to the realism of today––allowing people to move forward 
with nature. The virtual as a medium to learn through has allowed humanity to under-
stand their inner selves more clearly. Looking towards the world of digital interactivi-
ty, the virtual moves the creative evolutionary plane forward. While virtual play may 
not seem to fit into the operation of life as a whole, when looked at from these aspects 
it is clear that the responsive mode of gaming fits quite nicely with the attainment of 
ultimate self-awareness. For, the structured inequalities within society make it chal-
lenging for a person to develop an authentic individual self. The conception of “self” 
is so heavily formed once born that the individual practically loses touch with her 
own true original characteristics right away. Social circumstances of mass condition-
ing in Western society put the human being into two predicaments––either within the 
position of the rebel-artist or within the conforming mob-mind presence. If she lives 
in a pure sense––she strengthens her personal autonomy. Twentieth century painter 
Mark Rothko reflects this sentiment, as he discusses the journey of the artist. Here 
many similarities are found between the artist and the virtual player: 
 The unfriendliness of society to his activity is difficult 
for the artist to accept. Yet this very hostility can act as 
a lever for true liberation. Freed from a false sense of 
security and community, the artist can abandon his plas-
tic bank-book, just as he has abandoned other forms of 
security. Both the sense of community and of security 
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depend on the familiar. Free of them, transcendental 
experiences become possible.   104
Within forms of group consciousness, individuals can get in touch with their true in-
dividuality on the spirit level in the virtual. Senses of autonomy such as the aforemen-
tioned can be found through forms of creativity and expression. It is thus clear that 
play in the virtual offers individuals a journey to higher self-awareness. 
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Chapter Three 
Discourse in the Virtual 
 Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual 
person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in 
the process of their dialogic interaction. 
    ––Mikhail Bakhtin 
       Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
 Dialogical Path to Self-Awareness  
 To further contemplate higher forms of self-consciousness, we can look to-
ward the methodology of dialogical theory through twentieth century Russian 
philosopher, Mikhail Bakhtin. To set up these concepts, we turn to the foundation of 
personal identity. Identity is related to who one believes she is. To reveal the identity 
of the self here, we explore what might be authentic discourse in the virtual. Authen-
tic communication that is mutual between the self and others can be seen as a natural 
release that finds freedom within the concept of self. The dialogical path of commu-
nication encompasses more than one authoritative voice. The dialogical form provides 
discourse on the world in and of itself compared to a monologic tale of one soul. The 
dialogical makes the discourse about “us” contrasted to the experience being about 
“me.” The experience of mutual discourse with others creates an infinite journey on 
the path to higher self-consciousness. The opportunity to engage in authentic dis-
course presents itself well through the virtual. 
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 A component connected to the importance of finding the self in the virtual is 
the search and discovery of the hero of the self. Bakhtin interprets Fyodor Dostoevsky 
and the interest of the hero. It can be clearly seen in virtual play that the hero is what 
the player is commonly working towards. A parallel reason can be found as to why 
people read fiction. Interestingly, Bakhtin describes the hero for Dostoevsky as a 
“particular point of view on the world and on oneself, as the position enabling a per-
son to interpret and evaluate his own self and surrounding reality.”   Bakhtin goes 105
into great detail in Chapter Two of his text, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. In this 
chapter entitled “The Hero, and the Position of the Author with Regard to the Hero, in 
Dostoevsky’s Art,” the similarities to Bakhtin’s mentioning of Dostoevsky’s hero are 
uncanny for their similarities to the hero in the virtual game. Bakhtin discusses the 
entry point of the hero in Dostoevsky’s work. He asserts that the hero transforms in 
the novel due to how the world appears to him, rather than how the hero appears to 
the world. Also important is how he appears to himself––thus his forming self-aware-
ness.  
 As a specific example in a video game, a heroic character found in the game 
Starcraft 2 begins with Jim Raynor as an ordinary man on a mission and through the 
game, he develops into an ultimate hero. Through the game, Jim Raynor turns into a 
cyborg laden character who metamorphoses into a visible hero. Throughout the game, 
the character grows into the hero that he is later to become. The player is able to live 
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through the changing of the average man and become the hero who decides to take a 
revolutionary stand against a wayward military group in the game. 
 Bakhtin discusses the self-consciousness that develops in the every-man. 
Bakhtin remarks that, in his novels, Dostoevsky depicts the hero as a character only, 
and does not mention him as a hero. The reader follows the protagonist and his story 
and witnesses the transformation of the hero’s self-consciousness. This metamorpho-
sis occurs through the change of thought processes, actions, and reflections in the 
mirror. Both in Dostoevsky’s novel and in games such as Starcraft, the hero emerges 
over a period of time without the reader or player noticing until the vision of the 
physical hero comes into being. Bakhtin speaks of Dostoevsky’s hero metamorphosis, 
which echoes Starcraft’s hero: 
 He transferred the author and the narrator, with all their 
accumulated points of view and with the descriptions, 
characterizations, and definitions of the hero provided 
by them, into the field of vision of the hero himself, 
thus transforming the finalized and integral reality of 
the hero into the material of the hero’s own self-con-
sciousness.   106
 The aforementioned dialogical design, an objective scenario, contrasts with 
the monologic form of writing. In the monologic form of writing, the hero is bounded 
by stringent rules as to how the hero begins and how he is constructed. The form of 
self-consciousness is not organically formed and is inserted into the character more 
rigidly without room for thought or progressive awareness. To contrast the monologic 
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and understand the dialogic point of view in both virtual play and Dostoevsky’s novel 
The Underground, an explanation from Bakhtin can be looked upon: 
 The hero from the underground eavesdrops on every 
word someone else says about him, he looks at himself, 
as it were, in all the mirrors of other people’s con-
sciousnesses, he knows all the possible refractions of 
his image in those mirrors. And he also knows his own 
objective definition, neutral both to the other’s con-
sciousness and to his own self-consciousness, and he 
takes into account the point of view of a ‘third 
person.’   107
The third person can be seen as the player who plays the game. Similar to the novel, 
the player plays (reads) the game (story) of the transformation of the average person 
to hero as a third person. The player also becomes the hero now, as she is moving the 
hero in such a way that she is feeling her way through the game. She is matching the 
changing of awareness and opening to new sensations of self-consciousness. The dia-
logic design of the game mirrors the Dostoevsky novel while going a step further and 
allowing the player to essentially engage in the becoming of the hero. Interestingly, 
Dostoevsky himself discusses the role of the hero in his novels in the foreword to his 
work, A Meek One: 
 The telling of the story, of course, takes a few hours in 
breaks and snatches; it is disconnected in form, for he 
either argues with himself or addresses some unseen 
listener, a judge as it were. However, it is always like 
that in real life.    108
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Bakhtin states that the issue at hand is that there is an unfolding of a new view of the 
whole of the heroic person. This way of thinking highly contrasts prior ideas of a hu-
man who is shown to be a hero. The unfolding process, Bakhtin states, depicts a new 
form of seeing the human in art.   Understanding this as the framework of the dia109 -
logic story that depicts the transformation of the hero largely changes the experience 
of the reader with the novel. To compare the notion to virtual play, the involvement 
allows one to view and discover the human throughout more distinctly. 
 The natural development of the protagonist into the hero shows the organic 
nature of one who becomes aware and understands her own levels of consciousness. 
To realize these shifts are depicting the process of becoming is important to under-
standing the formation of identity and awareness in the player. Thus, the player is ex-
periencing the intrinsic process together with the character. Through the writing of 
Dostoevsky and through the polyphonic experience of the player in the virtual world, 
the player or reader is permitted to know what she knows. There is a sense of equality 
in the polyphonic or dialogic novel in that there is a participatory aspect of the story. 
In the contrasting ordinary novel, the reader is given a set of evaluations, juxtaposi-
tions, and finalizations of the hero and the story. There is no actual autonomy occur-
ring in the monologic story.  
 The monologic story keeps the reader out––the experience is treated as if the 
reader is spying on the character turned hero. To contrast, the dialogic story brings the 
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reader alongside the hero and allows the reader to enter the mind of the character. 
Bakhtin concurs:  
 All others’ perception of the world intersects with his 
perception. Everything that he sees and observes––both 
Petersburg slums and monumental Petersburg, all his 
chance encounters and trivial happenings––everything 
is drawn into dialogue, responds to his questions and 
puts new questions to him, provokes him, argues with 
him, or reinforces his own thoughts.   110
The purported isolated experience of the virtual game, then, pushes the player into a 
dialogical experience. While the gameplay experience is clearly virtual, the dialogical 
qualities are still held and are available to amend one to reconsider previously held 
beliefs. The dialogical experience certainly echoes the experience of reading the nov-
el. Only virtual play is even more transformative and intense for the player contrary 
to the reader as the player experiences these modes of becoming with many of her 
senses. Thus, the monologic position does not offer a great conversation akin to the 
dialogical mode. Bakhtin contrasts the dialogical experience of Dostoevsky to the 
monologic experience of Leo Tolstoy. Bakhtin says that the experience of the charac-
ter in the monologic story is very confined. The character does not experience any 
kind of self-awareness and is not able to make a response to the point of view of the 
writer. In the monologic story, the hero may not have the last word––thus, there is no 
autonomy or sense of becoming. Discussing the monologic style, Bakhtin states: 
 The words and consciousness of the author, Leo Tol-
stoy, are nowhere addressed to the hero, do not question 
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him, and expect no response from him. The author nei-
ther argues with his hero nor agrees with him. He 
speaks not with him, but about him. The final word be-
longs to the author, and that word––based on something 
the hero does not see and does not understand, on 
something located outside the hero’s consciousness––
can never encounter the hero’s words on a single dia-
logic plane.   111
 In the monologic story, then, the author holds the final word without room for 
an authentic response from the main character or hero. Everything is viewed from the 
authoritative position of the writer and there is no opportunity to engage in a true ex-
change of ideas and viewpoints. The monologic way of creating enhances the idea of 
a bourgeois patriarchal experience in which only one remains in power. The dialogi-
cal experience, by contrast, engages all who read or play and offers many forms of 
understanding and paths to self-awareness. Where one form of creation is very open, 
the other form closes. It is clear to see the majority of play in the virtual operates from 
the dialogical standpoint––rather than authoritative. 
The Hero and Heroine as Non-Hero 
 It is also quite clear that there is a difference between the hero and the heroine 
defined in the virtual story. According to recent statistics, 48% of people who play 
video games are women.   This interesting data displays the fact that gameplay is not 112
a stereotypical male-heavy pastime. With this knowledge, an issue that remains is the 
representative visual inequality of the aesthetic treatment of female roles within the 
game. Imagery that disempowers women can be seen in video games within the virtu-
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al, just as in much cultural media throughout American society.   In order to under113 -
stand these inequalities further, it is important to note that only 11% of women com-
prise the current number of video game developers and designers.   The gender in114 -
equality of creators of the video game, then, assist in understanding the dispropor-
tional visual representation of gender in the game. Interestingly, within virtual games 
that are platform-based, the most important female characters or heroines in the 
games are commonly seen as exactly who they will appear to be in the game immedi-
ately. Thus, there is not a transformation to be seen between the everyday woman and 
the self-aware heroine, as it might be shown within the masculine counterpart of the 
virtual game. The difference brings us to questions on social conditioning that carries 
on into the game. The social roles of women in current society can certainly echo the 
same balance within the game. The virtual game is a medium that offers the potential 
to break down previously held stereotypes, even more when it comes to gender and 
the objectification of the female character. If the hero is going to show the metamor-
phic transformation from everyman to superman, it is imperative for the player to see, 
too, that the character can now also visibly transform from everywoman to super-
woman. 
 While it is quite clear that the majority of the female characters in the virtual 
game are seen as either a character with primary sex appeal or a princess waiting to 
be saved, there are other instances that allow the female character to be seen through 
a different lens. Fortunately, there are virtual games that realize the importance of the 
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revolutionary tool of equality that the virtual game holds. In the Second Life commu-
nity, players can change their gender at any time or practice gender bending at will.  115
Further, players can choose characters that are not human, yet have human capabili-
ties. Additionally, according to research from Nottingham Trent University, up to 70% 
of women and 54% of men play as the opposite gender.   The safe mode of reveling 116
in various ways of being with nuances in identification push the player into these new 
experiences, albeit virtual. These involvements amend one to reconsider previously 
held thoughts due to new interactions in these dialogical relationships. 
 As an example of the absence of empowered gender roles in the virtual game, 
one can look to a sexually objectified female character. Lara Croft is a noteworthy 
illustration of a feminine icon in the traditional video game. While the character 
demonstrates physical abilities, she is highly sexualized visually. In the game, she 
functions primarily as an object of visual gaze. Here, the scopophilic tendencies are 
seen to be well at work in the game. The passive female as object is the counterpart to 
the dominant male viewer and creator of the game. The erotic form of representation 
turns the female character into an automatic object. A transformation from average 
woman to heroine is not made transparent to the player. With a character such as this, 
there are only two notions of gender––the dominating male and the female who is as-
sumed to be gazed upon.  
 These remarks on the patriarchal gaze open the opportunity to connect togeth-
er dialogue with reference to Judith Butler’s theories on the roles of gender and per-
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formativity in contemporary culture. Butler seeks to look beyond two genders and 
become more fluid with how people might define themselves. She firmly states that 
there are more than two genders and this societal “gender trouble” can be thwarted 
once it is known by many that gender can move and change.   While females in Sec117 -
ond Life and other real-time virtual games are still treated subordinately, there is great 
room for the notion of gender to be re-thought in the realm of the virtual. Many in-
stances can be seen where the playing field of male and female characters are neutral 
amongst the game, though there is still a large imbalance.  
 As an example that does depict a metamorphosis from sexualized to heroic 
female character, Samus Aran, a character in the science-fiction video game, Metroid, 
provides an apt example. While appearing to struggle for her quest to become authen-
tic, she is shown in the game as a more powerful character within the transformative 
process. She almost appears to be super-human in her transformation. Samus is por-
trayed as a fully capable being who is forgoing the male-constituted traditional forms 
of female-as-object in prior video games. Fully independent and autonomous as a 
human, her character is a bounty hunter who does not take orders and is one of the 
most powerful warriors in the galaxy she inhabits. Samus Aran is a strong contrast to 
Lara Croft in her non-objectified status. 
Construction and Deconstruction: Gender Roles 
 Coming from a post-feminist perspective––and to reflect within a feminist 
context––it is evident that there is an inadequate distribution of fair representation of 
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female characters when male developers create them for virtual games. When males 
are creating the character, a problem remains that they do not come from a place of a 
female or function as their voice. By reestablishing more substantial role models in all 
characters equally, it would serve to empower more people. Further, if gender is a so-
cial construct, it can be seen as a literal manifestation in the virtual game. The body, 
then, becomes a situation, as twentieth century French writer, Simone de Beauvoir 
suggests.   The ego is derived from the illusion of a true identity, and this misconcep118 -
tion goes back to one-sided beliefs held within language. By constituting one’s sexu-
ality within the virtual, however, terms and forms of identification begin to become 
fluid. There is no longer a fixed subject or determined gender in the game. Now free-
dom of choices are found. Despite ideological and patriarchal structuring in society, it 
might soon be perceived that people have potential to live in unlimited ways. Words 
and terms are now used as tools in a much greater toolbox within the virtual world. 
Language is becoming unlocked––and it has more and more ability to be of use 
through the virtual.  
 What might be needed is a feminist unthinking in the virtual game. It is quite 
obvious that video game or virtual content cannot remain stuck in one gender. Thus, 
the concept of gender and the game brings one to the understanding that it is a matter 
of the embodiment of freedom. Through language––and then through gender under-
standing––the main premise is that we rely on what we know, even if it is not correct. 
If we go back to the origin of gender, and even speech, this assumed knowing can be-
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come deconstructed. Julia Kristeva discusses both gender and language, and her theo-
ries can be linked to the discourse of virtual gameplay. While she comments that 
words are endlessly deferred, she states that speech gathers and restrains. Further-
more, she observes that art provides sinners the opportunity to live.   Kristeva states: 119
 The world of illusions––the world of religions––brings 
to light or embodies the prohibition that has us speak. 
Thus, it gives legitimacy to hatred if it does not invert it 
into love. Embodying, legitimizing––today we are too 
aware of their techniques to yield to them. The worlds 
of illusions, now dead and buried, have given way to 
our dreams and deliriums if not to politics or science––
the religions of modern times. Lacking illusions, lack-
ing shelter, today’s universe is divided between bore-
dom…or…abjection and piercing laughter.   120
Kristeva asserts that art indeed has the power to transform society. Art and play in the 
virtual, then, have the ability to work through the concepts of masculine and femi-
nine. As art and the virtual are small steps away from physical reality, virtual game-
play replicates reality in very usable terms. Virtual spaces are created to be intuitive, 
inviting, challenging, and dramatic. These fictional spaces offer new depths to the 
real. 
 Furthermore, Kristeva seeks to move beyond former positions of feminism 
and explore––through aesthetics––what individuality each person holds. In reference 
to identity, she sees that due to these transforming processes, one becomes detached 
and free––which, in turn, gives the individual an opportunity to create her self.  121
Kristeva sees that there should be a liveliness in the self-seeking process as well, 
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“When practice is not laughter, there is nothing new; where there is nothing new, 
practice cannot be provoking: it is at best a repeated, empty act.”   With this, the joy 122
and novelty in the virtual can be seen as a positive to entrance the new. 
Gender and Language 
 As it may be known, the exemplification of identity and visions of gender that 
are now seen within the virtual open new doors that were not available previously. 
Here, we look to Donna Haraway and her thoughts on gender, identity, and the cy-
borg. Haraway views the cyborg as a feminist tool due to the changes of categories 
within nature and culture. Haraway, too, suggests that new technologies offer mas-
culinist tendencies due to being developed by men. Haraway quite astutely asserts 
that if the new technologies are engaged critically, we can certainly provide tools for 
great change in gender interpretation.   Both Haraway and Butler claim that there is 123
no natural to begin with. Both writers state that humankind––thus, gender roles of 
male and female––are indeed self-created. Judith Butler says that the subject of femi-
nism and gender itself is a discursive formation, with constraint clearly built into lan-
guage. The term “female” and the term “male” begin in the words themselves. If the 
player could see this truth while choosing her gender in the game, perhaps she would 
see that the very idea of the feminine is a patriarchal construct based on a fictional 
foundation. Haraway proclaims: 
 I do not know of any other time in history when there 
was greater need for political unity to confront effec-
tively the dominations of ‘race,’ ‘gender,’ ‘sexuality,’ 
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and ‘class.’ I also do not know of any other time when 
the kind of unity we might help build could have been 
possible. None of ‘us’ have any longer the symbolic or 
material capability of dictating the shape of reality to 
any of ‘them.’ Or at least ‘we’ cannot claim innocence 
from practicing such dominations. White women, in-
cluding socialist feminists, discovered (that is, were 
forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-inno-
cence of the category ‘woman.’ That consciousness 
changes the geography of all previous categories; it de-
natures them as heat denatures a fragile protein. Cyborg 
feminists have to argue that ‘we’ do not want any more 
natural matrix of unity and that no construction is 
whole. Innocence, and the corollary insistence on vic-
timhood as the only ground for insight, has done 
enough damage. But the constructed revolutionary sub-
ject must give late-twentieth-century people pause as 
well. In the fraying of identities and in the reflexive 
strategies for constructing them, the possibility opens 
up for weaving something other than a shroud for the 
day after the apocalypse that so prophetically ends sal-
vation history.   124
Likewise, Simone de Beauvoir claims in her text, The Second Sex, that the main con-
cept of woman is a male concept. She expresses claims of man as the subject and 
woman as the object.   The stark concept, however, can change when it becomes that 125
the player can freely choose any gender she wishes to portray without societal judg-
ment. Further, according to Butler, currently there is only one gender––and that is the 
feminine. She claims that the masculine is not a gender, but rather, the general person. 
Butler claims that the masculine is all. The omnipresent masculine phallogocentric 
language, then, continues to keep the feminine construct established.   Of course, the 126
concept of a third gender or the use of gender-neutral discourse within the virtual may 
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allow for a wider acceptance of nuanced forms of identities to be understood. By dis-
rupting common thought on areas that are not questioned, the virtual world now has 
the ability to give the individual critical tools for inquiry into the formation of an 
identity. Butler states that people need to be able to think and behave critically––and 
not necessarily come to the topic of discourse on gender through a spectacle-based 
angle, but rather from an intelligent stance: 
 One critical function is to scrutinize the action of delim-
itation itself. By recommending that we become criti-
cal, that we risk criticality, in thinking about how the 
sexual field is constituted, I do not mean to suggest that 
we could or should occupy an atopical elsewhere, unde- 
limited, radically free. The questioning of taken-for-
granted conditions becomes possible on occasion; but 
one cannot get there through a thought experiment, an 
epoché, an act of will. One gets there, as it were, 
through suffering the dehiscence, the breakup, of the 
ground itself.   127
Given these philosophies of gender within the virtual, we see that the underlying rea-
son below structural inequalities is wrapped together in the concept of language. Lan-
guage, then, can be seen as an impediment on advancement, and add to deeper condi-
tioning of gender stereotypes. Of course, language offers pathways to states of evolu-
tion, though it also keeps people paralyzed in their tracks. Both Nietzsche and Swiss 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure probe questions such as these in reference to language. 
Saussure and Nietzsche hold similar claims that language is not ingrained. If language 
is one part that might hinder human development, what chaos would ensue if origins 
!70
were called into question? If complacency indeed breeds the herd mentality, the ques-
tion remains, will virtual space open up new ways of understanding, being, and be-
coming? An answer could be that, yes, the virtual does move beyond the limits of 
language. Perhaps if absence is uncovered as presence, the choices within humanity 
may be revealed. Humans have such immeasurable physical and mental capabilities 
that the limit of what one can do is still unknown. 
 Furthermore, language is not as purpose-driven in the virtual realm as it is in 
the physical realm. Rather, the processes of play in the virtual game focus on action, 
movement, interaction, decision-making over the use of language being overbearing. 
This offers much room for advancement in creation beyond the limits of verbal lan-
guage. For example, in the life simulation video game, The Sims, the player manages 
simulated characters during their daily life and routines. They often speak to the play-
er by looking up in the purported sky and speaking with the operating player. Intrigu-
ingly, this echoes a certain relationship between the individual and a God-like pres-
ence. However, when the characters in The Sims look up and speak with the player, 
their language is gibberish. If verbal language is not necessarily the most important 
form of communication, what other forms of communication can be used in order to 
achieve higher than desired results? 
 Conceivably, the virtual gives a new opportunity to allow all individuals to 
respect, honor, and revel in the opposites and enjoy their differences. It may be that 
the only way for the individual to understand these basic states of equality is to use 
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the imagination together with interaction in the game. Overall, the topic regarding the 
portrayal of females in video games covers a large and broad scope. This issue will 
not be examined as wide as it presents itself here, though it is clearly important to 
mention this extensive area of contention. 
Judgment and Difference 
 Through the virtual, interactivity becomes a conscious experience, and as such 
it can be explored as a new form of philosophy. Virtual experience is liberating, as it 
removes unwanted issues from a creative standpoint. Within this evolutionary growth, 
absence is deterred and more than enough is inevitable. If one’s ability to think is un-
limited, and the things one can imagine into existence are boundless, then the virtual 
realm offers these forms of energy to the player whenever she wants to play in the 
virtual and grow. When a player begins to understand these concepts, she starts to 
think from a mind aware of its own infinite nature. Playing offers new perspectives. 
These are new viewpoints that address themselves above common societal judgments 
as the normal social rules are not necessary in the virtual. In the virtual, life becomes 
more playable and the options to explore present themselves as more probable. Actual 
possessive property and class systems are not on the mind of the player while in the 
virtual. Physical possessions become obsolete within the virtual. 
 When playing the game, the player is afforded many opportunities to discover 
the higher self and quiet the ego. When finding this inner power, prudence is re-
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moved. Conservatism is banished from one’s being, thus the player becomes more 
understanding and contemplative of others’ experiences. 
 When contemplating judgment, the concepts of race and difference can be 
considered as well. While race and difference are also bound by language, judgment 
can be seen to be born out of reflection. The more disinterested form of aesthetic 
judgment in the game offers a release from judgment when playing and puts forth an 
intuiting sense of empathy for the characters being played. This non-serious form of 
judging adds a light approach to the concept of difference when playing. When all 
forms of appearance, gender, physicality, and status can be moved, removed, and 
switched at will, the player learns that she is in control of her beliefs about who she 
is. The imagination and perception take hold of the disengaged form of judgment and 
allow for a space that can easily be changed for more empowering forms of use.  
 Beheld within the virtual, races of new creatures and beings are found to be 
plentiful. Unfamiliar universes are opened up, and there is no room for stereotypes. 
New races, new genders, new forms of beings are constantly being created and 
played. Characters easily change from one mode to the next. When a player creates 
her avatar in the game, she has the power to create any identity that can be perceived. 
The game moves effortlessly through, in, and around time and space. For, in the 
game, one can override societally structured inequalities and transcend the limitations 
through the virtual. One can be a creator of a being and understand the place of the 
character freely compared to the three-dimensional reality one participates in when 
!73
confronting others. Virtual play transcends the trappings of race and puts the player 
into an epistemological mode. Here, the gamer can investigate and freely consider 
origins, nature, methods, and, if any, limits of all beings.  
 As an example, in the video game, Assassin’s Creed: Liberation, there is a fe-
male character named Aveline de Grandpré, who is Creole and the daughter of a 
Frenchman and an African woman. In the game, she has the ability take on a multi-
tude of personas. She is an assassin who can disguise herself in various forms, includ-
ing that of a slave. Her stepmother is caucasian and works with her to free slaves in 
the game, while on the hunt as an assassin.   Here, the player does not fall into any 128
type of marginal trappings and sees that one can change her status, personality, and 
sense of purpose easily in the game. The potential realization is that the player will 
transfer this understanding into their daily physical and spiritual lives to realize that 
this is capable in their reality as well. The character, Aveline, wears a regal uniform, 
showing a sense of passion and ambition in her desire to move past any judgment or 
notions of her femininity or race.  
 The dominant sensibility surrounding judgment and difference in the game is 
that the negative connotations of judgment can be lessened or eradicated by the iso-
lated and meditative experience the player finds herself in when playing. She is one 
with all characters and can be all characters. Here, she can act as the God force within 
each character if she chooses. The player becomes an equitable being and projects a 
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sense of understanding and respect due to the non-discriminatory stance she finds 
herself in by inserting her being into the vessel of the character. 
 Through distancing past programming and emotions, the player learns from 
her inner knowing not to discriminate against other beings––perhaps she comes to a 
universal understanding that can indeed be understood as a collective group that can 
also be accessed in the material world. By quieting her ego through play, she reaches 
her higher inner self, along with the infiniteness of all others. Here she can contem-
plate the experiences of others and feel for them and help them to conquer any issues 
that they may face in the game. She gains compassion and becomes a fair person, 
both in and out of the game. If discrimination is born from fear and the larger ego, 
perhaps the virtual may promote compassion. Thus, as focusing on areas of inequality 
might perpetuate the ineffectiveness of the demoralization it intends to discard, the 
game quietly pushes these unwanted issues out of the equation. Here, the player tran-
scends the idea of inequality. Inadequacy is not in the world if one opens her mind to 
the concept that it is not––and virtual play offers this issue of importance. The way to 
empowerment in all forms is believing in the value of the inner self. If the virtual 
world achieves self-realization, it could open up many possibilities to the player and 
she may begin to understand her own power, which may inevitably lead to new forms 
of growth, and even, change in physical reality.  
 For, if a person desires to change her life, she has to change the story that she 
tells herself. She needs to become something more. She cannot hope her life will 
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change––she has to become something bigger. She needs to overcome her ego and 
this means growing much bigger than the ego. Most forms of prejudice are based 
around the ego––thus fear. If a person wants to grow, she needs to live above the ego, 
and this takes action in order to occur. Virtual gameplay can thus be seen as a portal 
to other worlds in the mind and offers freedom from judgment and weakness. Virtual 
play clearly shows the player that she can indeed create her own life. 
Aloneness to Find Meaning  
 The ego is built upon the illusion of a created identity that has been formed 
within the episteme of language. The perception one holds of her identity can be said 
to be formed within the imagination. Further, the concept of the Taoist term, wu-wei, 
takes place within the game as action in the non-action is similar to working in the 
virtual while not working in the material. This notion can be further broken down to 
working with the spirit while not working with the ego. It is the being in the nothing. 
Just as Jean-Paul Sartre says in his Being and Nothingness, “Thus freedom is not a 
being; it is the being of man––i.e., his nothingness of being.”   It is a form of power 129
without exerting power. It is an inner confidence. These concepts are offered, while 
non-transparently, to the player if she chooses to accept it.  
 If it is held that society has not been entirely designed for the comfort of peo-
ple, the individual who becomes aware of this inequity can retreat from the mind of 
society and form her own vision of life. The player, just as in Plato's cave, might see 
the light and return back to society with renewed power to make anyone aware who 
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chooses to know as well. Thus, this experience of withdrawing from the imprison-
ment of control and coming back to share is a process of becoming a powerful cre-
ative being. In his text, Zarathustra: A God That Can Dance, Osho states the follow-
ing on the power of temporary aloneness: 
 From twenty-eight to the age thirty-five, all these peo-
ple––Gautam Buddha, Zarathustra, Lao Tzu, Chuang 
Tzu, Jesus––all have moved in higher planes of being. 
And just not to be bothered, not to be hindered by peo-
ple, not to be distracted, they moved into the moun-
tains––into aloneness. According to me, it was not 
against life––they were simply searching a silent space 
where there were no distractions and they could find the 
greatest orgasmic experience... what William James has 
called ”the oceanic orgasm,” in which you completely 
disappear into the ocean of existence––just like a dew-
drop slipping from a lotus leaf into the ocean. So the 
age thirty is not just incidental. All great seekers have 
left in the search between twenty-eight and thirty-five. 
That is the period of seeking, searching––searching 
something that is not of the body, but of the spirit.   130
 Creating Identity Through Curiosity  
 The act of gratitude can be demonstrated in the virtual, infinity is shown in the 
game, spirituality is available in virtual space, and a myriad of other dimensions are 
experienced within the game. The player is continuously given more chances by re-
ceiving other lives in the game. She is given opportunity after opportunity to play 
other characters in the game. In the game, the individual is not limited. The player 
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learns how to reach higher potentials. The player learns of her innate and infinite 
power in the game, and thus in life.  
 The virtual world offers the player a chance to claim a new understanding of 
life. Not only does the player achieve transformation by widening her understanding 
and curiosity, but she now sees things in a progressive way. Thus, the game can cer-
tainly overcome negative connotations in reference to class and status, as perception 
of the self becomes converted. The notion of one becoming godlike in her endeavor to 
reach her highest self connects with many virtual games that simulate the experience 
of being as God looking down on the people. There are many games that are life-sim-
ulated and focus more on creation rather than destruction or competition. SimEarth is 
a video game that is a planet simulator. In this game, the player has full control of a 
planet that encompasses all aspects of earth over its ten billion year span of life.   It 131
includes humans and species of all kinds. The player, in effect, acts as God and has 
the ability to do what she wants with the planet. Further, when playing in the mode of 
God, the player can look down and inwards to see what is possible. She can see where 
difficulty and opportunity lay and arise. She can see where there is inequality, injus-
tice, and prejudice from a distanced vantage point. The player sees, from the God-
mode, everything stripped down to the primal, or even spiritual level. The virtual, 
then, offers a quantum leap into possibilities of the human.  
 The game, SimEarth, created by designer Will Wright, models the game-plan 
after the Gaia hypothesis, which claims that the planet earth is an organism that is in-
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deed alive.   SimEarth, which was created in 1990 has branched out into the popular 132
video game, The Sims, which is also a life simulation game.   Wright credits his 133
Montessori schooling with the initial sparks of designing the enlightening game: 
 Montessori taught me the joy of discovery. It showed 
you can become interested in pretty complex theories, 
like Pythagorean theory, say, by playing with blocks. 
It’s all about learning on your terms, rather than a 
teacher explaining stuff to you. SimCity comes right out 
of Montessori—if you give people this model for build-
ing cities, they will abstract from it principles of urban 
design.   134
  
 Thus, Wright conveys there is a happiness in discovering––and it is clear that 
the joy does not have to go away. Big concepts are learned through play. These free-
ing principles are felt, too, in the virtual. While SimEarth or The Sims may not repli-
cate a common life in our society, the repetitiveness of the day-to-day living does re-
flect play as children. In essence, children play to learn. They model and mimic to 
understand the circumstances in which they are living and how they might live. There 
may be repetition in the game, though each time, something different will occur. The 
technology of The Sims offers the players room to grow, learn, design, and develop 
their self-expression through the game. Growing will happen with these baby steps 
into the game experience. In fact, most advice on success encourages a child-like cu-
riosity. Today, outside of success literature, child-like curiosity is rarely encouraged in 
mainstream society aside from the video game. 
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Universality 
 The concept of universality can be examined in reference to virtual game con-
tent. Marxist political theorist and critic Frederic Jameson discusses the relationship 
between the individual and objects, and relates that this conjoining has to do with a 
historical reality. With these specific concepts, Jameson discusses the new ages of 
Realism, Modernism, and Postmodernism.   He relays that the age of Realism con135 -
stitutes the period of the bourgeois consciousness. The age of Modernism put forth 
dissonance and unhappiness regarding the way the world is evolving. Postmodernism, 
then, for Jameson, is an opening that people are both aware of and looking at from an 
ironic standpoint, as society has been bombarded with too much information.   I con136 -
tend that this period after Postmodernism is situated around and within the world of 
the virtual, as it is related to open concepts such as universality. Jameson claims: 
 Yet something else does tend to emerge in the most en-
ergetic postmodernist texts, and this is the sense that 
beyond all thematics or content the work seems some-
how to tap the networks of the reproductive process and 
thereby to afford us some glimpse into a postmodern or 
technological sublime, whose power or authenticity is 
documented by the success of such works in evoking a 
whole new postmodern space in emergence around 
us.   137
Jameson is pleased with the authenticity of the human expressing her uneasiness with 
the modes of solitude and alienation––with no roots or stability. Rebirth and new 
growth can be found to occur within the removal of roots and what we could call dis–
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ease. The societal expressions of dissatisfaction show the human wail to remove their 
authentic selves from a life of an alienating life. People are looking toward a utopian 
vision in these notions––though they have been sidetracked by idle diversions. Jame-
son sees the Postmodernism as a time where all has become fragmented and people 
are each living in isolated realities.   For Jameson, this life is artificial and knowing138 -
ly banal. He also sees current life as a compilation, where life is collaged together 
with one impersonation following another in a spliced manner.     139
 What to do about these cultural circumstances? Jameson believes that what is 
needed now is cognitive mapping in an aesthetic manner. He calls this process “cog-
nitive mapping.”   Cognitive mapping is interesting in that it is a psychic form of 140
mapping that allows an individual to better understand the world around her. Jameson 
aptly states: “Ontologies of the present demand archaeologies of the future, not fore-
casts of the past.”   He believes people have and will continue to lose sight of what 141
is real and true if they continue to cling to the past. He compellingly sees the disap-
pearance of past methods to allow one to move forward an authentic reality. These 
concepts and thoughts ring within the new frontier of the virtual. Through the use of 
mind power over physical power, the actual map back to finding one’s inner self can 
be re-tracked and put on path. 
 The virtual is seen sitting uncomfortably in the more contemporary makeshift 
term, Metamodernism.   While Postmodernism is concerned with making the object 142
or concept again––without one way of doing anything––Metamodernism is set to 
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stitch together both Modernism and Postmodernism in a certain way that begins to 
make anew of the past situations. In the most updated and succinct synthesis of the 
term, it is summarized as follows: 
 The metamodern structure of feeling evokes an oscilla-
tion between a modern desire for sens and a postmod-
ern doubt about the sense of it all, between a modern 
sincerity and a postmodern irony, between hope and 
melancholy and empathy and apathy and unity and plu-
rality and purity and corruption and naïveté and know-
ingness; between control and commons and craftsman-
ship and conceptualism and pragmatism and utopi-
anism. Indeed, metamodernism is an oscillation. It is 
the dynamic by which it expresses itself. One should be 
careful not to think of this oscillation as a balance how-
ever; rather it is a pendulum swinging between numer-
ous, innumerable poles. Each time the metamodern en-
thusiasm swings towards fanaticism, gravity pulls it 
back towards irony; the moment its irony sways to-
wards apathy, gravity pulls it back towards 
enthusiasm.   143
 Before these new forms of thought burgeoning within Modernism, Post-mod-
ernism, and Metamodernism, new forms of spiritual thought were occurring, which 
resulted in the New Thought movement. The New Thought Movement began in the 
early nineteenth century, while Modernism began in the late nineteenth century. The 
New Thought Movement has been inter-woven throughout these centuries––in be-
tween Modernism and Postmodernism. The New Thought Movement can be found of 
interest to these studies as it encapsulates some inklings of use for people to move 
forward in their spaces of equality. We can see this movement of personal develop-
ment akin to the virtual path, as it is a way toward higher self-awareness that is pro-
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moted to greater groups of the population. Interestingly, the New Thought Movement 
promotes the power of the individual, and it is available to all people. While the 
Metamodernist movement makes sense as a place to stay until empowerment is 
known, it seems to be that the movement needs to be amplified into a more substan-
tial and energetic definition. Just as the term video game needs to be re-named and re-
defined as a tool that has limitless capabilities to quantum leap into more, so too does 
the era that we are living in. Metamodernism is helpful in placing us in a new posi-
tion, though the current time period may need to be re-evaluated just as Heidegger 
and Nietzsche have taught––as society is still based upon generations-old systems of 
thinking that do not offer empowerment to self-awareness. 
To Lose the Ego  
 The virtual has the potential to leap over the trappings of Modernism, Post-
modernism––and even Metamodernism. The virtual realm offers a new and unprece-
dented experience that cannot be reformulated as such within those prior isms. 
Through creativity, movement, reacting, and controlling, the virtual world is respon-
sive. When playing, there is an authentic inner experience that occurs that allows the 
ego to recede. After all, losing the ego is what has been sought after for thousands of 
years. Virtual play as a new bridge of art and philosophy offers a completely different 
mechanism than any previous form of thought or art. While Modernism sought to 
make things new, and Postmodernism found the irony, it seems that the newest ism, 
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path, or world has the ability to offer a form of departure to move on from the previ-
ous outlets. 
 In his text, The Metropolis and Mental Life, German philosopher Georg Sim-
mel writes very similar ideas about authenticity that can be found within contempo-
rary life.   While Simmel writes the following quote in the late nineteenth century, 144
the concepts of his lamentation relate to the fury one may have when seeing the 
change that could easily occur, though has not up to this point. Simmel’s negative 
connotations are quite comprehensible given he had no knowledge of what was to 
come in the digital age. Much of what he says rings true with the empowering con-
cepts found through the virtual: 
 The deepest problems of modern life derive from the 
claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and 
individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelm-
ing social forces, of historical heritage, of external cul-
ture, and of the technique of life. The fight with nature 
which primitive man has to wage for his bodily exis-
tence attains in this modern form its latest transforma-
tion. The eighteenth century called upon man to free 
himself of all the historical bonds in the state and in re-
ligion, in morals and in economics. Man’s nature, origi-
nally good and common to all, should develop unham-
pered. In addition to more liberty, the nineteenth centu-
ry demanded the functional specialization of man and 
his work; this specialization makes one individual in-
comparable to another, and each of them indispensable 
to the highest possible extent. However, this specializa-
tion makes each man the more directly dependent upon 
the supplementary activities of all others.   145
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Simmel is clearly discontent with the absence of human character and mundane tasks 
being subjected onto the everyday human. He sees this banality as a threat to individ-
ual subjectivity. Simmel sees that personality has been removed from the individual–
–and bourgeois mentality carries on with a blasé attitude. It is important to under-
stand, however, that these comments were written in 1903 and Simmel was one of the 
first theorists to comprehend and call attention to the incredible impact between ur-
banization and people in human society. His mentioning of an apathetic attitude, 
sphere of indifference, and reversal of spirituality in the human show that these forms 
of loss of the individual are just as real today as they were over a century ago. What is 
evident is that a new form or juxtaposition of Modernism and Postmodernism will not 
offer higher levels of consciousness to the individual. Clearly, a new form of living 
with and through the virtual dimension is desirable to handle our capability for quan-
tum jumps in higher consciousness and expression. Simmel says:  
 The individual has become a mere cog in an enormous 
organization of things and powers which tear from his 
hands all progress, spirituality, and value in order to 
transform them from their subjective form into the form 
of a purely objective life.    146
It seems that life is incredibly simpler for the person who is independently secure. 
Virtual play, then, is a self-initiated and self-enclosed experience in which one re-
sponds and receives instant feedback. While it can be seen as a truth that some people 
will never move toward understanding, there is a new way through the virtual.  
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 Philosophers such as Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Rancière cry out for 
the individual to claim and preserve her unique inner self. With this lamenting, we 
can better recognize the degeneration of humankind through a conformed mentality. It 
is promising that the virtual has been attained so quickly, as it clearly offers a portal to 
other worlds that could never before be imagined. Rather than constantly looking to 
the past and fearing the loss of it, perhaps we can move onwards into a digitally en-
lightened realm. 
Virtual Aesthetics  
 It has been said that art is the chief organ of the imaginative life.   Art inher147 -
ently demands the use of interaction, imagination, and perception. These modes of 
cognition offer fundamental pathways that lead to new forms of curiosity and dis-
cernment. These cognitive mechanisms are amplified within virtual play. Due in part 
to intense aesthetic realism in virtual gaming, there is a thin haze that causes one to 
believe that multiple spaces of thinking and being are available while engaged in play. 
There is a pure sense of delight in this experience. These imaginative capacities assist 
in finding pathways to new realities, which allow one to come upon distinctively nov-
el ways of being in the world. Connecting imagination with expression, painter Piet 
Mondrian states, “The universal is what all art seeks to express.”   Mondrian seeks 148
expression of the beautiful and spirit through aesthetics, and states that the universal 
in each person is and remains constant, as the individual is always being repeated and 
renewed. Further, he discusses that happiness is found through “perpetual rebirth of 
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the changeable.”   Viewing nature in this way of human-ness runs concurrently to 149
the virtual. Mondrian goes further to express the purification of spirit that is found 
through plastic arts: 
 ...Through the new spirit, man himself creates a new 
beauty, whereas in the past he only painted and de-
scribed the beauty of nature. This new beauty has be-
come indispensable to the new man, for in it he ex-
presses his own image in equivalent opposition with 
nature.THE NEW ART IS BORN.   150
 While this was written by Mondrian in 1920, his enthusiasm can be felt today 
and echoes the freedom with which individuals may find themselves in the virtual. By 
extending past limitations of the ego and popular emotion, and finding a new path to 
the ultimate inner spirit, the individual can create what she was always meant to be-
come. Thus, through the experience through art via the virtual, the human can be re-
born. Mondrian speaks at length about the new possibilities to expand the definition 
of art, and thus, expand the definition of the human: 
 The new spirit must be manifested in all the arts with-
out exception. That there are differences between the 
arts is no reason that one should be valued less than the 
other; that can lead to another appearance but not to an 
opposed appearance. As soon as one art becomes plastic 
expression of the abstract, the others can no longer re-
main plastic expressions of the natural. The two do not 
go together: from this comes their mutual hostility 
down to the present. The New Plastic abolishes this an-
tagonism: it creates the unity of all the arts. [. . .] Sculp-
ture and architecture, until the present, destroy space as 
space by dividing it. The new sculpture and architecture 
must destroy the work of art as an object or thing.   151
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To view play in the virtual as a form of art and look at it akin to Mondrian’s call to 
abandon the object-ness of art, virtual play falls neatly into place in terms of the his-
torical process of creative evolution. While plastic art, sculpture, performance, pho-
tography, video, and new media have moved toward new concepts of what space is or 
can be, it is clear that the form of the virtual is an apparent next step in the acquiring 
of higher consciousness through aesthetic means. If it is acknowledged that negative 
concepts such as poverty, scarcity, non-productive busy-ness, and stereotypes are 
promoted and perpetuated through propaganda and mainstream media, the unlimited 
potential of the human might be understood. Empowering concepts of potentiality are 
contemplated more deeply when an individual briefly steps backward from the uni-
versal mind and retreats into her inner authenticity. Thus, it can be seen as helpful that 
players will disengage from the buzz of mainstream when resigning into play through 
the virtual. Within this conscious societal detachment, the individual finds her “self.” 
She discovers that fictitious constructs consisting of time and space that she once be-
lieved to be true are actually non-existent. She learns that she creates time through the 
game. It can be claimed that this conscious state of meditative interactivity in the vir-
tual is next in the evolution of creativity. 
Appearances of the Real 
 Forms of freedom and power become revealed when diving deep into the na-
ture of the virtual. When young, many children are given a privileged access to the 
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concept of purity through innocence. All who will begin their journey in life are born 
free and full of what might be called “truth.” In the newborn human, what is found is 
an essential freedom, which is revealed through self-awareness. If a truth can be told, 
this is it. All are inherently free. One can discover this through the meditative tenden-
cies in the virtual. In the game, freedom is the only option. Sartre aptly states, “Man 
cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is 
not free at all.”   German idealist and Hegel contemporary, Friedrich Schelling sees 152
the essential human contribution to the world begins with the principles of human 
creativity.   He believes that there is something which unites everyone at a primal 153
core, which is called pantheism. This term is defined as a world soul––a single pres-
ence within the whole of nature.   Thus, his hypothesis states there is a universal soul 154
in each human. When a human is born, she begins her life absolutely free. Through 
the processes of modeling, the phenomenal touch between truth and humanity might 
become concealed. During one's life, then, the human strives to re-connect with her 
universal soul, or truth. Today, the game of misrecognition affords the individual the 
opportunity to re-connect with her universal purpose. Through creativity, the human 
is struck with aesthetic emotion which informs at a non-verbal level. Playing in the 
virtual helps to achieve this universal re-connection. 
 Schelling further offers a utopian concept within the universe found through 
forms of art. If nature cannot explain its beauty through words, the output of human 
knowledge and response can offer the inner essence of life. We can better understand 
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nature through art just as we can contemplate the subjective through the objective. 
Schelling calls for a new a mythological renewal of divine beauty within nature.  155
The virtual, then, could provide new forms full of aesthetic experiences that are able 
to produce new thoughts of spiritual understanding. Schelling does not see these 
mythologies as a new system, but as a new form of life: 
 Certainly one who could write completely the history of 
their own life would also have, in a small epitome, con-
currently grasped the history of the cosmos. Most peo-
ple turn away from what is concealed within themselves 
just as they turn away from the depths of the great life 
and shy away from the glance into the abysses of that 
past which are still in one just as much as the present.    156
Similar notions of truth are revealed through new measure within Platonic notions. 
Socrates speaks through Plato in Phaedrus: 
 For a human being must understand a general idea 
formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason 
the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recol-
lection of those real things which our soul once beheld, 
when it journeyed with a god and, lifting its vision 
above the things which we now say exist, rose up to 
real being.    157
While Plato has a general uneasiness for these nuanced sensitivities, as he saw art as 
inherently deceptive due to never reaching the truth, it can be seen that 2500 years 
later, this uncovering of the truth may be unwrapped once again through the virtual as 
a vessel to interpretations of enlightened truth. Contemporary Slovenian philosopher, 
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Slavoj Žižek discusses the concept of truth, phenomena of the real, and appearance. 
He sees that truth is not so much a real concept, but it can be seen as the view of an 
object without a distorting sense of subject. Žižek states that there is a detachment 
that separates perspectives from each other.   Within this gap is a truth: 158
 The Real is the appearance as appearance; it not only 
appears within appearances, it also is nothing but its 
own appearance—it is simply a certain grimace of real-
ity, a certain imperceptible, unfathomable, ultimately 
illusory feature that accounts for the absolute difference 
within identity. This Real is not the inaccessible beyond 
of phenomena, simply their doubling, the gap between 
two inconsistent phenomena, a perspective shift.   159
Kant discusses concepts such as the above mentioned similarly, though he leaves 
much of what he claims as incomplete: 
 What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is 
nothing but the representation of appearance; that the 
things which we intuit are not in themselves what we 
intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in 
themselves as they appear to us.   160
Žižek states that Hegel also finds Kant’s answers unfulfilling. Hegel believes that 
while Kant finds the unknowableness regarding the thing-in-itself to be a positive––
he stops himself too soon, as he does not give a whole vision of this revolution of the 
metaphysical world. Thus, Hegel makes the effort to take Kant’s basic premises fur-
ther: 
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 The Thing-in-itself expresses the object when we leave 
out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its 
determinate feelings and thoughts. It is easy to see what 
is left—utter abstraction, total emptiness, only de-
scribed still as a beyond—the negative of every repre-
sentation, feeling, and determination. Nor does it re-
quire much reflection to see that this caput mortuum is 
still only a product of thought... that it is the work of the 
empty I, which makes an object out of this empty self-
identity of its own... Hence one can only read with 
wonder the perpetual remark that we do not know the 
Thing-in-itself. On the contrary there is nothing we can 
know so easily.   161
Thus, Plato starts the initial musings on the metaphysical concepts of truth, the real, 
and freedom. Kant begins to unwrap these notions, and Hegel finds through both Pla-
to and Kant that there is this unknowable-ness, though it can be found quite easily, as 
it is inside of each person. If there is any kind of being-ness or universal-ness, then, it 
is inside of each human. If this were not the case, there would be no “truth.” There is 
either a whole or a nothing. Both concepts can be intertwined and they are one and 
the same. Within contemporary thought, Žižek concurs with Hegel, “the infinite Truth 
is ‘eternal’ and meta- with regard to the temporal process of Being; it is a flash of an-
other dimension transcending the positivity of Being.”     162
 Žižek sees through the many debates regarding metaphysics, phenomenology, 
and truth––and wisely states that what is to be found when getting to the essence of 
everything is, “only what we put there.”   The truth and our interpretation of it is 163
what we decide it will be. The virtual realm gives one an opportunity to explore a 
non-stifling way of being. With a fictional shift, Žižek quotes author C.S. Lewis and 
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his thoughts regarding his epiphany on his revelation that he, indeed, was a powerful 
human endowed with free will: 
 The odd thing was that before God closed in on me, I 
was in fact offered what now appears a moment of 
wholly free choice. In a sense I was going up Heading-
ton Hill on the top of a bus. Without words and (I think) 
almost without images, a fact about myself was some-
how presented to me. I became aware that I was hold-
ing something at bay, or shutting something out. Or, if 
you like, that I was wearing some stiff clothing, like 
corsets, or even a suit of armour, as if I were a lobster. I 
felt myself being, there and then, given a free choice. I 
could open the door or keep it shut; I could unbuckle 
the armour or keep it on. Neither choice was presented 
as a duty; no threat or promise was attached to either, 
though I knew that to open the door or to take off the 
corset meant the incalculable. The choice appeared to 
be momentous but it was also strangely unemotional. I 
was moved by no desires or fears. In a sense I was not 
moved by anything. I chose to open, to unbuckle, to 
loosen the rein. I say, "I chose," yet it did not really 
seem possible to do the opposite. On the other hand, I 
was aware of no motives. You could argue that I was 
not a free agent, but I am more inclined to think this 
came nearer to being a perfectly free act than most that 
I have ever done. Necessity may not be the opposite of 
freedom, and perhaps a man is most free when, instead 
of producing motives, he could only say, ‘I am what I 
do.’ Then came the repercussion on the imaginative 
level. I felt as if I were a man of snow at long last be-
ginning to melt. The melting was starting in my back—
drip-drip and presently trickle-trickle. I rather disliked 
the feeling.   164
This glimpse into a moment of authentic self-awareness is an astounding tale of a 
moment of emancipation. In Žižek’s text, The Act and its Vicissitudes, he discusses 
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this passage and explains that Lewis was clearly set free, yet still felt uncomfortable 
at the end of his description as he disliked the feeling of being aware. Discomfort sig-
nifies growth, so clearly Lewis was experiencing a quantum jump in awareness. Simi-
lar awakenings can most certainly be found when musing in the virtual. 
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Chapter Four 
Virtual Play: License to Create the Self 
  
 Evaluation is creation: hear it, you creative men! Valuating is itself the 
value and jewel of all valued things. Only through evaluation is there 
value: and without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow. 
Hear it, you creative men! A change in values––that means a change in 
the creators of values. He who has to be a creator also has to destroy. 
People were the creators at first; only later were individuals creators. 
Indeed, the individual himself is still the latest creation. 
 ––Friedrich Nietzsche 
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Anonymity 
 Within the previous chapter, new possibilities within the virtual via attaining 
higher sense of spirit and awareness have been established. Throughout this chapter, 
the capacity to willingly create the self as desired will be examined. The activity of 
play in the virtual provides beneficial mental applications including misrecognizing 
the ideal self, working in the form of anonymity, and embracing masked identity 
which supports the redefinition of conscious identity. 
 The sense of anonymity attained in the virtual world is an integral factor in the 
growth of higher self-consciousness. Idealism becomes a misrecognition at the point 
that Jacques Lacan states humans become detached from a perfect scenario and move 
into a perpetual state of always searching for the ideal. The birth of the virtual world 
has provided a loophole where one can go back to that self-reflexive moment and dis-
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cover the ideal self again and again. For, the authentic nature of the self is found 
when in the activity of play. Due to the accessibility of anonymity found in the virtu-
al, life itself becomes altered because one can now be who she wants to be. The ques-
tion is not about obtaining a true or false sense of reality as it is in finding the authen-
tic one. 
 A sense of anonymity becomes a virtual identity within the virtual world. An 
ideal sense of self can be attained quite genuinely in the virtual. The anonymous and 
virtual identity, then, can construct a much more perfect self, aligned with a height-
ened sense of awareness due to renewed sensibility and perception. No other forms of 
material commodities are needed to ignite consciousness. This positive way of think-
ing about technology is, again, a negation of a negation, as these worlds will bring the 
individual out of the spectacle of life and into the actuality of living, which is coming 
into a communion with the authentic self. 
 Through the virtual, a possibility has been created for a new renaissance in 
creative ways of being. New memories are created that replace previously held be-
liefs. Through this meditative state, one finds that she can become anyone, even if it 
is not in a physical state. The virtual causes a person to acknowledge her literal and 
mental surroundings. Rather than idly sitting in front of a television, the player con-
sciously and actively engages in situations that can certainly benefit her character, her 
outlook, and her perceptibility. 
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 Through anonymity, there is a pure state of detachment which allows con-
sciousness to interact in a space that is free of societal risks. Conditioned roles are put 
aside and the player can perform however she chooses. If she is a quiet person in 
physical day-to-day reality, she can become an outgoing dancer with large wings in 
the virtual. In the virtual, characters are accepted however they choose to present 
themselves. Further, if a person is more extroverted in physical reality, she can still 
behave as an extroverted character, although at this point it is on her own terms and 
she is aware of how she is presenting her self. 
 Becoming anonymous on a conscious level has become a useful next step on 
the road to higher self-awareness. Relishing in finding the inner self through the vir-
tual can be seen, then, as a necessary point in individual consciousness. Playing in the 
virtual world creates new ways to access other states of thought that may have been 
previously veiled. With more people learning about the freedom that is found in the 
virtual, the order of society becomes challenged. When one begins to play any game, 
she jumps into another universe and forgets about her daily routine in everyday phys-
ical life. Within the virtual world of the game, the player can become who she wants, 
she can go to other locations, and can live another life. There are no consequences as 
to her actions––just the same as the imagination. The player is centered in the mode 
of free play without restrictions. When the game is turned off and the player enters 
back into her current now, she may be able to see events more clearly with a new ap-
proach to problem-solving. 
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 Anonymity offers a renewed sense of power to the player. The self is first seen 
in the mind, and then the sense of novel perception can transfer into physical life. The 
experience allows one to see her own authentic self outside of the virtual reality. In 
the virtual, there is room for invention and the art of living is discovered. When play-
ing in the virtual, the activity is done in real time, and the experience envelops and 
responds to the player. This is a sharp contrast to simply reading travel magazines, 
watching a film, or talking with a person in a physical situation. 
Polyphonics in the Virtual 
 Due to the game experience being one of interaction with a form of dialogue, 
it is also a form of polyphonic discourse. Playing in the virtual as a polyphonic voice 
leads to interchangeable positions. Just as the writing of Dostoevsky probes thoughts 
and questions, and does not give answers, the polyphonic nature of the virtual twists 
in parallel branches. These parallels lead to the importance of the virtual’s contribu-
tion in society as a language that rethinks issues of structure, evolution, and individu-
ality, all illusions for the sake of forms of power. The virtual, becomes, then, a new 
possibility to re-imagine the world, with all of its unconscious processes of control. 
Looking inwards with the virtual and moving past a controlling system, the experi-
ence becomes a form of awareness, and the role of playing in the virtual becomes 
self-consciousness. New technologies create conditions for a new kind of polyphon-
ics: the technological or digital polyphonics. Here we see the world of virtual play 
function similarly to the novel as a creative form of giving and taking, only now more 
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heightened. Mikhail Bakhtin speaks of the birth of the novel, “From the very begin-
ning, the novel was structured not in the distanced image of the absolute past but in 
the zone of direct contact with inconclusive present-day reality.”   165
 Bakhtin shares notions of the mirror image with Lacan. In addition, they see 
eye-to-eye regarding the Other in the mind.   Bakhtin views the act of looking at 166
oneself in the mirror as working in the dialogic imagination. Bakhtin believes that 
when one looks in the mirror, the individual sees the entire vista of what others see 
and believes about this individual and legacy.   The mirror, then, can be used as a 167
tool in order to view the self from the minds of others. Here, the mirror translates to 
the screen, and the virtual character(s) translate to many minds and a plane of possi-
bilities. For Bakhtin, this could be seen as a benefit as this mode of interacting offers 
the ability to create a life and weave one’s way amidst many others and work from a 
dialogical standpoint in order to achieve greater realization of the “whole” of life, 
rather than a hole in life. 
The Carnivalesque  
 In fact, carnival does not know footlights, in the sense 
that it does not acknowledge any distinction between 
actors and spectators.... Carnival is not a spectacle seen 
by the people; they live in it, and everyone participates 
because its very idea embraces all the people. While 
carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it. During 
carnival time life is subject only to its laws, that is, the 
laws of its own freedom. It has a universal spirit; it is a 
special condition of the entire world, of the world's re-
vival and renewal, in which all take part. Such is the 
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essence of carnival, vividly felt by all its participants.... 
The tradition of the Saturnalias remained unbroken and 
alive in the medieval carnival, which expressed this 
universal renewal and was vividly felt as an escape 
from the usual official way of life.   168
Likewise to the concepts of the reflected appearance and polyphonic interchange, we 
turn to the concept of the carnivalesque aspects within the virtual. The bliss of play––
and enjoying oneself for the sake of experiencing pleasure––clearly demonstrates the 
adjoining relationship between virtual play and the carnivale.   Gaming can be seen 169
as carnivalesque in that it turns the reality of life on its head and throws aside hierar-
chal conventions and authority. The carnivale is seen by Bakhtin as a “world inside 
out.”   It is fragmented from common reality and offers a freedom that goes further 170
than the typical notion of what a life could be. The carnivale does act according to 
certain rules, yet it subverts them into something flexible that can angle along with 
imaginative properties. With both the virtual and the carnivale, anything is possible 
when bending rules. Bakhtin sees the carnivale as that which puts forth, “the chance 
to have a new outlook on the world, to realize the relative nature of all that exists, and 
to enter a completely new order of things.”   This concept is clearly relative to play171 -
ing in the virtual, as the perspective becomes something completely irreverent, yet 
playful and permissible. The transformative process of the player engaging in the 
game shows clearly the developmental and broadening scope of the carnivalesque 
aspect. 
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 Critical to the metamorphic aspects in the virtual play process is the universal-
ity of the experience blended with the force of action in the player. The Dionysian 
renewal that purges and reclaims its spiritual self is consistently at work in the game. 
For, the Dionysian figure is that which is becoming––it is the truest version of the 
self. What is found when actively playing in the virtual is an archaic and delighted 
nature. There, an innocence is found. Within the game, the player unwittingly hushes 
the ego. The Bacchanalian rebirth that occurs removes the original sense of the ordi-
nary. Today, in the world of the virtual, these Ancient Greek notions are now tethered 
in technological and digital settings. These other dimensions offer various perspec-
tives into the carnivalesque attributes to life. In the carnivale, all are one and face the 
same fate. Within the carnivale, people laugh in the face of fate––amor fati––and en-
joy the life one is given.   This acceptance of one’s life and the acknowledgement of 172
what comes of it offers an agreement. Interestingly, Nietzsche discusses the concept 
of the eternal return, in which one should live their life as if they would eternally live 
it over again. So, too, in the world of the game, death does not last long, and the abili-
ty to try again is unending. 
 An important question––is the virtual merely a spectacle much like the carni-
vale, or is it a powerfully creative experience? Bakhtin claims the medieval Feast of 
Fools was authentically carnivalesque, and that the more contemporary Mardi Gras 
has become a spectacle.   I argue that games in the virtual offers a new wave of over173 -
tones that echo the seriousness with which the Feast of Fools began. Only now, how-
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ever, the game experience is accompanied together with technological advances and 
philosophical concepts, which are grounded in creative change. Mardi Gras may have 
been simply a show, though gaming is now taking on a virtual and constant festival 
that offers all forms of delight, celebration, thought, action, and revelry. The carniva-
lesque nature of virtual gaming undoubtedly echoes the notion of Dionysian renewal 
and ecstasy. 
 While Bacchanalian festivals are well known to hold high the reverie of im-
morality and hedonism, the same concept is found in similarly to the likeness of gam-
ing to the celebration of life and renewal. When looking at the game regarding Diony-
sus and the carnivale, Bakhtin sees the inwardness coupled with togetherness to be a 
positive. Furthermore, he sees togetherness and positivity come together as a lan-
guage that is dialogical. The chaos of a non-streamlined activity offers the chance at 
self-creation in that it connects one to many. Because the inwardness is coupled with 
technological dialogic and polyphonic interaction, the ultimate self may be born. 
 To continue the comparison between gaming and the carnivale, these experi-
ences promote change and abruption, movement and manifesting. Bakhtin sees the 
carnivale as that which gives solace to those who do indeed live a double life. Their 
prior dogmatic existence disappears at the festival where all is perfectly acceptable, 
and there is equality amongst the players and spectators. The desire to be released is 
not new––it is beheld as the attaining of a sense of freedom. The freeing power is a 
form of deliverance and breaks a person free from monotony. Further, Bakhtin looks 
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at both the classical body and the grotesque body. He sees the classical body as some-
thing that is complete and individual. He sees the grotesque body, which we can see 
akin to the carnivalesque notions in many virtual games as something that is freeing 
and unlimited. Bakhtin states that the grotesque body is “never finished, never com-
pleted; it is continually built, created and builds and creates another body.”   174
 Within virtual gameplay, if one desires to engage in any activity––be it non-
purposeful, simply aesthetic, or even violent––they are free to do so in a non-conse-
quential atmosphere. It is in amusement and recreation––and here, it is permitted. In 
the video game, just as the carnivalesque experience, connections abound including 
spiritual awakenings, self-transformations, and evolving awarenesses. Transformation 
through acts of the carnivalesque highlight the possibility as to what Bakhtin sees as a 
promise for a utopian freedom which will occur due to the free rein on thought and 
becoming. The regenerative capacity of the carnivale offers a window to process and 
understand one’s life creatively, and to unearth the creative spirit. Here, the carniva-
lesque becomes a merging of activities in which utopian pleasure ensues. Day-to-day 
life intricacies are abandoned for a time of festivity and retreat, even if in the virtual 
through the game or the festival. 
 Hierarchies are abolished in the virtual, and what can be found is a world free 
from societal stagnation. The space of open access in the virtual gives one the chance 
to play and enjoy life a second time––in a new way. Here in the virtual––just as in the 
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carnivale––the clown is king now, as there is little difference between he who thinks 
he's a king and he who is a king. 
 Furthermore, with reference to the carnivale, we can look to the four cate-
gories that Bakhtin tells us comprise the carnivalesque attributes and note that these 
characteristics closely resemble the components of virtual play: 
1. Familiar and free interaction between people.  
2. Eccentric behavior when one's natural behavior is accepted and appreciated without 
consequence.  
3. Carnivalistic misalliances in which it is acceptable that all which is commonly sep-
arated to reunite.  
4. Sacrilegious in which events could take place that would not end in punishment or 
discipline.   175
 To discuss the first component, “Familiar and free interaction between 
people,” each player knows what level one is on and acknowledges the space in 
which they both currently exist in both the game and the carnivale. In the carniva-
lesque space, there is no resentment or doubts. All are, essentially, on the same page 
in the virtual world. All are swimming in the same pool of virtuality and realize this is 
something new––which offers limitless potential of a productive and authentic expe-
rience. The interaction is a continual dialogue. In Bakhtinian terms, dialogism is an 
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open-ended process that does not end––it is an existential process of humanity. 
Bakhtin claims this polyphonic dialogism is a condition that binds doubly between 
the self and the Other. Bakhtin’s dialogism states that discourse is ongoing, and so it 
is in the virtual game.   It is always already and continuously circling the present. 176
 Regarding the second attribute, “Eccentric behavior when one's natural behav-
ior is accepted and appreciated without consequence,” the level of eccentricity in the 
virtual indeed remains at certain points according to the nature of the game. In gam-
ing, however, there are no set rules for behavior as there is in physical civilization. 
Thus, eccentric behavior is permitted and not questioned in games that call for such 
freedom. The openness for one to behave how they wish without consequence is key 
to the power of finding a true self as there is infinite room to expand and revel within 
a space of pleasure. 
 The third component, “Carnivalistic misalliances in which it is acceptable that 
all which is commonly separated to reunite,” is important to virtual gameplay. In the 
virtual reality of the video game, it is unlimited yet confined to the specific Metaverse 
in which one is playing. In physical reality, there is one earth with many places. In the 
Metaverse, it is known that all are in on the one concept, whether they are moving 
about freely or together. There is an understanding that all are one yet can be separate. 
There is little confusion in the virtual Metaverse. The rules are embedded in an intu-
itive sense, not rigid or laden with guilt or a sense of specified duty. 
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 The last category, “Sacrilegious in which events could take place that would 
not end in punishment or discipline,” correlates to the video game in that there are no 
consequences that will end in harm in the physical world. The world of virtual game-
play, just as the world of the carnivale, is understood to be a non-judgmental space 
and the player is free to engage however she wants. If she wants to play a competitive 
game that includes violence, it is fine to pursue in the virtual. There is a release in 
which she can let go. The action in violent situations in a game will not pressure the 
player into seeking further violence when finished playing. The player engages in the 
adventure and is satisfied when done. Just as a person enjoys the thrill of a horror film 
without getting hurt, the gamer enjoys a larger thrill by taking part as closely as one 
can without actual damage being created when complete. The game responds to the 
player, which is something that has never occurred before. 
Becoming All 
 Furthermore, when a gamer plays in the game, she becomes all due to the 
scope of the virtual atmosphere with which she is immersed. The imagination is im-
mediately activated, along with perceptions. Playing and becoming all can be seen as 
a new form of training in perception. The imaginary deals with the capacity to con-
ceptualize images and how these images reflect on to the self. While it may be uttered 
endlessly that more can be done by way of teaching art and culture, it is imperative to 
integrate the teachings of awareness coupled with perception and imagination in order 
to progress further into the twenty-first century. Virtual play is an answer to this long 
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heard call. Virtual play puts forth ways in which the mind and body connect with new 
potential. The experiences within the game offer future ways of learning and becom-
ing more than might currently be realized. While the video game is largely seen as a 
commoditized object, the transformative power offered is yet unrealized potential. 
The experiential nature of playing in the game gives the player a new sense of ful-
fillment and optimal hope for what is possible. When the player begins to play, she 
dives into the newness of the game and experience. She becomes a being that is im-
mersed with others. She can become multiple characters. She indeed becomes all. 
Once the player becomes all, the becoming aspect is that of the universal. In the vir-
tual space, there are no prescribed social spheres, presumed ways of being, or judg-
ment that will affect one’s character. 
 By choosing identities and trying out different points of view, the player may 
experience empathy. The player can now see the world from a different point that 
may have otherwise never been known. While Nietzsche rejects notions of empathy, 
he says that he does understand how and why others act as they do.   Nietzsche can 177
relate to the way others feel even if he does not agree with them.   I argue that empa178 -
thy is indeed a step closer to a higher state of self-consciousness. Being able to relate 
without the experience or knowledge lets the ego diminish away from the personal 
sensibility, as this is a state of detachment or Kantian disinterestedness. For, key to 
enlightened forms of thinking, particularly according to Zen Buddhism, is losing the 
self. Empathy, therefore, assists in the loss of self. The concept of the loss of self on 
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the journey to self-awareness regarding Zen Buddhism can be seen in the Zen Bud-
dhist wood print entitled “Ten Bulls of Zen” by Kakuan.   The print depicts the 179
process of self-realization and awakening. The depiction shows an ox herder who is 
to be identified with the self and the ox that is to be identified as the authentic self. 
This ten-step process towards self-awareness can be likened to the experience of the 
virtual experience. The steps are as follows:  
 1. The Search for the Bull  
 2. Discovering the Footprints  
 3. First Sight of the Bull  
 4. Catching the Bull  
 5. Taming the Bull  
 6. Riding the Bull Home  
 7. The Bull Transcended (Bull Forgotten, Self Alone)  
 8. Both Bull and Self Transcended (or Forgotten)  
 9. Reaching the Source  
 10. In the World 
In the etchings and descriptions, the process of awakening is when the self and ego 
regard one another and then lose one another in order to discover that life is not as 
much about the self, but about appreciating and experiencing the current reality, how-
ever mundane or spectacular it may be at the moment. The last image depicts the now 
authentic individual who has explored all moments of understanding, empathy, and 
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awareness. While he does not appear any different, he has a new found inner under-
standing of reality and goes about the marketplace as he did before. However, he now 
has much to offer to others by way of his enlightened consciousness.   These modes 180
can be attained through the virtual game.  
 The player first approaches the experience as the known self. The player 
meets the Other self, which is her authentic self, while playing the game. The Other 
can be seen in various ways––as the character being played or the other characters. 
While playing, she discovers what it means to be a living being with a physical reali-
ty, specifically due to the transparent nature of the other-world of gaming. She thus 
sees the Other and feels a connection but does not yet understand how or why she 
feels a certain way to that Other. She, the player, feels a certain discontentment 
though cannot quite discover what it is that she is missing. She recognizes these emo-
tions and looks to unearth her feelings (which may be buried under the role of the 
self). She is in search of a path and begins to understand how to acquire a sense of 
well-being. She sees certain notions of how to attain a sense of peace, but does not 
know how to find this peace as of yet. She then realizes that her life is in her own 
hands. She does indeed have the power to decide and control how she wants to live. 
She, just as in Plato's Cave, is seeing the illusion of reality that she has always be-
lieved, and is coming out of the dark shadows. After realizing that she is free, the ox-
herder (or player) truly enjoys the reality that she can now actually see, ruminate, and 
play. She can release her prior pent-up energies and achieve untainted awareness.  
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 It is seen that this awareness can only be attained when the self is able to see 
the Other self for what it is. While this may have been done in the mind alone prior to 
the digital age, the digital era now offers emancipation in the game. The gamer or ox-
herder now sees that the Other was merely the experience of everyday life. Thus, the 
experience of the self and the perceived reality has been overcome. All is whole, unit-
ed, and one once these concepts are erased. The player, then, sees and understands the 
true nature of reality. As she understands the miracle of life through the transcending 
of self, she is able to put forth these energies into society. Here, too, it can be likened 
to the virtual. She has understood what was once thought to be true and false are con-
cepts of the mind. She then goes about her life with others and does not retreat to a 
life of exclusivity. She is prepared to put forth her exuberance for this understanding 
of life––if her thoughts are to be validated and received. 
 This transcending of social and ideological structures keeps the evolution of 
creativity moving upwards. With this other-world experience, a new culture is 
achieved that combines qualities of stability with elasticity and is afforded to the in-
dividual with no sacrifice to their physical being. By progressing above limits of what 
can be done in society while in the virtual, advances can be made in the world of the 
individual––thus the society in which she inhabits. Is it possible to view the world of 
virtual play as a new form of culture? If it is not located in a physical space, it can be 
viewed similarly within the confines of the mind. The culture in the virtual makes the 
development of human potential possible. For, if we deduce that there is no natural or 
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natural space per se, we might ask how the virtual might be seen. Society is a space in 
the minds of the societal members which is thought of as an ordered way to allow 
people to believe in the natural way of living and behaving according to social norms. 
If people reside in both their mind and in society, the only way to progress is to chal-
lenge assumptions and follow through into new ways of thought and becoming all. 
The Mask That Causes Freedom 
 Further along the lines of self-creation, the aspect of the mask can be sewn 
together through Bakhtin and the virtual. The mask itself keeps the player anony-
mous, yet it also renews. The mask conceals the player, and she is free to roam and 
play with abandon. Viewing the mask further, it connects revelry with dissimilarity, 
and it allows the energy of play to abound. The dissonant mode of disguise rejects the 
uniform nature of conformity.   181
 While the mask indeed conceals, it also opens other pathways into new forms 
of participation and communication, and ignites a new form of free social space that 
encourages life and art to mix while connecting to play and action. In these circum-
stances, differing voices are heard and connect, which break down previously held 
beliefs and stereotypical exchange. The opportunity for new points of view empowers 
genuine communication. Thus, the player is no longer an individual mind––a collec-
tive consciousness occurs, and the person becomes aware.   While in the act of play 182
and wearing a mask, the player is continuously evolving and becoming, as the mask is 
transitory and metamorphosing. She is renewing herself, while staying together or 
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communal in the collective Metaverse. Just as there is a constant creative evolution of 
all people together, the one player is not a lone figure, but a part to the whole of the 
history of humanity. 
 Furthermore, anonymity is synonymous with namelessness. Onomastics, the 
study of names, is a significant area to consider with relation to the virtual and 
anonymity. Naming is rapidly changing in the virtual. Prior to the virtual, names were 
considered a permanent fixture on identity. Names were seen as a label for the indi-
vidual. The player is offered many ways of describing who she is in the Metaverse. A 
name in the virtual is now called a username, screen name, handle, login name, and 
nickname. With these changes in names, we might see the user as essentially name-
less if a name is so easily pliant. Losing one’s name can be seen as a therapeutic 
equivalent to finding oneself, for to lose oneself is to find oneself. By losing one’s 
self, a new self-knowledge is attained. 
 Matters of names and the nameless can be equated with anonymity as being 
the nameless. When wearing the mask of anonymity, then, power is acquired. The ego 
with baggage is lost as the name that is filled with the past is dropped when entering 
the game. The player, who acquires a new name in the virtual, does not rely on past 
experiences in physical space to decide upon how she is going to navigate in the vir-
tual. The experience in the world of the virtual is a new terrain for her to explore 
without a name or past. Also important to consider is the urging of game systems to 
ask the player to make sure their name is not identifiable for security purposes. The 
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insistence of the changing of the name is a subtle notion showing the silent pushing of 
the user to open up to unanticipated possibilities. 
The Cheerful Death  
 In grotesque realism, therefore, the bodily element is 
deeply positive. It is presented not in a private, egoistic 
form, severed from the other spheres of life, but as so-
mething universal, representing all the people.   183
 We can next look to the concept of death in relation to the virtual gaming ex-
perience. It can be observed that when a person does not approach life with an irrev-
erent enthusiasm, impassivity ensues. Fear and apathy dissipate when a celebration 
occurs due to the carnivalesque aspect of an immortal collective. In the virtual game, 
the player is continuously given more chances––more lives. If the player “dies” in the 
video game, she can begin again––she experiences a virtual rebirth. In a sense, here, 
the player learns how to die––she learns about death in an awakened state. Further-
more, the player can re-set the game if she is unhappy with her prior moves. With this 
renewing state in mind, Bakhtin discusses the clownish portrayal of death about 
which French Renaissance writer François Rabelais writes in the sixteenth century. 
Rabelais writes of death as a comic portion to life, as it is what occurs in life though 
is not the end of a grand picture. We can then view this concept clearly likened to 
gameplay. With the infinite number of lives or turns a character can take in the game, 
the idea of the sole individual dying and eternally ending is halted. Here, death is 
something that is productive. It is not a narrow biological fact of life, but rather an 
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event that embraces the whole of life. In his writing, Rabelais seeks to knock down 
the past concept of a sorrowful death and display the soul and eternity of humanity. 
Bakhtin states: 
 Death is an ambivalent image for Rabelais and for the 
popular sources from which he drew his material; there-
fore, death can be gay. While depicting an individual 
body in the throes of death, this image also shows a 
glimpse of another youthful body being born; even if it 
is not shown or directly named, it is implicit in the im-
age. Where death is, there also is birth, change, renew-
al. The image of birth is no less ambivalent; it repre-
sents the body that is born and at the same time shows a 
glimpse of the departing one. In the first case we have 
the negative pole but without a break with the positive 
pole; in the second case, we have the reverse, the posi-
tive continuous with the negative. The image of the un-
derworld also bears this ambivalent character; it con-
tains the past, the rejected and condemned, as unworthy 
to dwell in the present, as something useless and obso-
lete. But it also gives us a glimpse of the new life, of 
the future that is born, for it is this future that finally 
kills the past.   184
Thus, Rabelais describes stories of death being a renewal of life and laughter. Bakhtin 
writes, “The “cheerful death” of Rabelais not only coincides with a high value placed 
on life and with a responsibility to fight to the end for this life––but it is in itself an 
expression of this high evaluation, an expression of the life force that eternally tri-
umphs over any death.”   Here, then, the player experiences a renewed relationship 185
with death. 
The Renewal of Self 
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 True reality is merely this process of reinstating self––
identity, of reflecting into its own self in and from its 
other, and is not an original and primal unity as such, 
not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its 
own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as 
its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes 
concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by 
the end it involves.   186
 To view notions of identity further, the 2011 film, The Skin I Live In, can offer 
further insight into the concept of one changing her outer appearance and, thus, the 
character discovers her inner core.   In director Pedro Almodovar's film, the main 187
male character, Dr. Ledgard, alters the female character’s identity, which provides a 
journey for her to find her true self. The film is quite dark and disturbing, though, in-
terestingly enough, so are a multitude of video games. Perhaps the cathartic release in 
both the tense film and the suspenseful video game can provide subconscious under-
tones regarding one altering her external identity in order to find her internal one-
ness.  
 An additional example of the conscious and physical act of changing one’s 
appearance and identity can be seen in reference to the performance artist, Orlan. Or-
lan is a contemporary artist who has changed her physical appearance over time. She 
used her body as the actual form of art and underwent great amounts of plastic 
surgery in order to confront common conventional stereotypes of what a female fig-
ure––or even any human figure––should look like. Her work, which is referred to as 
carnal art, is interesting to consider as she is confronting the cliched versions of body, 
identity, and power to create the self. Compared to concealed surgery where the pa-
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tient receives plastic surgery, though does not disclose the fact, Orlan makes the entire 
surgery an enormous spectacle. The sensational experience where she is recorded and 
invites celebrities into the operating room exposes the truth that each person has the 
ability to consciously create their self. Orlan states, “I can observe my own body cut 
open, without suffering!... I see myself all the way down to my entrails; a new mirror 
stage.”   188
 Digital technologies and creative thinking––together through the virtual––
have become a turning point in history. Because of the accelerated speed that the vir-
tual has allowed humanity to access, people are growing more enlightened in mind 
and spirit at an increased pace more than previous eras. The virtual age can be seen 
similarly to a form of a renaissance. Communication, connection, and understanding 
have grown immensely with the advent of the virtual. The virtual indeed affects phys-
ical reality itself, along with the perceived notion of time and space. Nietzsche pro-
claims that the importance of our basic concept of reality is constructed in no part on 
our own, and the importance placed on reality is entirely overrated.   Philosopher 189
Emmanuel Lévinas refers to the notion of interrupting history as a positive endeavor. 
In his text, On Escape, Lévinas discusses the necessity and positivity of a metaphori-
cal escape from being. He speaks of the need to escape into something other than be-
ing. He shows that escapism––like panoptic paranoia and Heidegger’s anxiety––is a 
real necessity. Here, we can see escaping in a positive sense. Lévinas claims, “Escap-
ing is the quest for the marvelous, which is liable to break up the somnolence of our 
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bourgeois existence.”   In the introductory essay by Jacques Rolland entitled, “Get190 -
ting out of Being by a New Path,” he discusses the possibility of changing one’s being 
from certain oppressions, and thus escaping into a new and open world full of possi-
bilities. The escape is not a nihilistic move, but can be seen as a form of revolution. 
Thus, virtual technology can be likened to an autonomous mode of creative imagining 
that overcomes the powers that constrain and oppress. For, even without the aware-
ness that this is occurring, the player happily escapes or consciously withdrawals. 
Lévinas states that these forms of escape are, in essence, a search for refuge. He sees 
escape as something more than getting out. He sees escape as way to go 
somewhere.   To quote Lévinas: 191
 Temporal existence takes on the inexpressible flavor of 
the absolute. The elementary truth that there is being––
a being that has value and weight––is revealed at a 
depth that measures its brutality and its seriousness. 
The pleasant game of life ceases to be just a game. It is 
not that the sufferings with which life threatens us ren-
der it displeasing; rather it is because the ground of suf-
fering consists of the impossibility of interrupting it, 
and of an acute feeling of being held fast [rive]. The 
impossibility of getting out of the game and of giving 
back to things their toy-like uselessness heralds the pre-
cise instant at which infancy comes to an end, and de-
fines the very notion of seriousness What counts then, 
in all this experience of being, is the discovery not of a 
new characteristic of our existence, but of its very fact, 
of the permanent quality itself of our presence.   192
 We can look further within new ways of experiencing consciousness within 
the virtual. In his novel, Nausea, Jean-Paul Sartre writes about existence and con-
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sciousness, and draws the character into a dilemma in which he discovers his own 
being, along with the objects around him. He does not see his own essence, nor does 
he see the essence of the objects. Life as he had previously known it was thrown into 
a new semblance. “And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had 
suddenly unveiled itself.”   Sartre likens this awakening to a state of nausea. Virtual 193
play, then, can also be seen as an experience that offers the player the new view of her 
own existence. It can be said that to be thrown into existence is to be free, with no 
definition of the reality into which one is thrown. 
 Technology continues to develop rapidly and the virtual experience is growing 
further open-ended as to types of virtual games available at any moment to a player. 
While this nausea beckons the player to see and understand her common existence 
compared to that of an object, she now has an infinite number of experiences in which 
she can take part at any given moment. She can jump into any skin and become any 
character in order to redeem her authentic self. The nausea dissipates once the essence 
of life is found in the game. A common way of life is to live in a fictitious manner, 
however, utilizing these pathways toward freedom opens up new possibilities into 
unique ways to re-discover the pure self. 
 Play in the virtual would not be as powerful without the artistic visuals that 
project such a crisp and other-worldly vision of spaces never before conceived. With 
respect to the aesthetic nature of the game, emotions are heightened when playing. 
Twentieth century British art critic, Clive Bell, concludes that this type of emotion 
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must be something that is elicited by an ever-present quality that is set art apart from 
other objects. Bell sees that there is indeed a common set of traits that unify and de-
fine what is called art. With this, any object that instigates this emotion is called a 
work of art. The nature of such responses is necessarily varied. Bell is not saying that 
all works of art incite the same state, instead they all produce a different feeling. Bell 
states: 
 The starting-point for all systems of aesthetics must be 
the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The ob-
jects that provoke this emotion we call works of art. All 
sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion 
provoked by works of art. I do not mean, of course, that 
all works provoke the same emotion. On the contrary, 
every work produces a different emotion. But all these 
emotions are recognisably the same in kind; so far, at 
any rate, the best opinion is on my side. That there is a 
particular kind of emotion provoked by works of visual 
art, and that this emotion is provoked by every kind of 
visual art, by pictures, sculptures, buildings, pots, carv-
ings, textiles, etc., etc., is not disputed, I think, by any-
one capable of feeling it. This emotion is called the aes-
thetic emotion; and if we can discover some quality 
common and peculiar to all the objects that provoke it, 
we shall have solved what I take to be the central prob-
lem of aesthetics. We shall have discovered the essen-
tial quality in a work of art, the quality that distinguish-
es works of art from all other classes of objects.    194
Bell proposes that although works of art are made up of many qualities, the concept 
of a significant form, which is made up of lines and colors, is something that exists in 
all works of art.   The semblance to the artistic visibility within the virtual game 195
goes hand in hand with Bell’s sense of aesthetic emotion. In fact, the personal experi-
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ence of a particular emotion is the starting point for all of the systems of aesthetics. 
Thus, it may be seen that the virtual game, too, encompasses both aesthetic emotion 
and significant form. 
 It is through the individual that art is to be sensed. If the experience in the 
game is that of aesthetic emotion coupled with significant form, the individual grasps 
moments of euphoria and pleasure akin to––or far better than––the experience of 
viewing fine art. This, in essence, is the ultimate feeling of being in control of the 
self. 
 Nietzsche speaks of discovering the renewed self in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra.   Nietzsche sees the human as one who is capable of continually chang196 -
ing, always questioning and creating her own life––if only she would acknowledge it 
is possible. Nietzsche, however, does not believe that we are to become this new be-
ing from scratch, nor are we to erase and forget about our past. That is not necessary. 
Instead, Nietzsche says we are to live and then come to an understanding and take 
decisive actions as to the fact that we want to live life fully, on our terms, not auto-
matically or ordinarily. Nietzsche wants humanity to step up to life and take back 
control. However, we could never take back this control in the beginning if it were 
always available initially. It is necessary that it is lost before it is found by way of the 
negation of the negation––thus, a contradiction. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
weaves together an epic story of Zarathustra (Zoroaster) who takes the reader on a 
metamorphosis of an individual who eventually creates their own life.   In a parable 197
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within the story, the individual starts out as a camel. It is important to note that this 
camel has already had a long life in which she obeyed all commands and did what she 
was told. The camel lived quite automatically, without questioning. In the process of 
transforming, the camel becomes the lion. After becoming the lion, she then becomes 
a child.    Nietzsche states: 198
 But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even 
the lion could not do? Why must the preying lion still 
become a child? The child is innocence and forgetting, 
a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first 
movement, a sacred “Yes.” For the game of creation, 
my brothers, a sacred “Yes” is needed: the spirit now 
wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the 
world now conquers his own world.   199
Metaphorically, we grow beyond our prior selves and find a new beyond for our iden-
tities. With this, we can overcome any past issue regarding our habits or behaviors. 
The virtual, now, provides the opportunity to create and realize a new self. The prior 
self does not have to stay around if it is not, in any sense, productive. There is a 
means now that enables anyone to play and create their self and purpose. 
 The process of self-creation, then, entails an individual discovering her inner, 
authentic self. Further, this self-discovery can be seen as something that makes one 
question her motives, her purpose, the reason for doing what she does. In his text 
Mind––Energy, Henri Bergson states: 
 Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, 
duplicates itself along with a virtual existence, a mirror-
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image. Every moment of our life presents the two as-
pects; it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side 
and recollection on the other... Whoever becomes con-
scious of the continual duplicating of his present into 
perception and recollection... will compare himself to 
an actor playing his part automatically, listening to him-
self and beholding himself playing.    200
These dual paths to living were––prior to the digital age––a veiled experience that 
leads to the fundamental question of perception. People have become accustomed to 
assuming their perceptions are a natural part of life, or that their sense of the world 
cannot change. Both perception and imagination are key components to the necessary 
ingredients in changing the understanding of self. In addition to cultivating perception 
and imagination, awareness is needed for both to evolve. In the symposium transcript 
from, Man and Civilization: Control of the Mind, Aldous Huxley discusses the need 
to teach new ways in understanding perception. He says that the sense of perception 
has been largely ignored and barely cultivated or employed in educational practices. 
He states that perception needs to be taught from youth and creative evolution will go 
forth stronger. Huxley calls for a renaissance in understanding how to utilize and 
promote further depths in perception. He echoes the mentality that we are quick to 
say what a problem may be, but slow to offer a cure. He came upon a 2000 year old 
Sanskrit text in which a couple discusses 112 exercises in “knowing thyself.”   He 201
wonders why we do not have a larger push to understand our selves or educate our 
youth and society in the mastery of perception.  
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 Huxley discusses these issues of perception and says that the understanding of 
the mind-body connection help to release pent-up adrenaline and aggression. We can 
view these concepts in relation to virtual play. These notions were stated by Huxley in 
January 1961, and he was looking for an answer to these societal issues that he saw as 
hindrances to the evolution of creativity. Perhaps the virtual play experience is the 
answer Huxley was searching for. Huxley stated that imagination could be used as a 
means of actualizing our potentialities, which is completely accurate as imagination is 
key in play. The virtual offers the development of perception, imagination, and the 
process of becoming aware. Huxley, too, calls for games in imagination and exercises 
such as the 112 Sanskrit methods in gaining understanding of the process of life in 
order to continue to evolve. The virtual is the next step Huxley would have been de-
lighted to see into fruition. Humans have such dynamic imaginations that finding 
ways to actualize the potential of this immense power can only be an improvement on 
the quality of one’s life. 
Community in the Virtual 
 When taking into consideration the thoughts previously made, we can build 
upon the necessity for an understanding of community via Karl Marx. Marx believes 
that individuals have complete ability to express themselves. He believes that people 
need to express themselves in their life. He further calls the world spirit, self-con-
sciousness. Marx sees the world as that which is searching for awareness in order to 
find the true essence of humanity. Marx states: 
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 Only in community [has each] individual the means of 
cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the com-
munity, therefore, is personal freedom possible. In the 
previous substitutes for the community, in the State, etc. 
personal freedom has existed only for the individuals 
who developed within the relationships of the ruling 
class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this 
class.    202
In the community that is built upon the essence of humanity, Marx believes freedom 
can occur. The ability to experience pure potential can only be found in the network 
of a communal essence. When people are free to make their own decisions and come 
to conclusions about their past assumptions, freedom may be achieved. Marx believes 
that humans are free when they are creative. He believes that the capacity for creativi-
ty is the essential species-being of humanity. However, humans are deceived when 
working in a way that is not independent from commodification. Marx believes that 
the ultimate species-being is removed when the worker is in the network of capitalist 
commodities.   203
 Marx proclaims that the work of art is the complete opposite of labor that is 
alienated. He sees the ruling class as who is to blame. The ruling class encompass 
those who have control over all production. Thus, they have control over mental pro-
duction. Those who are not able to control any material or mental production are then 
subject to who has the power. Marx states, “Even the need for fresh air ceases to be a 
need for the worker.”   Marx sees that the worker becomes the product when produc204 -
ing it. The worker loses her true sense of reality in that she gives up what is essential 
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to creating by making mass-made commodity objects. The worker is thus objectified 
and estranged from herself. Marx comments, “For man reproduces himself not only 
intellectually, in his consciousness, but actively and actually, and he can therefore 
contemplate himself in a world he himself has created.”   Marx sees that people are 205
taken away from their essence when faced with estrangement. He believes that the 
majority of society is duped into believing this kind of work is necessary to live a life, 
though it is, in actuality, a complete absence of truth and a large deception on the part 
of the patriarchal system. Proletariat labor leads people to believe they are beneficial 
in their toils, yet they are literally and unwittingly paying their life for the benefit of 
the commodity. Marx goes further with this thought: 
 The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre, go 
dancing, go drinking, think, love, theorize, sing, paint, 
fence, etc., the more you save and the greater will be-
come that treasure which neither moths nor maggots 
can consume––your capital.  The less you are, the less 
you give expression to your life, the more you have, the 
greater is your alienated life and the more you store up 
of your estranged life.  Everything which the political 
economist takes from you in terms of life and humanity, 
he restores to you in the form of money and wealth, and 
everything which you are unable to do, your money can 
do for you: it can eat, drink, go dancing, go to the the-
atre, it can appropriate art, learning, historical curiosi-
ties, political power, it can travel, it is capable of doing 
all those things for you; it can buy everything it is gen-
uine wealth, genuine ability. But for all that, it only 
likes to create itself, to buy itself, for after all every-
thing else is its servant.  And when I have the master I 
have the servant, and I have no need of his servant. So 
all passions and all activity are lost in greed. The work-
er is only permitted to have enough for him to live, and 
he is only permitted to live in order to have.   206
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Due to this overarching inequity, it can be seen that the virtual serves as a much-
needed outlet to escape and find one’s true essence that has been or is in danger of 
being lost. No matter that the virtual is a technologically structured space––gaming 
allows one to play. There is enough variety for one to find what they enjoy. Gaming is 
not governed under an authoritative state. The amount of games that are independent-
ly produced offers enough for one to utilize their free will and play anything they 
wish. There are no rules for the games. There are no limits to which genres one can 
peruse. There is no saying how many times one can play the same game. The world 
here is limitless. Just as Jacques Derrida uses the book to critique language, the player 
uses digital technology to engage in delightful bliss.   The players are essentially us207 -
ing the virtual platform in order to follow a blissful state that is hitherto stifled. There 
is no need to retreat to a way of the past in order to find an authenticity. Instead of 
looking for a natural state, the player of this technological age finds their freedom in 
the virtual now. Marx says, “As individuals express their life, so they are.”   Fur208 -
thermore, Marx sees the work of art as the “other” of commodity production. He sees 
it as a view into non-alienated labor. The virtual, then, can be seen as a necessary part 
of history and the general development of society. While much of society claims peo-
ple need to disconnect from technology in order to know the self better, perhaps the 
virtual can instead be seen as an antennae that can be used to connect. 
The Virtual Apparatus 
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 Through the discussion of the need for outlet via Marxian commodity theory, 
it can be seen that people also have a need for forms of apparatus to achieve greater 
freedom. Giorgio Agamben sees contraptions, devices, and gadgets in life as an appa-
ratus. More specifically, he sees that which interrupts and divides as an apparatus. For 
him, then, the video game is most certainly an apparatus. He believes that the appara-
tus keeps people distant and separated from one another. Agamben sees those who 
utilize an apparatus as always already under a control. However, it can also be seen 
that the individual can overcome the power of the apparatus––the individual can use 
it for her benefit. With the rapid acceleration of constant available information, hu-
mans are capable of acquiring an unprecedented intuition into what it is to be au-
tonomous. There is little room to be anything but autonomous when being bombarded 
with constancy. People are highly resourceful in the digital age. The virtual world of-
fers new forms of wisdom––above and beyond to those who wish to partake. It is not 
impossible for the subject of an apparatus to use it in the right way. Here, we have a 
difference when it comes to gaming. Agamben comments on the couch potato who 
becomes a mere point in viewership ratings. However, regarding gaming, this may 
now be viewed as a creative outlet. Essentially, one can use the game however they 
wish. There are no set rules. Overall, the creator of the game does not know how 
many people are playing at a current time. Virtual play is not the same as watching 
live television. It is an interactive activity that largely involves aesthetic value. While 
Agamben claims that the apparatus keeps relationships abstract, it is important to note 
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that he says the apparatus also offers the Open. We can see the Open in the worlds of 
the virtual today––as constructions of new worlds.   209
 In his text, What is an Apparatus? Agamben also discusses friendship. He 
quotes Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and reveals that Aristotle says that a 
friend is an other self. Looking at the virtual and friendship, then, we can see the 
player on the other side of the screen as an other self. Agamben also talks about the 
convict who has become free. The ex-prisoner is now unbound and sees life much 
differently than before. The prisoner is, one may say, past the law once freed. The 
prisoner now sees something different in her surroundings and actions. Agamben says 
this person has left the world of guilt and is now above the law. “Like the freed con-
vict in Kafka’s penal colony, who has survived the destruction of the machine that 
was to have executed him, these beings have left the world of guilt and justice behind 
them.”   Here, these ideas can be seen to echo the virtual as well. The player leaves 210
the world of imprisonment and has become free. Mentally, the player has retreated, 
and due to her active presence in the virtual space, she has surpassed the oppressive 
nature of reality. Therefore, beings that leave the world of guilt and justice behind 
them are free from judgment.  
 Becoming 
 With these notions in mind considering the communal possibilities and lover 
of life, we can look to the developing process of becoming. The manner of becoming 
is not the same as the aspects of being. When one is being, she is continuing on a 
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path. When one is becoming, she is moving toward higher ground––she is transform-
ing. Becoming, then, is a metamorphosis. To become, however, one has to first ob-
serve her current point of origin. In order to integrate a path of becoming, the individ-
ual must be awaiting at a starting point. We can see these concepts tie together with 
Nietzsche’s notion of the renewed self who has to start on the ground, no matter how 
she gets there.   The point is to show up to this point and discover the new direction 211
in which Hegelian Geist may be found. The old ways of adhering to an omnipresent 
authoritative monotonous life are shed when one awakens to a new way of becoming 
and transforming into their authenticity. The authentic self is continually developing, 
though the first step in the ontology of becoming is what is important. Stepping into a 
new world, a utopian Metaverse of the virtual shapes new views and outlooks. The 
process of becoming gives power to the player, and offers the chance for her to be-
come empowered and take charge of her new trail. The experience that the player be-
holds gives a fresh perspective each time the game begins. In gaming, the player is 
rewarded by being offered multiple chances to keep beginning, to keep renewing. 
 Becoming more in a game can be seen as a new experience where the player 
can explore and form a unique voice. Artists of the past who rebelled against tradition 
may not be a very far reflection of gamers, as they are similarly looking to challenge 
what is no longer useful and navigate in new directions. Socially, it may be a confus-
ing point in time, thus the struggle to become and form identity may be more chal-
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lenging, though finding a direction in the virtual fosters new techniques and forms 
new questions about what is the way one may evolve. 
 It is further critical to consider the time that we are in today along the con-
scious route of history. Digital technology is rapidly flourishing. Playing in the virtual 
can be seen as something that adds to a more enhanced life experience. In a sense, the 
virtual is similar to other outlets in history. It happens to be the channel of today's 
digital era. The rewarding aspects are that what may be embraced within this never 
seen before interactive experience. In The Painters of Modern Life and other Essays, 
Charles Baudelaire remarks about his current times and how they vary greatly from 
past eras. He believes that each age beholds a unique vision. Baudelaire states, “I 
have remarked that every age has its own gait, glance, and gesture.”   Baudelaire fur212 -
ther discusses the dandy in the city (who we might be likened to the player in the 
video game):  
 Thus the lover of universal life enters into the crowd 
though it were an immense reservoir of electrical ener-
gy. Or we might liken him to a mirror as vast as the 
crowd itself; or to a kaleidoscope gifted with con-
sciousness, responding to each one of its movements 
and reproducing the multiplicity of life and the flicker-
ing grace of all the elements of life. He is an ‘I’ with an 
insatiable appetite for the ‘non-I,’ at every instant ren-
dering and explaining it in pictures more living than life 
itself, which is always unstable and fugitive.    213
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The lover of universal life described can be seen comparatively as the player who en-
ters the game––anonymous and behind a screen, yet happy to engage with a trove of 
others. Eager to view, learn, and experience new offerings and ways of living. 
Evolving into a New Creation 
 According to Donna Haraway, the nature that we have believed to be true has 
been developed and engineered through capitalism and patriarchal rule. In the world 
of the virtual, a non-optimal and non-dominant society functions smoothly. Haraway 
sees that it is not a rebirth that is required, but a form of regeneration.   While Har214 -
away discusses the utopian dream occurring via the world of the cyborg, it can simi-
larly be seen that the virtual is that which creates room for higher consciousness. Sim-
ilar to Butler, Haraway states in many ways that there is not a natural human––that 
humans have been made. Humans have been developed unequally and there is an op-
portunity for humans to be created justly. Haraway states “we have allowed the theory 
of the body politic to be split in such a way that natural knowledge is reincorporated 
covertly into techniques of social control instead of being transformed into sciences 
of liberation.”   In Donna Haraway’s paradigm, nature indeed connects with tech215 -
nology and they become one. Acquiring and understanding knowledge differently al-
lows a person to create their life and, thus, self differently.   216
 These ideas can be seen similarly regarding Michel Foucault and human na-
ture vs. nature, cogito, and the language or discourse. Foucault deconstructs subjec-
tivity and sees the human as “a new invention” while also finding the individual being 
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erased.   It remains interesting to think of Foucault's death of man, Nietzsche's death 217
of God, and his concept of Superman, Hegel's end of art, and countless others speak-
ing to this effect––“the end of” and how this may be something quite positive. For, 
technology and the virtual are forms of power––as well as necessity. Further, when 
connecting these ideas to the concept of writing and language, it is fruitful to think of 
video diaries or video blogs where writing has become something so far removed 
from the origin. To go another step further, technology has come so far that the user 
can swipe and use two fingers––there is an evolution––we re-use the thumb and tap. 
Nietzsche, even, acknowledges technology that becomes us in reference to his writing 
ball (typewriter), “It is a thing like me.”   218
 For the virtual can be seen as essentially human and humans are those who 
find or create technology. Gaming technologies have become a system that moves 
and evolves within a creative evolution. There is a certain dualism that needs to be 
overcome to see creative evolution as always becoming a new creation. Panpsychism, 
the concept that the mind is a universal feature of all things in which everything de-
rived, can further be viewed as a key to unlock this issue of dualities. Someone who is 
a panpsychist, or panexperientialist, sees her self as a mind in a world of minds.  219
Panexperientialism to virtual gaming is an important link, particularly when other 
players are playing together simultaneously. Many possibilities are left open in refer-
ence to people living in multiple worlds at any given moment. The individual not 
only lives in her own mind and in the mind of society, but she lives, too, in the myriad 
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of characters she can be and the characters that are activated while she is playing the 
game. This is part of a new evolution, for what was once believed to take place all in 
the mind––is now something that can be seen visibly. 
 A central question here––how might a person live her life––is one that so 
many philosophers have questioned at length.   These thinkers see the world as 220
something that is living, that offers many openings where people can live their lives 
in ways previously unimaginable. Further, we can look at the notion of the body and 
question what it can actually do. It may be that virtual games show us other ideas. 
Remarkably, Deleuze mentions that Dutch philosopher, Spinoza, says, “We do not 
even know of what a body is capable of” and “We do not even know of what affec-
tions we are capable, nor the extent of our power.” Spinoza takes one step further and 
offers another tip: “Teach the body to do many things; this will help you to perfect the 
mind and to come to the intellectual level of thought.”   It is stunning to consider 221
that Spinoza made these remarks in the seventeenth century. Thus, just as one may 
learn how to die in a game by way of a Rabelaisian cheerful death, one may also learn 
what the body can actually do while in the virtual space. 
 Machines may have been created to remain foolproof, but games are develop-
ing so rapidly that there is great room for spontaneity. It is when the player becomes 
too sure of herself that she makes mistakes. In physical reality, if one is in a rush, it 
invariably leads to mistakes. Here, in the virtual, time is endless and there is no need 
to hurry. If a mistake is made, one can begin again without any thought of the past err. 
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If an error is made in the virtual, the player may “die.” After the death, though, the 
player can learn from the mistake and re-set the game. 
The Virtual as a Form of Art That Creates Change 
 In his The Future of the Image, Jacques Rancière discusses the image and how 
images are all that we have.   His comment can be witnessed strongly in the virtual. 222
Image-based reality is happening at a quickening pace, and can easily be seen in so-
cial media applications such as Instagram, Pinterest, and Tinder. Within these plat-
forms, people primarily view the image only. Rancière furthers the notion of image-
ness, in that it is a group of relations between elements and functions. Rancière sees 
positive change is possible within aesthetics and discusses the functions of the con-
temporary image. Rancière views the social aspects of art as an optimistic view of the 
future of the image, though it is up to artists to be able to change history.   Here, we 223
can see the relationship that is needed is with one’s self. 
 Rancière believes every individual should certainly have a chance to decide 
how she wants to live her life. While he does not say how to go about this, he does 
discuss how one might respond to their environment. Further, while many philoso-
phers commonly spell out the problems at hand and do not offer a prescription as to 
how to fix the issue, I claim that the virtual world of play is an answer to how one 
may decide as to how they create and understand their life. The space of the virtual 
has created a place for connection to others and to the inner self. Connections and in-
teractions are continuously being made in the virtual with continuous updates also 
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occurring. As it has been found in psychological and scientific studies, in order to be 
a whole human being with all needs met, a person needs these areas to function prop-
erly in their physical life in order to live a fulfilling life.   Through interactive tech224 -
nology, one can overcome the inauthentic self and engage in productive activity.  225
Rancière states the following that is remarkably similar to the power of the critical 
use of the virtual as a form of art that creates change: 
 Critical art is an art that aims to produce a new percep-
tion of the world, and therefore to create a commitment 
to its transformation. This schema, very simple in its 
appearance, is actually the conjunction of three pro-
cesses: first, the production of a sensory form of 
‘strangeness’: second, the development of an awareness 
of the reason for that strangeness and third, a mobiliza-
tion of individuals as a result of that awareness.   226
Rancière sees the political state as that which breaks with the “natural order” that in-
dividuals should rule their public and private lives. While it seems that people are 
free, they have already been pinned and placed into a specific collection of objectified 
types. It seems that people cannot deter far from the presupposed order they are sub-
tly being forced to abide by. The police state offers a perpetual state of insecurity in 
order to keep an oppressive state, Rancière claims. Virtual otherworld experiences 
bypass this paradoxical equality and offer a new freedom.   Further, if we dissect and 227
translate the word mindless into selfless, an alternative viewpoint can be pointed in 
the direction of the virtual. With this, time in the virtual can be seen as a dissensual 
activity that activates awareness. Just as we are progressing nowhere as a democratic 
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society or striving towards an unrealistic optimal state that leads to no place in partic-
ular, Rancière believes the state of dissensus is where autonomous creativity sits. A 
state of consensus is stagnant. Imperfection is the power.   We can look to the virtual 228
world as a hybrid form that allows a space for self-discovery. 
Performativity as a New Path 
 To move further into the topic of performativity, Judith Butler states, “Perfor-
mativity has to do with repetition, very often with the repetition of oppressive and 
painful gender norms to force them to resignify. This is not freedom, but a question of 
how to work the trap that one is inevitably in.”   Her associations with performativi229 -
ty can be looked at as closely in reference to the virtual character. While Butler dis-
cusses performativity through the structure of gender roles, performativity can also be 
seen as something positive in the virtual space. Through performativity and aspects of 
the carnivale, the virtual can be seen as a productive place to oppose the subordina-
tion of society. Butler discusses these aspects in relation to gender, while performativ-
ity occurs every day. Butler says, “The parodic repetition of gender exposes as well 
the illusion of gender identity as an intractable depth and inner substance.”   Just as 230
we might hope that parodies and performance may cause people to be aware of the 
roles to which they conform, Butler sees the performative act as a way to get out of 
the conventions we are used to being a part of––to awaken from the imposing prac-
tices and acts we are told to undertake––to be able to step back and see things as they 
are.  
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 Butler, then, calls for a Nietzschean transvaluation.   Here, Butler sees paro231 -
dy and performance as being able to revitalize the “distinction between a privileged 
and naturalized gender configuration.”   Butler offers a theoretical background be232 -
hind performativity and discusses the many ways that are needed to break free from 
patriarchal discourse. While we are constantly prescribed specific passages to take in 
society, there are limited options to being, and any other way of being is generally 
seen as wrong or not natural. Butler sees the same predicament in the world of two 
genders––as there are only options for masculine or feminine today. 
 In this light, Nietzsche claims, “We have to learn to think differently––in or-
der at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently.”   It may be 233
asked, then, why one needs to feel differently. Nietzsche says it is vital to question the 
origins as to why one thinks and feels the way she does. Nietzsche sees that people 
commonly think in terms of morality––most want to be moral citizens. He sees this 
obeying stance as harmful and believes the pressures of one trying to be a good per-
son is that which stunts the growth of consciousness. Nietzsche believes these are 
problems that originate within the feelings of compassion and pity, which he calls 
mitleid.   Nietzsche claims that people find value in compassion and pity, as it is be234 -
lieved to be that which aids in helping others who suffer. Nietzsche, however, sees 
mitleid as something that is largely misunderstood. It is one thing as to how one 
thinks they should feel when conjuring compassion, and it is another as to how one 
actually feels when contemplating compassion. Thus, Nietzsche says that humans 
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overall do not understand the basis or origin as to why people feel this way in refer-
ence to compassion or suffering. Nietzsche believes the state of mitleid is actually a 
concern for the self and that compassion is more about the individual than the 
Other.   Mitleid, then, can be seen as a manipulating factor to make the ego feel bet235 -
ter about itself. Due to this state, many people may help others in order to receive 
praise, look better to the Other, and feel better about oneself compared to the unfortu-
nate Other. With this in mind, gaming deflects mitleid, as there is not as much person-
al reason to look better to an Other, other than to look better to one’s own Self. 
Perceptions of the Real 
 We do not either live in a world of reality nor do we live in a world of illusion. 
There is much more, and it becomes a human obligation to push the creative par-
adigm further and continue to search, discover, and evolve. Žižek discusses the world 
of the virtual and the problem with wrapping it up sweetly in a Matrix-like bow. 
Žižek sees the multifarious ways in which we can view the future of technology. He 
acknowledges that some view the concept of the film, The Matrix, as “our world [be-
ing] just a mirage generated by a global Mind embodied in the World Wide Web.”  236
He too connects the notion of The Matrix to Plato’s cave, in that humans are viewing 
spectators in a cave watching the shadows on the wall, believing all to be a reality in 
the cinema of life. Žižek believes that what is needed is a bridge between both truth 
and illusion. We do not need to be slaves to the Matrix concept, nor do we need to run 
from it. People can learn to bend the rules of truth and illusion and become masters of 
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multiple modes of living. For, one need not devote their time to living robotically, nor 
only fleeing and playing: 
 ––There is a correct insight in this complication of the 
simple and straight division between the “real reality” 
and the Matrix-generated universe: even if the struggle 
takes place in the “real reality,” the key fight is to be 
won in the Matrix, which is why one should (re)enter 
its virtual fictional universe. If the struggle were to take 
place solely in the “desert of the real,” it would have 
been another boring dystopia about the remnants of 
humanity fighting evil machines.   237
To further Žižek’s claims, he states that it is not about taking the blue pill or the red 
pill. It is not about stripping us of the fiction, nor the reality. If we are stripped of ei-
ther, we lose all sense of any reality. Fiction is, thus, a necessary life component. Life 
becomes more understandable and graspable through story. In fact, the virtual does 
not need to be seen as something separate from the real if it is a daily part of some-
one’s life in the real. By being a focal discussion piece, the virtual earns a space in the 
real. Žižek furthers these concepts and agrees that it is not so cut and dry. He does not 
agree to either taking the blue pill in which one continues to remain in Plato’s cave 
and believe whatever she is told. He also does not agree to taking the red pill, which 
opens up the worlds of possibilities encompassing a utopian Wonderland. Instead, 
Žižek says that he wants a third pill: 
 So what is the third pill? Definitely not some kind of 
transcendental pill which enables a fake fast food reli-
gious experience, but a pill which would enable me to 
perceive not the reality behind the illusion, but reality in 
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illusion itself.––Our fundamental delusion today is not 
believing in what is only a fiction, to take fictions too 
seriously––on the contrary, it is not taking fictions seri-
ously enough.   238
 Žižek says that we are always-already dealing with others, in a phenomeno-
logical sense. However, any part that does not fit in with an ideal version of others is 
left out of the image of them. For, if we are not dealing with the real other, and we are 
always dealing with a virtual or abstract version of the other, the world of the virtual 
takes this actuality of life and makes it not only more accessible visually and techno-
logically, but keeps it streamlined and visible to the players. We are always-already 
continuously acting in the imaginary virtual. By interacting with other people, the ex-
change is always behaving as if certain portions or visuals or characteristics are not 
there. Portions of others become erased in our dealings with others. Further, Žižek 
says that even our beliefs are virtual and presupposed. It is seen that humans want to 
believe in appearances. Interestingly, the virtual Other in our day-to-day reality is one 
who we do not want to disappoint. To contrast, the virtual Other in the game is an ally 
and one who chooses to play with the player in an insistence of enjoyment and non-
resistance. There is a willingness and engagement with the virtual Other. The act of 
pretending and feigning an interaction disappears in the virtual because it is in a space 
where rules are broken down and a second life can ensue. Freedom may be found in 
the virtual space. 
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 Just by talking, Žižek says that the existence of the Big Other, who holds the 
key to meaning, is assumed.   Žižek, however, states this authoritative Other is a 239
complete illusion. This can be seen similarly to Rancière’s discussion on the police 
state. Perhaps, it is better that gameplay is currently seen as more of a rogue act, as it 
creates a new freedom due to the fact that it rebels against the authoritative state. Play 
becomes something that is life-asserting and optimistic. Play has become a dissensual 
act in many ways. Kant asserts, “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incured 
tutelage. ... The motto of enlightenment is therefore ‘Sapere aude!’ [Dare to know!] 
Have the courage to use your own reason.”   240
 The virtual world has the ability to create authenticity. The virtual space 
serves as a framework to safety test boundaries without worry for physical implica-
tions. At this point in history, the virtual is needed to make sense of the real. 
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Chapter Five 
Becoming through Play 
 Can it be that what really scares them in the doctrine I shall try to 
present here is that it leaves to man a possibility of choice? 
       ––Jean-Paul Sartre 
 Existentialism and Human Emotions 
States of Purposelessness 
 After considering the concepts referencing the self as conscious creator, we 
turn to states of becoming more through purposelessness within the virtual. Purpose-
lessness begins without purpose and changes throughout a process to ultimately find 
purpose. Thus, in order to attain it one must cease striving for purpose temporarily. 
Rather, by ending the focus and engaging in pure play, purpose may be uncovered. 
Purposelessness offers no ultimate reason for engagement other than the pleasure 
gained from interacting in the experience. Purposelessness becomes a benefit when 
one is driven to move forward even without an initial known meaning. Primarily, a 
person cannot find purpose unless she is being her authentic self.   Thus, if one acts 241
without purpose first––with an indifferent sense of abandon and play, she will learn to 
enjoy her states of being more. In the activity of purposelessness, one can discover 
feelings such as delight and humor. In this state of mind, the ego has been forgotten 
and strewn aside. Paradoxically, when purpose is quieted, the true purpose abounds. 
In the virtual, the subtlety of the ultimate purpose of the game is often not visible to 
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the eyes and mind of the player. The player holds the unconscious belief she is play-
ing a game to retreat from life’s duties, perhaps. However, if the player moves along 
far enough, the journey throughout the game leads to a new awareness––particularly 
if the player is receptive to the freedom that awaits her in the virtual reality.   Hence, 242
the virtual is another means toward viewing reality. 
 Thus, as purpose promotes meaning, one must look away from it first in order 
for it to be found. In his book, Man’s Search for Meaning, twentieth century author, 
neurologist, and psychiatrist, Viktor Frankl, sees that those who ultimately attain a 
purpose are continually striving to move forward, and will keep going in their life de-
spite any obstacles.   People need a purpose to grow into the future and develop their 243
process of becoming. Life becomes more effortless if one has a reason to live. Twen-
tieth century writer and philosopher, Albert Camus, is similarly close to Frankl in his 
theories. Camus states that a person will either give up life completely due to constant 
absurdities in the world, or she can create her own work of art that becomes her new 
life.   For many people today, gaming is a reason to live, and, interestingly, some say 244
video games have saved their life.   245
 The act of purposelessness indeed gives players purpose in an eventual state. 
If it appears as artificial purpose to an outsider, then so be it. I push this tendency fur-
ther and ask, what difference does the artificiality versus the real make if the person 
receives a sense of fulfillment? The mind does not know whether an imaginative 
thought is real or not. The mind decides what to keep and remember based on infor-
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mation it is given through senses and thoughts. One may feel warmly about a person 
while being together with them physically, though they will still have that similar 
feeling upon looking at a photo or video of that person. The mind is satisfied with the 
copy of the individual for that time. The mind is fulfilled. People are able to program 
their minds however they choose by utilizing their imagination and coupling it with 
images and visualization. Positively shaping one’s perceptions and imaginings offers 
the ability to change anything one cares to think about, even if the actual experience 
is not occurring in real time or space. By imagining new experiences and encounters, 
a shift can and will occur in the mind of a person. By using the imagination to en-
hance one’s mind, the use of virtual play has the ability to push even further, as it 
provides ample opportunity to step into other worlds and experience visions that 
would never have been seen. Those who can alter these experiences and expand may 
grow and evolve internally. 
Experiencing Other Worlds 
 The cognitive difference between reality and the virtual is extensive in con-
temporary Western society. What is considered “real” appears to most people to hold 
more importance over the imagination. The significance of dreams is commonly dis-
missed and the joy of purposelessness is looked down upon. What the majority does 
not realize, however, is that while in these modes of imagination, growth in percep-
tion, and playing with no purpose––the player becomes larger in her becoming. She is 
sparking new awarenesses and realizing new freedoms and potentials that otherwise 
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would not have been seen previously. The mind can be worked with by using the 
imagination as a means to understand personal freedom. While one can use her imag-
ination in a negative sense and believe she is in constant danger and employ a state of 
fear due to bombardments of unfavorable news, she can also put imaginative fears 
aside and conjure up self-confidence and fearlessness. Thus, the virtual play experi-
ence offers the chance to have one re-direct her previous limiting thinking and replace 
it with positive and visionary ideas for a bolder life. Further, the virtual space offers 
the player the ability to see other worlds and understand others on a more intrinsic 
level. In working with the imagination, one can shift and transform the mind. The 
imaginative state can show the player novel situations with previously unexplored 
perspectives. 
 The imagination can be folded down and deduced into an actual reality. While 
there is nothing that has a separate and fixed identity, according to Buddhist philoso-
phy, all that exists depends upon the consciousness that imagines and perceives it. It 
can be seen that impermanence relates to the virtual as the experience playing puts the 
player in a state of non-purpose. The player could indeed have a motive or desire to 
see a certain visual whilst playing, however, the critical point is that the player has 
willfully chosen to engage in this alternate reality and is now beaming off new 
thoughts and meanings and solutions to imaginative prospects that never would have 
been seen otherwise. For the Buddha says: 
 All that we are is the result of what we have thought: it 
is found on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. 
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If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness 
follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him.    246
When the player encounters other places through the virtual, she is creating and en-
gaged in the process of conjuring up and playing in a new reality. Again, the mind is 
not bothered to differentiate the difference between what is real from what is virtual 
during the experience.   The mind can easily separate the differences, even though it 247
receives the same sensory stimulus from both real and virtual moments. These virtual 
sensations can be understood similarly to watching a horror film or riding on a roller 
coaster. The mind knows that the body is unaffected, yet it still feels the sense of fear 
or dread that is a sublime pleasure. With this, the body can easily be affected by the 
virtual experience and remain safe.  
 In his text mentioned earlier, Frankl discusses the notion of living life as if one 
has already lived once before and know the consequences and this same concept oc-
curs while playing the game.   He states, “Live as if you were living already for the 248
second time and as if you had acted the first time as wrongly as you are about to act 
now.”   Frankl developed and instituted the form of therapy called logotherapy. Lo249 -
gotherapy stems from the Greek word, logos, which is defined as “meaning.” Thus, 
the practice of logotherapy can be seen a desire for meaning. The term, then, is trans-
lated as a form of “meaning therapy.” We can see play in the virtual as a new form of 
logotherapy.   In the virtual atmosphere, the player is engaged in the education and 250
understanding of meaning to her world. Rather than analysis of a subject, logotherapy 
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seeks to find the authentic qualities of the person’s spirit in order to uplift their quality 
of life. Rather than digging for meaning in the past, logotherapy searches for meaning 
in present and upcoming ventures. It is quite literally a productive endeavor. Frankl 
sees three primary areas of importance in logotherapy as follows:  
 1. Every person has a healthy core.  
 2. The focus is to resourcefully enlighten the individual and provide tools to 
show them their inner spirit and capabilities.  
 3. Each person has the freedom to find meaning in their life.    251
The act and experience of play, thus, can be used quite similarly to logotherapy. Many 
people may not think of playing games in the virtual world as therapy, though it 
demonstrates how to contemplate similar ideas Frankl mentions. The time spent play-
ing in the game not only offers subconscious moments of reflection, but also allows 
one to meditate on their lives. It is when the person becomes too sure of herself that 
she makes mistakes. She, then, grows to be in a hurry and often will make mistakes. 
In the game, if the player becomes too sure, she may “die.” The player then learns 
from the mistake and has the opportunity to begin again. In the game, time is infinite–
and there is no need to rush. If she makes a mistake, she starts over. 
Meditative Interactivity 
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 Here, we will address both the eastern and western concepts of purposeless 
purposefulness. To begin, twentieth century Indian mystic, guru and spiritual teacher, 
Osho, believes in many forms of meditation, including dynamic meditation. Osho’s 
teachings unite various meditative practices in order to find the higher self. His teach-
ings can be interwoven with the meditative aspects of virtual play that have the ability 
to bring one to a heightened sense of enlightened being.   Osho developed medita252 -
tive rituals that focus on physicality, silence, and celebration. His pursuit in these 
concepts were created in order for one to experience reduction of repression, lowering 
of ego, becoming empty by losing the false (socially constructed) self, and, thus, at-
taining a higher sense of awareness. Osho was known for telling jokes that were of-
fensive where he insulted many ethnic and religious groups in the world. Osho de-
fends his humorous methods by saying his intent was to shock people in order to have 
them search inside of themselves and question their identification with and attach-
ment to their ethnic and religious beliefs. His belief is held that divisions of religion, 
politics, gender and race are completely destructive. Osho discusses the life that rev-
els in love, awareness, humor, joy, creativity, meditation, interactivity with others, and 
courage: 
 If you really want to know who, in reality, you are, you 
will have to learn how to cease as a mind, how to stop 
thinking. That’s what meditation is all about. Medita-
tion means going out of the mind, dropping the mind 
and moving in the space called no-mind. And in no-
mind you will know the ultimate truth, dhamma. And 
moving from mind to no-mind is the step, pada. And 
this is the whole secret of The Dhammapada.   253
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 Thus, what is needed is a combination of being deeply aware of the mind, and 
consciously quieting it in order to find the true essence of the self. Osho contin-
ues, “[Life] is a cosmic play, a continuous beautiful game, a beautiful hide-and-
seek––not leading anywhere. Nowhere is the goal.”   Here, Osho discusses how 254
the rush to attain perfection negates the whole essence of the pleasure of being 
and becoming aware. His perspective offers the player the ability to live vibrantly 
without any hindrances or pressure. The way of becoming is connected to the 
concept of flow in which space and linear time seem to disappear when one is 
immersed in the present. The game is always concentrated in the present. One's 
actions when experiencing flow permits her to essentially play in life. This is an 
optimal state of consciousness in which one’s process of creativity takes on its 
own reason for being. Osho thus states:  
 Don't be serious, because a play can never be serious. 
And if the play needs you to be serious, be playfully 
serious, don't be really serious… Then this very mo-
ment you can move into the ultimate. The ultimate is 
not in the future, it is the present, hidden here and now. 
So don't ask about purpose––there is none, and I say it 
is beautiful that there is none.   255
Thus, through the activity of ultimate non-serious play with the desire to connect, the 
trance-like state puts forth the experience of meditative interactivity. While the meta-
phorical term “meditative interactivity” almost seems to be an oxymoron of sorts, it 
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can rather be seen as a form of heterotopian space in that it brings together a calming 
connection with the self and the Other.   256
 In reference to the Western sensibility of purposelessness, it is known to be 
wrapped in debates that encircle foolishness and endless contention in reference to 
logic. Albert Camus says to enjoy the present and bathe one’s life in sensuousness, as 
there is no purpose or second world after this one. Eastern thought insists on purpose-
lessness being the optimal purpose. Hence, Eastern sensibilities focus on exchange 
and rapport, while Western sensibilities focus more on competition, individualism, 
and the striving for success. Eastern sensibilities that revolve around universal rela-
tionships, rather than individual conquests––offer great fertile possibilities to the futu-
re of the virtual. It can be seen that aspects of both Eastern and Western sensibilities 
can work together for the greatest effect of the medium of the virtual. 
The Road to Enlightenment 
 In other respects towards purposelessness, Jean-Paul Sartre believes that states 
of imposed meaning transcend actual activities that occurred in the past.   With 257
Sartre’s finding that every activity can have a transcendent quality, and Frankl’s dis-
covery that the overarching power of love and desire for purpose exceeds any 
thought, it can be seen that these same notions exist in the virtual. If the player begins 
to lose her prior conditioning or labeling of herself in the physical world due to play-
ing the virtual world, she can lose her former self that she did not create in an authen-
tic way. She, thus, annihilates her former being. She becomes what Buddha says is the 
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highest attainment, no-thing.   Twentieth century essayist, Anaïs Nin, appropriately 258
states: 
 Character is timeless. Ageless. We live back and forth 
in the past, or in the present, or in the future. With the 
young, one lives in the future. I prefer that. Changes 
occur constantly according to the vision, image, or 
myth which possesses one. We do not grow absolutely, 
chronologically. We grow sometimes in one dimension, 
and not in another, unevenly. We grow partially. We are 
relative. We are mature in one realm, childish in anoth-
er. The past, present, and future mingle and pull us 
backward, forward, or fix us in the present. We are 
made up layers, cells, constellations. We never discard 
our childhood. We never escape it completely. We re-
live fragments of it through others. We live buried lay-
ers through others. We live through others’ projections 
of the unlived selves.     259
Furthermore, in his text, Existentialism and Human Emotions, Sartre asserts, “The 
only being which can be called free is the being which nihilates its being.”   Here, 260
we see a freedom occur as that which is gone is free. Sartre continues, “But since de-
sire, as we have established, is identical with lack of being, freedom can arise only as 
being which makes itself a desire of being; that is, as the project-for-itself of being in-
itself-for-itself.”   Sartre also discusses the concept of holes. The notion of holes can 261
be viewed in relation to the virtual with existential concepts such as searching for an 
escape from being. Sartre says that people seek holes to fill in their lives. In gaming 
situations, there are many holes that a character can slip or fall into, which takes the 
player into a new dimension or another world. Sartre says that it is a mode of being 
that is presented as a hole that needs to be filled with one’s own body.   The concept 262
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of losing the former self to come upon the new self is difficult for many to swallow. 
Many people have strong attachments to their past and their conditioned concept of 
who they are, no matter how false their perception may be. Playing the game in the 
virtual can easily put the player into a meditative state that opens awareness in the 
mind and causes one to encapsulate deeper understanding. 
 When the player has the ease to slip into this meditative state, she can connect 
to dhamma, which is an access to insight. The dhamma is known as the truth, and it 
can be seen when a person quiets her mind. Dhamma is a meditative quality where 
introspection takes place. Once a person is aware of her present surroundings and 
moment, she has stepped into dhamma. Dhamma embraces mindfulness and inner 
knowing. According to Buddhist principles, when the individual steps into the place 
of the dhamma, the more the person can decide if she is in the state of insight or not. 
Buddhist teachings say it is fine if we do not always reach dhamma, though it is im-
portant to be aware if we are in touch with it. Once we move closer to an insightful 
reality, Buddhist teachings claim one will become the Dhamma. When everything is 
seen as what it is, and all is uncovered or truth is revealed (aletheia), we have encoun-
tered dhamma. It is understood that when birth and death, hate and greed, and all mat-
ters of life are viewed, we have uncovered truth. When playing a video game, very 
often these modes of life are shown in great detail. Here, if the player is open and re-
ceptive, dhamma is on show for the player to take and use in her life. If the player is 
not paying attention, of course, dhamma evaporates. 
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 By being observant, all that exists is shown, and the player can find that the 
truth is always surrounding. When one silences the ego-mind, the player might find 
that she is seeing things as they really are and not jumping from one dukkha to the 
next.   With the understanding of truth through becoming, one may find an internal 263
sense of peace and fulfillment in the process of playing the game. This awakened 
state of awareness allows one to see a new dimension to their actual world, rather 
than seeing limits in their life and goals. Due to the enchantment of the mindful state, 
one may wish to move further and delve deeper into the probing of what is phenome-
nally possible. 
Attaining Wisdom Through Mindfulness 
 Referencing the process and practice of attaining higher self-awareness and 
meditative mindfulness, the Buddha teaches that this form of enlightenment or tran-
scendence will occur over time. An enlightened sensibility is not an instantaneous 
moment where one reaches nirvana. Thus, regarding the activity of the game, the 
process of the evolution of becoming occurs increasingly over time. A player will not 
play for a short period of time and automatically become open-minded. Rather, it is 
an uncovering process that slowly unveils truth to those who are patient enough to 
wait and prepare the mind. To quote the Buddha in reference to this claim: 
 Just as the ocean has a gradual shelf, a gradual slope, a 
gradual inclination, with a sudden drop-off only after a 
long stretch, in the same way this Doctrine and Disci-
pline (dhamma-vinaya) has a gradual training, a gradual 
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performance, a gradual progression, with a penetration 
to gnosis only after a long stretch.   264
 These meditative processes are a means of becoming self-actualized. It is clear 
that each era in history is changing and evolving into a new creation. The digital age 
is currently moving so speedily that societal evolution is an undeniable and approach-
ing truth. Referring to the current time, in his text, The Courage to Create, Rollo May 
says, “We are living at a time when one age is dying and the new age is not yet born. 
We cannot doubt this as we look about us to see the radical changes.”   May speaks 265
of those who are able to curb violent behaviors by choosing to find a new form of 
physical courage by the “valuing of the body as the means of empathy with others, as 
expression of the self as a thing of beauty and as a rich source of pleasure.”   The 266
concept can be seen in virtual play, as the player interacts as a character in the game 
and explores with other characters. Here, the gamer learns sensitive qualities and ex-
plores her own creative process, which culminates in a higher self-consciousness. 
Within this state of awareness, manifestation of new realities can take place. The 
more aligned one is with this creative force, the easier innovative occurrence of a life 
arises, and the more genuine the individual becomes. The closer a person reaches self-
actualization, the less she is concerned with what society may think of her, which 
then feeds the courage to create what is inside, which is who the person is ultimately. 
For, time is fluid and conforms to both action and inaction for its participants. 
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 Play in the virtual can equally be likened to wisdom given from the Upan-
ishads, the sacred and ancient Indian texts. The Upanishads texts are said to offer the 
ultimate spiritual vision. They are a collection of Vedic texts that hold the earliest 
concepts of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism known as the Vedanta, which is the 
final goal of wisdom. Here, veda is defined as wisdom and anta is defined as end. 
Great similarities can be pointed to play in the virtual and what was taught in the 
Vedic period, possibly ranging from 4000-5000 BC.   These concepts and definitions 267
were meant to portray images of those who were seeking to approach a wise being in 
a secluded forest in order to learn about the cosmic universe and God. By intriguing 
similarity, large numbers of virtual games consist of settings within mythic-like 
forests, as these teachings were given in distant retreats that consisted of ritual and 
ceremony. According to translator, Swami Paramananda, the Sanskrit word, Upan-
ishad, is a compound word that means to sit at the feet in the presence of a teacher, 
and concurrently means to shatter or destroy ignorance.   Interestingly, the concept 268
of killing the Self––as the authentic, immortal Self cannot be destroyed––is men-
tioned throughout the texts. We can see this concept many times over in the game and 
the virtual. In both spaces, the self can be continually renewed and re-created. The 
metaphorical killing of one’s self is a metaphor for the killing of the ego. In the game, 
the player has this ability by committing a character suicide in order to re-set the 
game, or the player can end the character chosen at any given moment in order to try 
a different character. 
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 The aim of the Upanishads was to show the individual how––by the path of 
right action––she may prepare herself for higher attainment of the self. The writings 
claim that oneness of soul and God lies at the root of all life. In the writings, it claims 
that until the mind is withdrawn from various distractions of the world, one cannot 
enter into the dimension of a higher spirit. To quote a piece from the writing:  
 He who sees everything as nothing but the Self, and the 
Self in everything he sees, such a seer withdraws from 
nothing. For the enlightened, all that exists is nothing 
but the Self, so how could any suffering or delusion 
continue for those who know this Oneness?    269
The text claims that she who perceives the self everywhere will not shrink from any-
thing, for through her higher consciousness, she feels united with all of life. 
 Another pertinent point in the Upanishads that refers closely with virtual 
gameplay is that the face of truth is hidden by a golden disk.   The concept of the 270
golden disk is quite enigmatic. As Sanskrit was written in a cryptic language where 
words have extra or changed letters based on word position, what is known about the 
importance of the golden disk closely relates to elements in the virtual game. The 
golden disk is discussed in Verse fifteen of the Isha Upanishad––it states that the door 
of truth is covered by a golden disk. The writer asks the source, or sun, to open the 
golden vessel in order for him or her to be bathed in the grace of truth. The golden 
disk, which is a false gold, can be seen as the buddhi within each person and it is only 
golden due to the light of the essential self glowing inside. This light, however, is not 
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bright for all people. The self only glows golden when impurities of the mind are 
eliminated through a spiritual understanding.  
 Thus, the glowing cannot be seen if the non-illuminated ignorance prevails. 
The golden disk, thus, can be found by a purification of the mind. Once the mind is 
purified, one can open the disk and engage in the actual light of the authentic inner 
self. The last portion of this process, then, is to understand the wrapping together of 
the individual self and cosmic self.   Opening the golden disk can also be seen as the 271
moment that a person is about to lose her identification with the ego and become 
more enlightened. Interestingly, there are many scenarios in virtual games where the 
protagonist needs to remove or penetrate a golden shield with some type of force. 
Further, steel doors are common in action games. Perhaps these subconscious ele-
ments within the virtual game can play a part in a form of spiritual transcendence. 
Play 
 After considering the aspects of purposelessness and meditative qualities in 
the virtual, we come upon the concept of play. To define play, it is the opposite of 
work, and it lacks seriousness. Play is commonly seen as a connection with child-
hood, while the concept of work connects with adulthood. However, it is found that 
adults who are most associated with their authentic self have retained their inner 
child. Nietzsche also states that the artist has held on to her child-force, “He has re-
mained a child or a youth all his life, stuck at the point at which he was first assailed 
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by his drive to artistic production.”   They allow themselves to play and enjoy. In the 272
virtual space, the player engages with others, as well as herself. To understand the self 
as uniting with the Other in a definitive sense, the experience can be seen as an im-
pressive form of awareness. When engaging in play, the human becomes filled with a 
copious sense of belonging in the universe. German poet and philosopher, Friedrich 
Schiller says that when a person is engaged in play, she is fully alive, as there is no 
gain or motive to be sought. Play is the reward. Schiller, states, “Only play makes the 
man whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once. Man only plays when he is in 
the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only a human being when he 
plays.” Further, Schiller says, “It is through beauty that we arrive at freedom.”   In a 273
harmonious coordination, Heidegger says, “Freedom is letting things be.”   While 274
Heidegger calls art the becoming of truth by relating the matter of art to truth as 
aletheia or unconcealment, the virtual is fortified within play, beauty, and multiple 
interpretations of truth.   275
 To further address the physicality of play, it can be seen that brain waves 
change at certain periods of a person’s life and circumstances––and also at play 
throughout life. When children are ages 0-4, there is a heavy concentration of Delta 
waves. Delta waves are similar to heavy states of sleep in adults. Children ages 4-7, 
experience Theta waves, which focuses on constant changes in behavior. Children 
ages 7-14 experience Alpha waves in which healing and meditation take place rapid-
ly, and new synapses occur more frequently. Ages 14 and above, adults frequently 
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experience Beta waves. While Beta waves are most common and do not provide as 
much growth and progression for the mind as do Delta and Theta, people can train 
their minds in various ways to go into these higher states of awareness and medita-
tion. Delta and Theta brain waves offer rejuvenation and ideal health. The varying 
brain waves are available to be induced through meditation or brain entrainment 
methods, and they can likewise be stimulated through play.   276
 Play can also be seen as the opposite of caution. Players are willingly experi-
encing the virtual game in order to throw caution to the wind. Generally, there are no 
physical consequences in the virtual experience. Behavior that exhibits risk––if even 
in the virtual––leads to a positive frame of mind. The individual can play in the 
Metaverse and engage in incautious activities for the simple act of amusement. In The 
Will to Believe, William James speaks of two different approaches to beliefs and char-
acteristics in life. He says one can take the negative approach in which the person 
lives a life based in fear, timidity, and self-doubt. There is no risk involved in this way 
of being. Alternatively, James says that the positive approach to life perspective is to 
embrace all truth and adventure that one can. This type of person will look to discover 
new things and enjoy new experiences.   James states, “Our errors are surely not 277
such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite 
of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive ner-
vousness on their behalf.”    278
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 The similarities between caution and risk are clear within play. In the virtual, 
there are constant new places to explore and move one's mind forward and expand. If 
an individual enters into an experience with a positive approach and expects new op-
portunities will occur, more often than not, more positive experiences will be offered. 
James says this is a form of faith that one must believe in order to live a life worth 
living––as there is something worth aspiring to. If one remains cautious and does not 
explore, one may never know what could have been possible.   Playing allows the 279
mind to remain free and active, rather than passive. While a person is playing, she 
still remains aware. This awareness offers a person the freedom to be open to unex-
pected angles and new viewpoints. Further, in a space of beauty which encompasses 
the aesthetic dimension, the individual will be more open to inspiration and have 
more eagerness to be inventive and productive. 
 Imagination is heightened when playing games. When in a state of play, the 
imagination is exercised like no other form. Aspects of the virtual can be broken 
down into many parts that include illusion, intuition, synthesis, and understanding. 
One can cause their mind to act freely, transcend circumstances, and develop in new 
directions. In The Republic, when Socrates and Glaucon speak of living a good life, 
Socrates says that openness of the mind is a virtue.   280
Creative Opportunity Through Play 
 Socrates sees differences between two worlds which are called praxis and fic-
tio. Praxis means action, and refers to the real world, while fictio has to do with the 
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world of play and make-believe. Furthermore, the term schole, which means scholar 
today, meant leisure in the time of the Greeks. Plato sees that play is important, par-
ticularly for the young. He realizes the magnitude and importance that play holds on a 
mind. Plato sees play as what transcends being, as play and the use of imagination 
transcend above and beyond an actual known reality.   With play being so potent for 281
Plato, there is quite clearly great influence behind the creative process of playing––
thus, becoming.  
 The activity that is found within the virtual employs a search that has been 
going on since ancient times in which we seek excellence of the human. When ap-
proached from this perspective, play becomes creative and brings the individual to a 
new place within the search for virtue. The activity of “playing” in any situation 
brings about a new feeling that is quite wondrous and novel––which becomes a path 
toward creativity. Playing produces combinations of surprise and also the obvious. 
Carl Jung speaks of art that can produce connectedness and calls it visionary. Combi-
nations of play and creativity connect unions of symbol, metaphor, and image that go 
beyond previously unsuspected preconceptions and explores connections between 
abstract ideas.   Jung states:  282
 The dynamic principle of fantasy is play, a characteris-
tic also of the child, and as such it appears inconsistent 
with the principle of serious work. But without this 
playing with fantasy no creative work has ever yet 
come to birth. The debt we owe to the play of the imag-
ination is incalculable.   283
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 Thus, the activity of play coupled with elements of surprise, recognition, and a 
touch of the visionary, offer new perspectives in one’s mind. The process of virtual 
play takes one beyond the ordinary ways of experiencing the world. Playing in the 
game transcends any preceding common visions of life. Playing offers countless pos-
sibilities to the player. Games in the virtual distinctively own this power of reordering 
thought from images and moving screens. When playing, the player projects her ex-
perience in a way that could not be seen or felt in any other scenario. By envisioning 
her involvement through the game, the player is permitting the actions to develop 
while unconscious impulses become more accessible. By imitating and representing 
objects and characters in the game to oneself, there forms a release of intellectual 
bondage. Thus, a life, just as a game, can become a theatrical event constantly chang-
ing and being revised, guiding internal drama through play. 
 Play is an activity where the mind is being used in new ways. When playing, 
the individual offers a willingness to divorce herself from the obvious reality she is a 
part of. Play becomes a voluntary detachment from physical forms as they exist in the 
world. Playing is an activity where one explores her own individuality and is able to 
examine the possibilities of human connection. Playing is quite clearly one of the 
main components of the virtual game. When playing, one might be mimicking or 
might be modeling. 
 Plato views play within the context of education. He discusses early education 
mainly in the Republic, written about 385 BC and speaks about it further in his later 
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work, Laws.   Plato is interested in children gaining an education in virtue, rather 284
than preparing for a trade. This is forward thinking. Plato also feels that people should 
be trained to be free and that people should not have a fear of death. In the virtual 
game, the player is confronted with death at incalculable rates, and learns to accept it, 
rather than cower and block it from their thoughts. Further, as has been mentioned 
previously, Plato’s admittance that creativity, art, and play offer such a large extent of 
power that they can overcome one’s mind brings more influence and potential to the 
concept of the video game as a form of discourse that empowers.   Through play, 285
and through the game, a person is able to face fears and understand the nuances that 
are rarely discussed. In the Republic, Socrates discusses with Glaucon how important 
play is in reference to the education of philosophical rulers: 
 “Well then, the study of calculation and geometry, and 
all the preparatory education required for dialectic must 
be put before them as children, and the instruction must 
not be given the aspect of a compulsion to learn.” 
 “Why not?” 
 “Because the free man ought not to learn any study 
slavishly. Forced labors performed by the body don't 
make the body any worse, but no forced study abides in 
the soul.” 
 “True,” he said. 
 “Therefore, you best of men,” I said, “don't use force in 
training the children in the subjects, but rather play. In 
that way you can better discern what each is  na tu ra l ly 
directed toward.”   286
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Free Play and Development of Character 
 With these ideas considered, it is seen that a child is shaped by play and cre-
ative thinking when young––and character will only develop in the adult if she con-
tinues to or resumes playful activities. Plato believes that the utmost way of instruc-
tion should be free play, though it should be motivated, structured, and not completely 
random in order to promote development of future adults to offer themselves towards 
a civil society and contribute to the good itself in the state.   Free play abounds in the 287
virtual game, though it holds an underlying structure.  
 Plato sees that the planning and designing of the city can be viewed as a play-
ful game in which adults indulge. He believes the ideal city should be treated more 
lightly and not taken too seriously.   Furthermore, Dutch theorist and historian, Jo288 -
han Huizinga, speaks largely on the benefits of play and how they too relate to culture 
and creativity: 
 In play there is something “at play” which transcends 
the immediate needs of life and imparts meaning to the 
action. All play means something. If we call the active 
principle that makes up the essence of play, “instinct,” 
we explain nothing; if we call it “mind” or “will” we 
say too much. However we may regard it, the very fact 
that play has a meaning implies a non-materialistic 
quality in the nature of the thing itself.   289
Vehicle of Detachment 
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 It is important to consider that play and imagination apply modes of detach-
ment. The vehicle of detachment is close to the activity of play in the way a person 
might alienate herself from reality in order to understand universal concepts internal-
ly. The creative journey for the inner self is similar to all forms of creativity in that 
artists need to reflect into forms of detachment at times. Forms of creating can be 
seen as a kind of detachment. To illustrate this one step further, Andy Warhol finds a 
place of openness with the same zen-like concept: 
 Sometimes people let the same problem make them 
miserable for years when they could just say, “So 
what.” “My mother didn't love me.” So what. “My hus-
band won't ball me.” So what. “I'm a success but I'm 
still alone.” So what. I don't know how I made it 
through all the years before I learned how to do that 
trick. It took a long time for me to learn it, but once you 
do, you never forget.   290
 In the virtual space, the creative player becomes disengaged from convention-
al existence and moves deeply into what they construct to replace it. In the virtual, 
players may latch on to new ideas and worlds that may surpass beliefs. Further, reach-
ing a level of not caring can add to a new understanding of self. Some people push 
themselves to a new level of not caring in order to get past limiting beliefs. We can 
see detachment done through play. One pretends and acts. Virtual activity may thrill 
the soul and opens up new worlds and possibilities to the player. When playing, it is 
as if a window to new worlds have been opened through detaching. Through game-
play, a person can unleash her creative imagination more freely. For, ways of commu-
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nication with one’s self-image can only be performed through creative imagining, and 
not as much as commonly believed––willpower. As specified previously in this chap-
ter, one’s visualizing of their self-image will be accepted as being real––even if the 
person has knowingly created a false or contrived image. As it may be seen by many, 
a large difficulty in overcoming the change in one’s self-image is the internal critic. 
The individual needs to find a way to develop her belief or her self-image to over-
come the critic inside. 
 Of course, an authentic self-image cannot be reached by moving away from 
reality indefinitely. By retreating into a virtual place via the game, or something such 
as a room of one’s own, one can uncover hidden truths about their ultimate self.  291
With this concept, the game can be seen as the proverbial room of one’s own. Within 
the virtual, a personal space can be created through the imagination and a person can 
envision these mental pictures of who they want to be. The importance of choice of 
self and actions cannot be underestimated. In the virtual, it is learned that we have 
choice as to who we are to become.   292
Myth as Cure to Anxiety 
 In his text, The Courage to Create, Rollo May discusses the Oracle at Delphi 
from the time of Plato. In the chapter entitled, “The Delphic Oracle as Therapist,” 
May discusses the Greek Oracle as a place that offered an opportunity to create the 
self. The Delphic shrine was believed to be the counsel of Apollo. The shrine helped 
Greeks during a time of great transition—it was a re-creation of their society and their 
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identities. May relates self-creation with the notions of myth and symbol––in essence, 
he sees the concepts work in concert with the ability to know thyself. Self-creation 
through myth and symbol can be found, too, in the majority of virtual games.   The 293
Delphic Oracle provided symbolic comments that helped people overcome the anxi-
ety they faced. Further aligned with today, May states that this emotive experience 
occurred through “the apprehension that accompanies a formative, fermenting, cre-
ative, powerfully expanding period.”   There is a clear connection to today’s rapid 294
developments that commonly cause anxiety in society. People rush home from their 
place of work to engage in virtual play just as the people traversed to Delphi in order 
to relieve societal anxiousness. Moreover, Apollo was the god of reason and logic, 
healing and wellbeing, and because of the relationship between form and beauty––he 
was also known as the god of art. Greeks traveled to Delphi in their hopes of a cure to 
their anxieties and insights to their own becoming. May points out that the oracle giv-
en by the priestesses of Apollo at Delphi were open-ended, inviting the seeker to 
search her own inner wisdom for meaning and direction.   The unrestraint can be 295
seen similarly to the virtual experience today, and is no less thrilling or pertinent than 
when it was conceived and brought to the public during the Greek ages. This experi-
ence with the Oracle then and the game today is about the process of knowing the 
self––even if there is no “self” as it is commonly known. In other words, the “self” is 
always changing and transforming. It is a constant evolution. The “self” is continually 
born and dies in a cycle. Thus, the concept of the authentic self is indeed a conun-
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drum, as it always transforming. The loss of self, then, is the highest attainment be-
cause then the subject is simply aware. 
 The Delphic Oracle aided in the occurring of creation by giving a space and 
ritual that generated and supported the symbols and myths that the Greeks held in 
their imaginations during this time of becoming. Rituals were practiced that allowed 
them to transition into an altered state of consciousness. The Oracle allowed the 
Greeks to experience meaningful myth-making in ways they would not ordinarily at-
tempt. Ultimately, the oracle represents communal meaning, which can be seen as 
necessary to the evolution of humanity. May states that the oracle represents the “un-
conscious collective insights of the group.”   Thus, these same experiences can be 296
seen in virtual gaming communities. The game offers new myths for the player to 
ponder, along with insightful experiences to contemplate. Room is left available for 
the player to work out any thoughts or anxieties and come to her own conclusions. 
 A playful form of dialogue can be found in myth. Plato’s myth of the Allegory 
of the Cave gives a perfect example of a story used in order to link education of the 
citizen and the community in Plato's Republic. The power of a myth can be wrapped 
around the concept of play. Very often, myth and play are intertwined in video game 
narratives. In The Quest for Myth, writer Richard Chase states: 
 Myth is an aesthetic device for bringing the imaginary 
but powerful world of preternatural forces into a man-
ageable collaboration with the objective (i.e., experi-
enced) facts of life in such a way as to excite a sense of 
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reality amenable to both the unconscious passions and 
the conscious mind.    297
Myth, then, brings together the literalness of experience and the dreams of one’s fur-
thest desires. Both myth and the act of play offer a means to embody the human con-
dition by viewing and understanding life within plots and characters. When playing 
the game, and, in a sense, subjectifying a world through this activity, many players 
might share a communal vibration of internal oneness. By witnessing, albeit virtually, 
cause and effect scenarios through playing a game in the virtual, a person might con-
struct a new idea of what could be beyond her own identity and circumstance. 
Through playing and myth, infinite life concepts and emotions might be sensed and 
structured differently due to aesthetic appeal and the clandestine captivation of art and 
symbol.  
 By interacting with internal concepts through the game, a person might find 
her own way by working with new forms to represent unique ways to understand 
complex ideas. Through the coupling of game and myth, ethereal concepts evolve 
into concrete visuals. With past myths, this transformation occurred through stories. 
Here, in the virtual game, we have the story, the intense visuals, and interactivity. If a 
person has certain concerns built up inside, the bottled-up emotions need expression. 
The dynamic experience through the virtual game, then, can open a virtual portal so 
the player’s anxieties can be released. As it is understood, the same relieving was 
once done through myth. Myth once helped to shape identity and offer release. Now, 
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the virtual space offers this many times over through interactivity paired with the best 
of mythic qualities. Within the game, there is a superfluous range of images and iden-
tities that provides patterns to which growth may aspire. 
 In Greek myths, both mastery and play are spread throughout the stories. In 
the virtual game and myth, these forms of cleverness are offered with a supernatural 
boost. In the virtual game that utilizes myth, one can encounter forms of knowledge 
through an innumerable array of characters.   Characters are offered in a form of 298
class that can be chosen. Just as class is structured in society, there are also hierar-
chies in the game––though in the virtual, the choices are transparently malleable. In 
the game, players can consciously choose their class. This important distinction 
alone––that one may be able to willingly choose her social class–can provide the con-
cept to the player that she might also have the chance to choose her own class in her 
physical reality––if, perhaps, she learns to harness her authenticity. When playing the 
virtual game, players are offered flexible class systems. In certain games, when 
choosing a class or level, the player can decide on her abilities, skills, her origin, edu-
cation, and place of residence. 
 Just as in myth, the character is both competent and idealized. In physical re-
ality, the human has been known to strive for proficiency yet simultaneously desire 
her original state of innocence. The virtual game can be seen as a glorified novel––
only now the reader is in the story and is able to watch and navigate at once. The 
gamer now becomes part of the story––she is no longer a bystander. The game––just 
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as the novel––becomes the individual’s new internal map of what she can become. A 
person no longer needs to experience a lone search for identity. Through the virtual, 
the internalization of the personal story becomes a communal experience. Likes, fol-
lowers, and friend requests come to the player easily.   She only will be alone if she 299
chooses so now. She has the choice to alienate herself or take turns in uncovering new 
layers of self and then come back to the community. 
Story 
 The evolution of the virtual is changing the way we interact with images and 
communicate with others. Never before in history has it been easier to see such im-
agery at a glance or to connect with others through this higher realm of interactivity. 
Just prior to interactive play in the virtual space, one’s media entertainment common-
ly came in the form of television. The viewer who watched television had little choice 
as to what to view. Through playing the virtual game now, however, one has complete 
ability as to what she chooses to watch, who she chooses to become, and how she 
would like to interact with others. The game now offers one the search for truth. The 
individual can discover her authentic potential. Through play, a mental window is 
opened and one’s self-image is more readily available to see herself more clearly. 
There is now opportunity to experience an honest self-assessment. One's self-image is 
essential to how she might act in life. Her beliefs dictate to her what she feels she de-
serves. 
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 Self-beliefs have to do with stories people tell themselves. People are told sto-
ries by other people, and they also tell themselves stories of past events and present 
occurrences. Those who may feel bewildered in their life, perhaps, do not know how 
to tell themselves a new story about their life that could occur for them positively. 
Thus, one’s own story has the potential to change a person’s life. Humans have been 
led for thousands of years to listen to and respond to stories. One might even say that 
there is nothing more engaging than a good story. Stories invoke creative listening 
and, thus, higher cognition to listeners, readers, and players. 
 Humans hold deep desires for experiencing and engaging in story, as they feel 
as if they are part of something larger than themselves. Stories open up the mind to 
higher mental functioning in which it has the capability to work at its highest poten-
tial. Going through a storied event together with other people (virtual or real) is a core 
piece of the notion of the ritual. Connecting stories with rituals are incredibly strong 
experiences, as a ritual can be among the most powerful bonds that humans have with 
one another. These elements of story connect others and, thus, create close affinities. 
Players in the virtual space and those who engage in gameplay through social media 
are part of large and interconnected networks and communities. 
 Elements of story and play occupy central roles within various areas of 
knowledge.   The game can become a form of personal discovery through the narra300 -
tive––however linear or non-linear. Contrasting myth, the novel recognizes the dis-
tinction between subjective and objective. Both myth and fictional stories are fre-
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quently found in the virtual game, which offers a dynamic interaction that cannot be 
found in other outlets of activity in such a way. 
 Through visual aesthetics and the plot, some games can be seen as rich and 
beautiful, while others are impoverished and crude. Some games appear to be quite 
contemporary while others appear archaic. Juxtapositions between play and the aes-
thetic interest offer effective surprise to the player with an anticipation as to what 
might be next. These are functions of reward and pleasure within the game. Thus, the 
virtual game offers cognitive interest through its transformative story-telling. A seem-
ingly limited experience can spread its power over a range of time while playing a 
game. The video game shows what is possible through visuals and action. The person 
who cannot visualize what is possible may not attempt to move. Thus, the virtual cre-
ates illumination. Through various means of departure, one can move aggressively 
toward a preferred reality, which means uncovering hidden truths about oneself and 
thus encompass greater frequencies of contentment. 
 In The Psychological Novel, author Leon Edel discusses the element of time 
in myth and the novel. He states: 
 Like William James, Bergson taught that we are re-
molded constantly by experience; that consciousness is 
a process of endless accretion, so long as mind and 
senses are functioning; that it is ‘the continuation of an 
indefinite past in a living present.’    301
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Similar to the novel and myth, the virtual game has turned the uses of metaphor to an 
exploration of modes of awareness. For, if technology is and remains the servant of 
humans, the story and myth that engage the player will enhance her intuitions and of-
fer a harmonious experience. 
 The story in the game can also be seen as a form of psychic energy. Jung saw 
psychic energy as a basic life-force which would manifest itself as needed.   Jung 302
says that we should regard the self as the most important archetype, as it keeps every-
thing surrounding it together. Jung states, “The reason for evil in the world is that 
people are not able to tell their stories.”     303
 Stories offer a way of thinking powerfully and more abstractly, which can eas-
ily be seen in the virtual. When engaged in a form of power thinking within both sto-
ry and game, an individual might understand that everything is neutral. A person real-
izes over time that things may not have meaning other than the meaning a person 
gives to it. Thus, due to the game, people can learn to create a story and give life it’s 
meaning. Thinking such as this recognizes that if one is creating her own meaning 
and story, there is no reason not to create a story that is supportive to the individual. 
The cycle of form and reformation in the game connect to the stories one learns and 
tells herself. Telling oneself a new story becomes something that is resourceful and 
creative—a person has to think about what can be produced from the old cast-off 
parts of the past. Rollo May states, “The poet’s labor is to struggle with the meaning-
less and silence of the world until he can force it to mean; until he can make the si-
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lence answer and the non-being be.”   The vision of form arising from new stories 304
becomes a special sort of moving material into being. 
 By changing the stories a person tells herself, she becomes involved in a form 
of re-setting. If a video game mistakenly turns off without saving, a player may cry 
out, “I’ve lost all of my worlds! Now I need to make them over again.” Re-starting 
the game turns play into fiery change for the better at times. When playing in the 
world of digital space, glitches will occur, power outages happen––and players have 
to start over again. These experiences teach the player the laws of cause and effect 
and teach the deeper processes of re-birth. This re-setting can be likened similarly to 
prescribed fires in the wild. In the physical world, controlled fire is executed on cer-
tain land areas to attain what is organically necessary in a specific space. Controlled 
fires are created and maintained enough so they are able to eradicate unnecessary 
components in a forest. Interestingly, fire is a normal and beneficial occurrence in the 
wild. Many forms of life depend on fires and wildfires as well. The similar process of 
re-starting in the forest, and also in the virtual game, then, is a path towards an en-
lightened form of being in all areas of life. Re-setting is a part of gameplay that many 
do not notice, though they become acclimated to re-starting and may learn intuitively 
that re-setting clears space in order to begin again anew. The subliminal negation of 
negation concept may not be something that is an obvious benefit to the player, 
though it is clear that it can cause positive effects over time. When one decides to be-
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come aware in her life, these mechanisms allow one to come to new realizations of 
the self. 
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Chapter Six 
Particulars Within the Virtual 
 The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the charac-
ter of setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That challeng-
ing happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is 
unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is 
stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched 
about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and 
switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply 
comes to an end. 
 ––Martin Heidegger 
 The Question Concerning Technology 
Lying Beneath Technology 
 After considering many areas that offer the player the power to become more 
through forms of being and doing, the concepts of technology should be examined for 
further understanding. It is further important to question the organic nature of tech-
nology. It is through forms of technology that people are able to move further in their 
evolution. It is evident that technology is moving humanity at an unprecedented pace. 
Thus, technology can be seen as a tool that connects with consciousness and pushes 
forward. While technologies in primitive time periods were utilized by putting to-
gether objects used for obtaining food and shelter, technology today can be seen in 
terms of ideas and actions through art and word now being formed in order to come to 
a higher realization of the self. The term “technology” can be broken down into the 
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Greek terms technē and logos. Technē is defined as “art” and logos as “word.” Art and 
word form together within the virtual world. 
 Through technology, the virtual world of encompassing play emerges as a 
natural progression. Within the considerations of technology, we come to Heidegger’s 
thoughts within his text, The Question Concerning Technology. While Heidegger 
looks highly to technology, he also believes it is dangerous when people become ob-
sessed with it. With this in mind, he believes we can avert the obsession through art 
forms within the technology.   Thus, he sees real benefits within technology, though 305
it can be said that a contemplative energy needs to be included within the technology 
in order for the progression to work effectively. It can further be seen that the virtual, 
in such an ephemeral state, is also continuously revealing. Heidegger sees technology 
as a constant form of revealing or aletheia. Heidegger comments on the following: 
 But where have we strayed to? We are questioning con-
cerning technology, and we have arrived now at 
aletheia, at revealing. What has the essence of technol-
ogy to do with revealing? The answer: everything. For 
every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing. Bringing-
forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of 
occasioning–causality–and rules them throughout. 
Within its domain belong end and means, belongs in-
strumentality. Instrumentality is considered to be the 
fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire, 
step by step, into what technology, represented as 
means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. The 
possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in re-
vealing. Technology is therefore no mere means. Tech-
nology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, 
then another whole realm for the essence of technology 
will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., 
of truth.   306
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To consider the premise further, Heidegger indeed views technology as a saving 
grace. Heidegger states that we commonly see technology as having a thingly quali-
ty––such as the equipment associated with technology. If, however, we liken technol-
ogy to metaphysical conclusions, we can see that technology may be even more supe-
rior than the thingly. Heidegger sees technology as showing consciousness what was 
not there to be seen prior. The revealing experience he associates with technology 
brings together the concept of a revelation, which he calls Dasein, and the perception 
of technology itself. Interestingly, Heidegger comments that technē “is the name not 
only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also from the arts of the mind 
and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing forth, to poiēsis; it is something 
poetic.”   Here, we see technology as something quite transcendent and imaginative. 307
Heidegger understands where the concept of technology began in the times of Plato––
and how the term technē was intertwined with both art and poiesis. Heidegger sees art 
as a connected part of society before the covering up or veil evolved. He asserts that 
art had a pure interconnectivity and was coupled with being in the times of Ancient 
Greece. Notably, Heidegger sees the downfall of society occurring when the authen-
ticity of art, life, and creation became masked and truth became hidden. Heidegger 
believes that the saving grace within the essence of technology manifests itself as a 
truth of being, in which both the simultaneous revealing and concealing of being aris-
es. He sees convenience and apathy as what keeps us in a stagnant mode. If there is 
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no sense of urgency or real desire, authentic art and creativity cannot occur. For, new 
technologies are created within the thoughts of a creative humanity.   308
 Furthermore, technē is commonly linked with epistēmē, and as such, both 
terms display the knowingness that is constantly in the process of revealing.   Hei309 -
degger sees this synthesis of technology and poetics as a force that is natural. The re-
vealing-ness of technology brings to the forefront what is completely human. Heideg-
ger states that this “enframing" is what we recognize in our life and being that is be-
cause of the truth that technology stirs about. Furthermore, Heidegger discusses the 
German term, Gestell, and says that it lies below current technology. This “lying be-
neath technology” has then become enframed. Heidegger states:  
 Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-
upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to 
reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-re-
serve. Enframing means that way of revealing which 
holds sway in the essence of modern technology and 
which is itself nothing technological.    310
 Heidegger, too, sees a very real paradox within the notion of technology. He 
understands the potential for a danger that could occur due to the way society en-
frames technology. However, the paradox is found in the fact that technology equally 
holds the key to revealing the oppression of humanity to itself. When Heidegger ques-
tions the essence of technology, he understands that his notion of “essence” is quite 
dissimilar to Plato. Plato sees “essence” as a permanent condition. Heidegger sees 
“essence” as the process of developing and enduring. With his formulations, he de-
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constructs the thoughts that Western civilization have been resting on for over two 
thousand years.   311
 In addition, Heidegger sees that humanity becomes more fluid through art. He 
sees the aestheticization of art keeping it in the place of subject and object. He looks 
to art as something that has the ability to change, rather than subjectify. He, interest-
ingly, urges humanity to approach art and life from a post-aesthetic frame of refer-
ence.   Heidegger believes that people need to experience the origin of art in their 312
own way, and recreate it in their own mind to receive the full experience. Heidegger 
believes it is possible for art to open up the point of view of being in the human that is 
necessary for survival. This process can easily be translated to the virtual world. Hei-
degger believes an intimate knowing is discovered once a significant understanding 
of art has been met.   313
 Further into the particulars of the virtual, Theodor Adorno sees humanity as 
being oppressed by the advents of capitalism and its hold on ultimate knowledge. He 
calls on new prospects for humanity––and nature as well. Thus, while the unassuming 
citizen might see the virtual world of play as moving further away from nature, it can 
be seen that the virtual is moving closer to forms of truth within the mind of the indi-
vidual. The virtual game offers an opening to the individual in order to see what is 
available––if only she decides to suspend disbelief and grant access to her ever-curi-
ous imagination. Adorno states: 
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 Technology is said to have ravished nature––a turn of 
phrase that derives essentially from bourgeois sexual 
morality. In a framework of different productive rela-
tions, the same technology might be able not to violate, 
but to help nature realize some of its aims (wohin sie 
vielleicht möchte) right here on this old earth.    314
Thus, the virtual world via technology can be seen as an organic process in the human 
longing and search for access to the infinite self. If technology is first created through 
thought, a whole new function of thinking about virtual play through technology may 
be considered. When the uses of technology are more fully known, one might look 
beyond idle setbacks and analyze how it is can be productive. If this understanding is 
not made known, the truth of technology serves no purpose, and it is simply an objec-
tive medium. 
 The virtual world through technology has the ability to take people some-
where else than they expected to be. Thus, the virtual depicts truths. The experience 
of truth is expressed into the virtual which then expresses back to the beginning of the 
first experience, thereby revealing the truth. The experience appears on the virtual 
screen, as an object. Through the virtual, the object is no longer hidden. By viewing a 
“new world” within the virtual, the player has the ability to immortalize objects and 
envision them as more significant than they are in physical reality. The player is able 
to visualize what has happened, what lies within, and what is available. While it can 
easily be said that the virtual offers the player a mere illustration of one’s imagination, 
the hyper-likeness to physical and imagined worlds rather offers the player a chance 
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to notice exquisite details that make up forms of the real. Unexpectedly, the player 
discovers a higher form of self-awareness within the virtual.     315
Action 
 After considering technology within the virtual, action can be understood as a 
bridge between inner and outer worlds. Action is progressive, and the most effective 
method to growing is actively “doing.” Physically doing, even if it is in a virtual set-
ting, allows the mind to believe it is moving forward. Activity itself propels one into 
progress. Movement and a sense of progress reward the player with a state of accom-
plishment. If a character moves within the game, the image of the actionable move-
ment becomes imprinted in the mind, and it allows one to experience increased capa-
bilities. Forms of action will encourage a person to change and establish behaviors. 
Any form of action, particularly with repetition, will create new ways of being. Once 
a person is playing in the game, new circumstances are all-encompassing. Once a 
spark of possibility enters the mind, a new way of thinking has been disclosed. Play-
ing in the virtual, then, can be seen as a habit that strengthens. 
 Active play can quickly relieve prior conditioning within the individual. The 
act of play can deepen the knowingness of the player, as the experience has the ability 
to find her ideal self due to her actions. As a result of the evolution of the virtual, 
people can grow to discover deeper clarity in their life. Through the game, the player 
can re-align her unique energy and develop an authentic mode of being with more 
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benevolence. The virtual experience is not about being on one's own in mental isola-
tion. In the virtual, there is a capacity to represent to the individual her personal free-
dom and power by backing away from oppressive thought systems. Finding the au-
thentic self in the game is further found through experiences of communion. Many 
games encompass communal aspects of sharing, following, networking, connecting, 
working together, and communicating––virtually. Group participation allows the 
player to grow as a unique entity while having the ability to learn from others. The 
experience in the virtual game can easily translate into the physical dimension. To see 
the world within the screen, the player may then see the world’s reflection outside. 
Thought 
 In his Poetics, Aristotle calls the mind the place of forms because it is able to 
grasp objects apart from physical matter. Aristotle says that the mind has no physical 
form, and it thinks its way through images. Therefore, the imagination is not fully de-
pendent on the body compared to the faculties of perception. Aristotle asserts that 
thinking, then, is up to humans themselves. Thought does not rely so much on percep-
tion, but rather the imagination. Further, Aristotle claims that he wrote his Nico-
machean Ethics, “not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become 
good.”   Through his findings, Aristotle claims that one needs to not only perform 316
good acts, but do them in the right way. Aristotle further claims that the ultimate end 
for the human is happiness, which can also be called eudaimonia (εὐδαιµονία) in 
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Greek. The state of eudaimonia is said to be the highest state that a person can attain. 
Aristotle states that this is the most worthy form of excellence to strive for in life. The 
journey toward eudaimonia contains important forms of character that include 
courage and pride. The interweaving of friendship is also formed when one reaches 
this ultimate mode of living, says Aristotle.   The process and searching for the ut317 -
most attainment as a human being is similarly found in the virtual game. In virtual 
play, the process of becoming and recognizing one’s own courage is understood.    
 Aristotle further describes the three types of intellectual discipline. The three 
forms closely correlate to gaming and its characteristics. The three disciplines are 
termed productive, practical, and theoretical.  
1. The mode of productive discipline focuses on the external formations that one 
might create, such as building a structure or a house. Quite interestingly, many games 
focus on the player constructing buildings, forms, towns, cities, and worlds.  
2. The practical discipline lies in the realm of ethical considerations. This mode is 
centered on the concepts of action and decisiveness. These characteristics are crucial 
for the experience of the game activity. 
3. The last Aristotelian discipline is the theoretical form. This is the discipline that is 
concerned with truth alone for the sake of it to be known.   These universal forms of 318
recognition bring about important factors for the individual and player alike. 
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 Further, in Poetics, Aristotle discusses tragedy and the elements of dramatic 
theory. He states that the plot is the first and main principle of a great work. The plot 
alone should move one to strong sensations. Both tragic plays and gameplay hold 
similar qualities as they have the ability to spark fervent emotion in the viewer. Only 
now, the viewer is engaged in the intensity of experiential-ness. The plot is quite cen-
tral to many virtual games. The components of gameplay or plot are different com-
pared to narrative components to the game. 
 Aristotle holds the basis of poetry to be imitation. He theorizes that imitation 
provides forms of pleasure due to the fulfillment of the learning process that happens 
because of the creative nourishment. For, Aristotle states that learning is––or should 
be––pleasurable. He says that people enjoy learning when they see a likeness in what 
they are studying.   Clearly, the virtual game covers an expansive field of genres, 319
though it does hold close affinity with the rules Aristotle sets out. A large number of 
games allow one to ponder over the nature of the story and time itself. The cathartic 
qualities in gameplay can be seen quite clearly, as they are a method to release fretful 
feelings. When a player comes to the game with any sense of anger, aggression, frus-
tration, anxiety––she may be able to work through these negative energies and find a 
purifying effect through the renewing aspects present in the game. 
 As it can be seen, then, creating an authentic self can indeed occur within the 
digital world of the virtual. Formative beliefs are taught by family, friends, society, 
media, and acquaintances which work to create a person’s identity when young. It is 
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commonly found that when a person becomes a certain age after adolescence, she 
may search for who she truly is if driven enough to become more. Thus, a new sense 
of autonomy is born by consciously creating the self again. Once the mind has been 
developed, a person has the ability to create and re-create her identity as much as she 
desires in order to fit her awakened state. Gameplay offers the person who seeks a 
higher sense of self-awareness the virtual tools to do so again and again if desired. As 
humans are artistic beings, the adolescent who has grown and matures into an adult 
may come to find herself with an urge to explore a way to create again. 
 Action and thought together comprise a creative moment. While playing the 
game offers immense leaps into new modes of possibilities, character adjustments can 
be achieved through self-discipline and control of the self. Through these forms of 
self-balance, a person can intuitively learn how to re-invent the self. The experience 
of acting in the game is also an interesting topic to consider. Acting can be viewed in 
various ways, though it is constructive to observe acting as akin to playing. A person 
consciously changes her persona when acting. The player, then, acts in the virtual 
game, which offers a chance to create the self. The formative process is more than 
contemplation, as it delivers to the player a larger space to become. Thus, while the 
activity of playing a game in the virtual may commonly be seen as a repetitive pas-
time, it remains essential to see that the moments played in the game consist of mak-
ing worlds, forming new identities, interacting with the self and others––all offering 
immense forms of creativity.  
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 With reference to the interactive participation within the game, the player is 
necessary while the game is the tool. The player automatically controls all perceptions 
and experiences, thus, it is imperative for the individual to consciously discipline 
these modes. Once the player becomes aware this she is indeed the programmer of 
her self, she can create her identity as she desires it to be. Nietzsche says, “Why does 
man not see things? He is himself standing in the way: he conceals things.”   In the 320
game, then, the player slowly learns to consciously direct her actions––and essentially 
gets out of the way. Through this process, the individual becomes a conduit of cre-
ativity and may attain her highest state of self. By playing the game, the player sees 
that more can be accomplished with enough persistence. For, there is an all-encom-
passing, yet non-transparent, commentary from society and mass media that teaches 
the individual that she needs a crutch––that she has no power. When a person plays 
the game and sees that she does have power, she might feel that it is a false assump-
tion at first, though the more she plays and feels a fulfillment and recognition, the 
deeper she will come to recognize her abilities.  
 Moreover, the conscious act of thought is closely tied together with the con-
cept of self-reliance. Humanity has been seeking to find the highest state of awareness 
of the self. People have been searching for this natural power and connection to the 
eternal nature of being. However, the incalculable strength of the individual has per-
severed and the relentlessness of hope has peeked through the stratosphere of oppres-
sion. Here and there, occurrences arise where an individual does indeed find her self-
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confidence and decides to empower herself. In his text, Self-Reliance, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson writes that there is nothing outside of ourselves that can bring us peace, that 
we are the only ones who we can rely on to live an authentic life. He says further: 
 A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of 
light which flashes across his mind from within, more 
than the lustre of the firmament of bards and sages. Yet 
he dismisses without notice his thought, because it is 
his. In every work of genius we recognize our own re-
jected thoughts: they come back to us with a certain 
alienated majesty. Great works of art have no more af-
fecting lesson for us than this. They teach us to abide by 
our spontaneous impression with good-humored inflex-
ibility then most when the whole cry of voices is on the 
other side. Else, tomorrow a stranger will say with mas-
terly good sense precisely what we have thought and 
felt all the time, and we shall be forced to take with 
shame our own opinion from another. There is a time in 
every man’s education when he arrives at the conviction 
that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he 
must take himself for better, for worse, as his portion; 
that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel 
of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil 
bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him 
to till. The power which resides in him is new in nature, 
and none but he knows what that is which he can do, 
nor does he know until he has tried.   321
In addition, Emerson offers similar sentiments, and relays that the boundaries be-
tween humanity and truth are conformity and consistency. In order to recreate civi-
lization, an individual must look within and begin to question what she is being told. 
Emerson says, “It is easy to see that a greater self-reliance must work a revolution in 
all the offices and relations of men; in their religion; in their education; in their pur-
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suits; their modes of living; their association; in their property; in their speculative 
views.”   Emerson also sees action as promoting change. He does not believe in rely322 -
ing on the past to move forward. We can see this progression occurring in the virtual, 
as it is a momentum that builds and looks ahead, rather than behind. Through explor-
ing the power that the worlds of the game encompass, it is clear that an energy is 
building. The continual evolving of independence through the game allows people to 
see what is conceivable. The force within the virtual propels creativity into a mode 
that can be expressed by the player uniquely. Creativity, then, is a relentless force that 
will not be buried.   
 Ideas are interchangeable through thought. Once a person begins to see her 
thoughts from a point of view that becomes inter-disciplinary, the individual can 
make adjustments. An educational tool to help people achieve mastery of skills can be 
found in what is commonly called the “Conscious Competence Matrix.” The method 
of understanding coincides with the known statement coined by Christ and, then, dis-
cussed by philosophers, including Žižek, “For they know not what they do.”   This 323
ladder of learning has been taught within business and human development, though it 
corresponds to the awakening experience in the virtual nicely. It is seen here in the 
conscious competence matrix that conscious growth takes place in four steps.  
1. The first step is determined as unconscious incompetence, where the person is not 
yet aware of what she does not know.  
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2. The second step is conscious incompetence in which the individual now knows 
what she does not know.  
3. The third step is conscious competence. Here, she is consciously aware of what she 
is learning and willingly framing into her mind. She engages in repetitive acts in or-
der to create effective change. We can see this as a crucial step in the virtual.  
4. The final step of the conscious competence matrix is unconscious competence. 
Here, the player behaves as she desires, without question.   The behavior becomes 324
automatic. This similar formation can occur within the game where the player begins 
not knowing, and, if she plays a sufficient amount of time, she becomes proficient 
without trying.  A training of better behavior that is automatic is the goal in this struc-
ture. 
 While this practice towards becoming may seem somewhat abstract toward 
the concept of creating the self through the virtual, it is seen that the player begins 
with an unconscious awareness of who she is. As a player progresses in the playing of 
the game, she grows to realize that she can locate her authenticity. After playing for 
some time, she comes into her inner self without conscious thought.  
 We may further consider similarities between classic forms of art and the en-
gagement with the game. The prior form of interactivity while viewing art was a pas-
sive experience. Playing in the virtual is now an interactive one. The virtual world 
offers the player physical, mental, and spiritual experiences where the player dictates 
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the moves and motives behind the character or circumstance in the game. While it can 
be said that video game creators are the designers and regulators of what is being ap-
plied to the player, it can also be inferred that the virtual game experience holds mas-
sive potential for conscious creativity. Furthermore, intuitive interfaces, systems, and 
coding now make the capabilities available so the player can develop and build their 
own games with ease. The player is no longer a passive consumer or spectator.  
Détournement and Spectacle 
 Twentieth century French Marx theorist and writer, Guy Debord’s, analyses of 
the spectacle of society, along with his thoughts on détournement and the dérive 
through the Situationists International are still quite prevalent today.   I argue that the 325
virtual world cannot be seen completely comparable to the spectacle, as the spectacle 
does not cause room for productivity. While, of course, there are games that do not 
lead to productivity, the amount of room for growth and knowledge through the video 
game outweighs the effects of absurdity through the spectacle. In addition, Rancière 
claims that we need to push further than the détournement.   Perhaps the 1960s 326
seemed to be a radical way of being, and can be seen that way even now––though this 
is because the patriarchal control will not allow an actual rupture of the symbolic or-
der. Societal restrictions are so rigid that any form of autonomous thought or move-
ment is quickly dismissed, ignored, silenced, and squelched.  
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 Nevertheless, it is helpful to become reacquainted with the concepts of the 
spectacle and détournement to see how these forms of power can be used to the best 
of our abilities within the virtual. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Debord and his group, 
The Situationists International, called for deliberate activity in contrast to mind-
numbing passivity. Here, the SI is addressing situational aesthetics within the cultural 
spectacle. Within the situationist movement, the person or group would consciously 
create their physical situation. The belief behind this experiment was that the individ-
ual who realizes that she controls her life and creates it moment by moment will be-
gin to have power in her own self and create new, more authentic, worlds.   The SI 327
states, “Art can cease being a report about sensations and become a direct organiza-
tion of more advanced sensations. The point is to produce ourselves rather than things 
that enslave us.”   In a game such as Second Life, the player has free ground to create 328
her character, identity, and actions. She has control to roam in the virtual world. The 
player learns that she is always in the middle of her own experiences. Thus, a self-
aware consciousness unfolds in the virtual. The consciousness passes through to the 
material world. If all things begin with consciousness, the virtual game is an evolu-
tionary pathway for an individual to find her highest self. 
  
 The Situationists’ concept of détournement is an early post-modern form of re-
creating by means of sabotaging a former spectacle-based image or icon in popular 
media and completely changing the meaning. To compare détournement to the virtual 
world of play, players are continuously re-inventing the creative flow in the game. 
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Players can code or hack the former and original game and create new versions of the 
previous game in many instances. This can be seen similarly to détournement and 
most art forms that have prevailed and changed dominant culture. Thus, while dé-
tournement means “overturning” or “derailment,” it can be seen as a positive force 
that rescinds conditions into creative experiences. Détournement, which is an appro-
priation from popular culture into a new, subversive meaning is expeditiously turning 
over new forms of mimesis into itself to promote greater innovative production. The 
benefit to the virtual is that, while the mode of production is quickly speeding, the 
mode of creativity is enhanced and being engaged.   
  
 Détournement is established as a rip-off of popular media. Looking to the vir-
tual space as a mode of détournement, the world of play sustains an unending cycle 
that will continue to change and evolve as it is continued. In the game, the viewer be-
comes the director and can change the ending as much as she pleases. She creates and 
de-constructs the entire script––learning while playing. The situationists see the no-
tion of the détournement as an opposition to the spectacle. This form of activism 
against behemoth media opens up new ways to allow creativity into one’s life. The 
stifling effect of the spectacle envelops such a large number of passive viewers that 
the virtual game, akin to the idea of détournement, opens up a space for the player to 
breathe and play. The détournement becomes a social construction that is meant to be 
a production of activity, rather than passivity. Here, the individual becomes involved 
in her life. She becomes an active and interactive member in the story she creates. 
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While the spectacle of society creates unreal scenarios for the passive viewer to con-
sume, the game in the virtual, too, provides unreal scenarios, though the player is now 
engaged and conscious areas in the mind become expanded. 
  
 The spectacle is pinpointed as the downfall of productivity and is quite invisi-
ble since it is promoted perpetually at all times. The spectacle does not challenge the 
spectator. Here, we can see the virtual game falls in two camps. Our knowledge of 
these two camps will aid us in delineating how we can see the virtual as conducive to 
creating the self of not. To be sure, not every virtual game will be considered a form 
of personal creation. Depending upon one’s definition of creation, of course, that will 
dictate what form of the game is art or not, however, for our purposes in this discus-
sion, let us look to art as paths and forms of expression. Within these two camps, one 
encompasses the game that is indeed available for expression and the ability to find 
the inner self. The second falls into the spectacle category and is all about itself and 
brings the player into what the SI call “an increasingly full-time spectator of the es-
tablished absurdities.”   While the spectacle can be seen as a form of thought control, 329
we can look to the virtual as a space for personal control of thought. 
 The game, then, is a prospect for a sophisticated avenue in becoming more. 
Instead of discarding the entire medium and chalking it up to a spectacle, it can be 
looked upon as a framework that allows for superior ways of creating. In their essay, 
“The Use of Free Time,” Debord and his group comment the following: 
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 There is no revolutionary problem of leisure––of an 
emptiness to be filled––but a problem of free time. As 
we have already said: “There can be no free use of time 
until we possess the modern tools for the construction 
of everyday life. The use of such tools will mark the 
leap from a utopian revolutionary art to an experimental 
revolutionary art.” The supersession of leisure through 
the development of an activity of free creation-con-
sumption can only be understood in relation with the 
dissolution of the traditional arts––with their transfor-
mation into superior modes of action which do not 
refuse or abolish art, but fulfill it. In this way art will be 
superseded, conserved and surmounted within a more 
complex activity. Its traditional elements may still be 
partially present, but transformed, integrated and modi-
fied by the totality.   330
Many video games indeed have much to do with commodity and consumption on a 
corporate scale. When virtual games are created, there are multitudes of designers 
creating for a large company looking to produce a hefty revenue. Many video games, 
then, are created to pacify and lead the player nowhere. However, it is imperative to 
see the unrealized probabilities that the game holds in light of the philosophical con-
cepts offered. Independent video game designers are already at the pulse of creative 
aspects that are changing the game into a dynamic mode of becoming. This is similar 
to many forms of evolution in the arts where subversive off-shoots of larger capitalist 
entities have by-and-large changed history.   There are many examples of games that 331
have been created to offer the player an improved sense of self-awareness within 
mainstream game publishing, independent game publishing, and fine arts as well. As 
technologies grow and the virtual field expands, the space of virtual play and games 
is taking hold rapidly. Not only is there now a genre of “serious games,” but the ex-
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pansion of the said virtual reality headsets, Google glass, and 3D printing are putting 
the virtual into an important position. 
 The game in the virtual, then, is able to flip the spectacle on its head––as it is 
becoming more and more productive. While Debord sees the spectacle as the moment 
that is never––and actual physical life becomes cheapened––the game becomes sig-
nificant in that it can affect physical life for the better. When the player leaves the 
game, she is renewed. She has, perhaps, meditated through play, trained her mind ac-
cording to her needs, and performed in a global arena. Moreover, the game offers an 
increasing amount of experiences in which players play with one another in real time 
and eventually forge actual friendships and relationships in the physical world.   Of332 -
ten, then, relationships are cemented through the process of experiencing the game 
amidst others.  
 Viewing the game in terms of Debord’s theory of dérive, it can be understood 
as a mode of passage that one takes through controlled spaces, while keeping the 
element of chance intact. The concept of dérive is based on the coupled actions of 
play with a stroll. It is seen as a drifting. The dérive enhances one’s appreciation for 
the various changes in scenery and ambiance on the walk, which can be summarized 
as a matter of paying attention to one’s surroundings. The dérive is a process of af-
firming excitement by one's environs. The comparison to virtual games cannot be de-
nied in this illustration. The experience of the dérive is freeing, as an individual may 
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choose to examine her setting however she chooses. For, in Debord’s Theory of the 
Dérive, he quotes Marx, “Men can see nothing around them that is not their own im-
age; everything speaks to them of themselves. Their very landscape is alive.”   333
The Virtual Game as Art  
  
 Video games that are indeed productive forms of becoming are being created 
and sold both within capitalist outlets, and also within museums. In the video game, 
The Vanishing of Ethan Carter, the player is situated in a space that encompasses 
beautiful vistas that indelibly immerse one in a gorgeous and moving world. Beauty 
abounds and is everywhere. Within the game, there are mysteries, puzzles, learning 
opportunities, and murder mysteries to solve. This particular video game has no time 
limit and there are no tutorials. The player has the ability to roam in the world as she 
pleases in the non-linear virtual space. In this video game, she is on her own to play 
as she wishes. As many video games are known to coddle the player and be fast-
paced, this game offers the player absolute space for free play.   Designer of the The 334
Vanishing of Ethan Carter, Adrian Chmielarz states in an interview with respect to the 
game, “We believe that games are a very potent story-telling medium, and we hope to 
be a part of the movement trying to evolve story-telling in games.”    335
 Further, if we look to an earlier video game from 2006 that is based in war, we 
see the player is transported to historical events. In the game, Company of Heroes, the 
story takes place in the middle of World War II. The player is dropped into the war 
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and re-lives a historical moment in history through extreme virtual interaction and 
immersion. The explanation of the game is as follows: 
 A real-time strategy (RTS) game set in World War II, 
Company of Heroes brings to life––in full cinematic 
detail––the greatest war mankind has ever known. 
Gamers will experience the journey of the brave men of 
Able Company in a deep single-player campaign that 
begins with the invasion of Normandy through their 
fight across Europe. Company of Heroes' completely 
destructible environment means no two battles ever 
play out in the same way. Advanced squad AI brings 
soldiers to life as they interact with the environment 
and execute advanced squad tactics to eliminate the op-
position forces.   336
While the place, theme, and plot may be quite harsh and unsettling, the basic concep-
tion of the idea that one can be dropped into a moment in time of history allows one 
to see the many possibilities the virtual beholds. To be virtually transported and hold 
the ability to experience in full detail a historical time and space is unprecedented. 
Thus, while games based in war are not necessarily productive to one’s becoming, we 
can see that there is budding potential underlying the concept of re-living occasions 
and participate in historical moments in time. The beauty to behold is that re-living 
moments in time through the aesthetic experience brings the concept of historical 
painting to a new intersection in the history of art. 
 In addition, the virtual game continues to find its way into the art world fur-
ther. The entrance of video games into the arts was discussed in the first chapter, and 
we can see two additional examples here. Within the past fifteen years, the digital age 
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has spilled into the work of many artists. Visual artists are frequently using sources 
from digital media and interactive technologies––with this, the world of gaming is 
influencing and overflowing into artwork substantially. Contemporary artist, Feng 
Mengbo, created a large-scale installation that was purchased by the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York entitled Game Over: Long March in 2010. In the piece, 
Mengbo composited large swaths of video game imagery along canvases stretched 
eighty by twenty feet.   The enlarged imagery of a superimposed game gives the 337
viewer the opportunity to feel enveloped by it. The experience offers the viewer in the 
museum a sensibility that they are inhabiting within the video game. In this space, 
viewers are miniaturized and feel like the character. This experience explores various 
topics in reference to the shifting of perspectives––particularly, the location of the self 
as spectator, player, and viewer in the space of the virtual. When inhabiting the space 
that Mengbo has created, concepts break down as to what is reality and what is repre-
sentation. There has become a simulacra through the experience, as realities and 
truths have been suspended and the viewer is disoriented. This experience could not 
have occurred otherwise if it weren’t for the experience playing the video game ini-
tially. Thus, it is clear that we see video games function as critical discourse within a 
museum setting, which shows promise for the medium and all forms of virtuality. 
 There are a myriad of other instances of the video game within a museum 
space. Contemporary visual artist, Harun Farocki’s video installation, “Harun Faroc-
ki: Images of War (at a Distance)” in the 2011 exhibition “Serious Games I-IV,” dis-
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plays four videos playing at once. Farocki questions the reality we are given as a peo-
ple, particularly within the age of controlled media. In his videos, Farocki shows four 
videos. The videos display soldiers preparing for combat by training through video 
game simulators, a mock site that is created to look like Iraq, though it is based in 
California, an instructor explaining the gaming procedure for combat use, and the last 
video shows soldiers working with video from war footage used to encounter memo-
ries from war in order to confront post-traumatic stress disorder. The final blow to the 
viewer is to discover that the last footage is a staged depiction to promote video 
games for soldier post-traumatic stress.   Here, in this exhibit, we see knowledge and 338
experience intertwined in perplexity. Any form of ideal is shattered and what we be-
lieve to be real or trustworthy is negated. Farocki played with and examined how we 
see the world through media, and how the virtual can shape us unwittingly. This ex-
ample of the video game as a form of simulacrum shows the manner in which specta-
cle is used to promote the state of insecurity. Illuminating, this critical form of dis-
course is becoming well-known in the minds of the viewers, as it is given them an 
opportunity to see past the curtain and understand that ideologies can easily be creat-
ed through subversive tactics. 
 Of further relevance, it is worthy to note that MoMA and Smithsonian have 
acquired video games for their collections. While MoMA curator Paola Antonelli sees 
video games as interactive design, the Smithsonian sees the games they purchased as 
works of art. Smithsonian director, Elizabeth Broun says in relation to the games they 
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purchased, “We acquired them as great works of art.”   Michael Mansfield, Smith339 -
sonian curator, likens the skepticism of the video game as art to the birth of photogra-
phy as art. Mansfield states, “There were concerns about photography being a viable 
art form. I think one critic defined it as the bastard child of science left at the door of 
art. The same issue has been raised with video and performance art.”   These exam340 -
ples show clearly there is a growing power beneath the video game, though it is not 
yet widely known.  
Spontaneity  
 Within the virtual game, quick decision-making is a crucial and constant part 
of the process. Making decisions while playing acts as an outlet for becoming. The 
repetitiveness of forming quick decisions is essential to one’s intelligence and capaci-
ty for problem-solving. Active decisions cause a person to grow in mental aptitude 
and confidence, which allows for one to quickly search for viable solutions. When 
deciding to make a move, then, the game offers the chance to re-live the creative 
process, while approaching moments from hybridized perspectives. If a person under-
stands she can experience what she thinks through the virtual game, the process of 
becoming is enhanced in physical reality. Within the process of becoming more than 
ego, an individual grows farther than the sense of absence. 
 Re-connecting to spontaneity allows one to become aligned to her higher self. 
Decisions within the game act as a channel for the player to experience the designing 
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of her life. Decision-making coupled with action enhances the experience and also, 
subtly, gives the player a sense of responsibility to her creativity. The player sees that 
she can enjoy unlimited play. A chance of play is offered to the player where she can 
see a manifestation of her power from the virtual to the physical. Playing presents a 
joie de vivre, as the player awakens to new awarenesses. Decision-making allows one 
to see that challenges are central to becoming more authentic. Rather than ignoring 
challenge, the player is confronted with as many challenges as she desires in the 
game. When playing the game, the level of challenge is frequently difficult, though it 
is not an unconquerable feat. The challenge might be demanding enough that the 
player is motivated to conquer the goal, yet does not feel defeat. Paradoxically, be-
cause what the player learns can benefit her mind, the ability to affect the physical is 
feasible. Further, the player can choose any mode in the game, just as in her actual 
life. She can choose to make the level easy, medium, or difficult. She can choose to 
jump over continuous hurdles, receive multiple power-ups, share with others, fight 
others, love others, dance, learn how to do an act that would never be attempted in 
physical reality. The player can be competitive or free. She can remain under a timer 
or play in creative mode. She can act under surveillance or she can create a city. Here, 
in the virtual, she is free and possesses choices. 
The New Aura 
 The virtual can further be seen as having a new aura. Walter Benjamin dis-
cusses technologies of mass reproduction in his “The Work of Art in the Age of Me-
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chanical Reproduction,” stating that current technology adds a new aura to art––an 
essence that has not been set upon humanity before. Just as Kant calls for the old phi-
losophy to be destroyed in order to see the new philosophy begin, Benjamin sees the 
reproducibility of the form to be an enlightening ability.   Thus, the virtual game can 341
be seen as holding a revised aura for the viewer. Reality is structured within evolving 
networks and does not stay still, and certainly, the intangible uniqueness incorporated 
within the virtual offers the player various levels of thought that are unbounded. Here, 
now, we see aesthetic capability spill out into the arms of the people––it is no longer 
kept by a certain elite few. Benjamin sees the mechanical reproduction as a positive 
prospect for art and humanity. The relationships created within the virtual are only 
beginning, and it is clear that the evolution of digital interactivity is creating new 
forms of authentic auras. Benjamin, too, sees that the duplication of the work is some-
thing that we have been leading up to in the perspective of human history.   Interest342 -
ingly, Benjamin states: 
 During long periods of history, the mode of human 
sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode 
of existence. The manner in which human sense percep-
tion is organized, the medium in which it is accom-
plished, is determined not only by nature but by histori-
cal  circumstances as well.   343
Benjamin sees technology and reproduction as a positive, and believes this evolving 
becomes needed as to the changing points in time. The original is now not necessarily 
necessary to experience the aura of the work. His belief is that the reproducibility will 
affect artists and their viewers for the better, through the use of these tools we are 
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now able to access. Benjamin states: “The cathedral leaves its locale to be received in 
the studio of a lover of art: the choral production, performed in an auditorium or in 
the open air, resounds in the drawing room.”   344
The Virtual as Interrupter  
 Heidegger deconstructs and peels away layers of non-truths. Heidegger wants 
humanity to be free––and sees that it may be attainable through art.   Heidegger ac345 -
knowledges that there is potential in art and that we can avert danger through art, be-
ing, and thus, dasein.   Heidegger cares most about humans finding their essential 346
being-ness in a world of things. Heidegger states: 
 Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which 
in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any exis-
tent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which 
makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible.   347
Just as Nietzsche believes all humans have the potential for genius that can transcend 
bourgeois consciousness, Heidegger, too, believes we all have the ability to create our 
higher self. An individual, then, can emancipate herself through self-creation. By de-
parting oppressive systems in a creative way, an individual may become her authentic 
self.  
 Further, Rancière sees art as the interruption of the everyday. He sees genuine 
artistic activities that takes people from their usual places and creates in them a form 
of function.   Essentially, this can be seen as a form of dérive as the person disrupts 348
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common patterns and chooses to consciously create her surroundings and experi-
ences. Using creative thought to a high degree can be seen as an innovative form of 
living. The virtual dimension that allows the player to begin to think on her own is 
not to be seen as an outright revolution either, but rather as a form of quietly revealing 
truth. Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Rancière believe that truth will indeed reveal 
itself––and it appears that an evolving form of art through the virtual is a discourse 
needed to implement the seeking of truth. 
 Rancière sees that citizens in society willingly remain obedient and participate 
in the illusory game of authority, and those in power prefer this inauthentic situation. 
Rancière states: 
 This is exactly what Aristotle says in Book I of the Pol-
itics, when he distinguishes political rule (as the ruling 
of equals) from all other kinds of rule; and again in 
Book III, when he defines the citizen as ‘he who par-
takes in the fact of ruling and the fact of being ruled’. 
Everything about politics is contained in this specific 
relationship, this ‘partaking’ (avoir-part) that needs to 
be interrogated as to its meaning and conditions of pos-
sibility.   349
Democracy began as a concept, Rancière states, that was to benefit those in power. 
With the word demos meaning “common people,” the concept of democracy was seen 
as the lesser group of people who were not and would not be privileged enough to 
make a difference in society. Complacency may be seen to evolve here.   The com350 -
mon people were never meant to know they had any power, nor were they meant to 
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be heard. Thus, the facade that is known as a democratic community has been a con-
structed illusion for quite some time.   To contrast this long-standing inequality, a 351
loophole has occurred through, first, the dissensual act that is art, and second, the vir-
tual world where anyone can be free and in power. It is clear when seen from this dis-
ruption of the common rose-tinted view of history that the virtual world offers a for-
midable challenge to authoritative rule, if accepted.  
 Rancière discusses the concept of the police state, and its chimerical form of 
control that is nothing more than a deviation from a false premise. Thus, the current 
system that is based on an outdated model still exists. Rancière comments on the illu-
sion and set-up of the ideal city-state that Plato constructed. It was treated as the only 
mode of life. It is said that ancient cities have evolved and are, perhaps, more superla-
tive to current cities today, though the very concept of democracy in politics is still a 
paradox.   Rancière addresses the countless methods as to how politics portray the 352
assumption that there is an unequivocal strength on the other side.   He acknowl353 -
edges the question––how can the paradoxical concept of democracy be understood? 
He states: 
 To re-open the gap, Derrida contrasts a democracy to 
come to a democracy which has reached itself or 
reached its self. A democracy to come, as Derrida sees 
it, is not a democracy that will come in the future, but a 
democracy employed within a different time, a different 
temporal plot. The time of a ‘democracy to come’ is the 
time of a promise that has to be kept even though––and 
precisely because––it can never be fulfilled. It is a 
democracy that can never ‘reach itself’, catch up with 
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itself, because it involves an infinite openness to that 
which comes––which also means, an infinite openness 
to the Other or the newcomer.”    354
We can see the contradictions Rancière discusses similarly to the notion of Debord’s 
spectacle in society and twists Baudrillard’s concept of simulation and simulacra. A 
distinctive bend with Rancière, however, is that he believes the mode of this false 
democracy and police-state can be transformed through the dissensus via art. These 
concepts can be connected together with the standpoint that the virtual experience as 
a new way of seeing can be viewed as a new form of art that has the ability to tran-
scend common reality.  
 To connect these points via Rancière, we look towards Jean-Luc Nancy’s In-
operative Community. Nancy remarks that society is unknowingly longing for a “nat-
ural” connectedness between others, though the common contrived community are 
not the place for actual communal-ness.   Thus, these false constructs created for the 355
people, such as democratic society and community, are predicated on completely er-
roneous information. The limitless worlds of the game within the virtual, then, offer 
immense probability as to how they will disclose what is achievable and what is in-
deed fictitious. It appears that people have always had an unconscious knowing that 
they are missing their freedom while they are constantly informed that they are free. 
The reminder that they are free coupled with the need for a police state does not allow 
room to wonder what might be truth. The primordial urges for real communal gather-
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ing and a true creative life simmer inside of each person, knowingly or not. The pos-
sibilities to be informed now have potential to be given through the virtual. 
  
 While it might be commented that the virtual offers a false community behind 
a facade of something that is unattainable, it may also be seen that the virtual game 
offers all that one could hope for in order to discover authentic community and au-
thentic self. Furthermore, while it may be said that the same choices can be found in 
life as in the game, this is the point that, perhaps, the virtual space will offer the 
chance to find truth through the awareness that freedom must exist somehow. 
 Thus, in order for freedom to occur, a dissensual state or way can be seen as 
essential. Rancière views the artist and philosopher as agents of change that indeed 
have the power to transform issues of non-freedom. Rancière states:  
 In this way, it is possible to define a certain dissensual 
practice of philosophy as an activity of de-classification 
that undermines all policing of domains and formulas. 
It does so not for the sole pleasure of deconstructing the 
master’s discourse, but in order to think the lines ac-
cording to which boundaries and passages are con-
structed, according to which they are conceivable and 
modifiable. This critical practice of philosophy is an 
inseparably egalitarian, or anarchistic, practice, since it 
considers arguments, narratives, testimonies, investiga-
tions and metaphors all as the equal inventions of a 
common capacity in a common language. Engaging in 
critique of the instituted divisions, then, paves the way 
for renewing our interrogations into what we are able to 
think and do.    356
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Nietzsche’s thinking is similar when he discusses the free spirit in his text, Beyond 
Good and Evil.   Nietzsche sees the free thinker comparable to the dissensual citi357 -
zen. Nietzsche also looks to the Buddha for the sense to become a free spirit and 
thinker.   Just as Rancière, then, Nietzsche believes that we have been taught a sim358 -
plistic version of what life is and could be. Humans are not given knowledge of what 
power they hold. Nietzsche sees the free spirit as one who lives to seek this truth and 
independence. What Rancière sees as a dissensual free spirit, Nietzsche sees as an ex-
perimenter of life.  
Speed of Realistic Representation in the Virtual 
 To further contemplate the nature of visual aesthetics within the game, it is 
useful to consider the rapid development of visual representation in the virtual. Video 
games were first created in the 1960s, and the speed of realistic representation is re-
markable. Aesthetic realism within virtual games is advancing so quickly, of course, 
due to fast-paced developments in technology. The expeditious pace in depicting 
highly accurate mimetic representations is worthy of critical introspection. In our 
time, the most contemporary virtual games appear to approximate something such as 
a living painting. The moving imagery in the game appears quite real and almost as-
sumes a transcendent quality of being. This, of course, can be speculated in various 
ways. While Plato sees the artist as a liar, and imitative representations as the lowest 
form of earth, we can observe the promising qualities that have the ability to access 
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one’s higher awarenesses.   I propose that we look to the rapid movement of aesthet359 -
ic growth in the virtual as promising. While a frame of a video game could pass for a 
painting, it is a splice in time as moving image within the game. Ordinarily, within the 
viewing of a painting, the viewer examines the work and walks away. Here, however, 
the viewer controls the image and creates an experience within the artwork.   The 360
world of the virtual has given contemporary culture the ability to form the future into 
any mode it chooses at this point. Aesthetic growth can be seen as occurring quickly, 
particularly if viewing the timing of the progression of various forms of art and the 
quick pace that video games are moving forward. Fast-forwarding to contemporary 
painting today, the attainment of hyper-realism is a common artistic ambition. While 
much of art still pushes boundaries in expressionism, abstraction, and conceptual 
thought––hyper-realism is typically seen as a high crux of attainment. This exertion 
for the real shows itself in the virtual now, however, as the transformation from crude 
to hyper-real imagery has occurred over a span of thirty to forty years, compared to 
over 17,000 years, it can be seen that the rapid evolution of aesthetic realism has mul-
tiplied thousand times over in chronological time. 
Originality and Genius 
 The concept of genius can be discussed in order to understand the benefits of 
the virtual game. While the idea of genius can be thought through language itself, we 
begin to rid the bourgeois subject with Nietzsche, as he declares that we need to take 
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up the notion of Kantian genius and reconstitute ourselves. Thus, while it may be said 
that the artist is considered to be genius, it can further be said that every individual is 
genius. Particulars within the virtual game further encompass the notion of genius and 
originality within the game space. Playing within a virtual experience has the ability 
to remove the player from a world of ineptitude. Perhaps, the apparatus or Fou-
cauldian dispositif can change one’s life in an optimal way. Of course, digital devices 
are transforming every day life for consumers in contemporary society. Household 
appliances are created with digital interfaces, cars are created with premium GPS 
screens and computers, the mobile phone can be seen as a mobile computer. How 
might virtual play be thought of differently? A major premise to the specialness of the 
play in the virtual is that it has the potential to create more genius in society. While 
these other applications create greater interactivity and new ways of thinking about 
objects and the space around us, the game in the virtual is the only application that 
has the capacity to enhance a mind and spirit in a quantifiable way.  
 While the digital interface on the electric toaster has the ability to save the 
consumer's time, create less mess, and transform a mundane task into an event, the 
virtual game has the ability to change a person’s self-awareness and teach the person 
to have an improved self-image and perception of the world she physically inhabits. 
While society is becoming networked via the internet, the aspects of the virtual game 
should be seen as a specific powerful tool that can fruitfully be used to implement 
positive change in the authentic self. 
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 Hence, we see that the virtual world can create the genius. People look to the 
virtual as if it offers too much assistance, however, we can see this as cooperation for 
the future. People have achieved an astonishing amount of skill and, through virtual 
technologies, this benefit can be seen to propel the evolution of society. While playing 
and learning can be seen as a united concept due to the complexity with which play 
allows the player to discover herself, current ideological systems and institutions may 
be looked upon as to what does or does not create genius. For, it is known, intuitively 
or not, that creative play indeed creates genius, thus, it almost seems to be no question 
that play should continue into adulthood. In the virtual game, the adult player be-
comes a new version of herself.  If play is beneficial, then, taking play to the next lev-
el may be seen as an evident measure. 
 It may be seen that it is important to change one’s thinking or access thinking 
from another place to model in order to solve problem in life. If a person needs to 
change her self-image, she may need to pull ideas from elsewhere. By thinking the 
same way and not playing with spontaneity, little will change. Similar views are ad-
dressed within the scientific article, “Why No New Einstein?” In his article, quantum 
physicist, Lee Smolin discusses that the common way that most people live their life 
today is the narrow path toward security. We find here that most burgeoning indepen-
dent thinkers are formed to follow societal codes that assure their future in an em-
!213
ployment position that is purportedly secure. Rarely are those who think more cre-
atively given full rein of experimental experiences. Smolin remarks: 
 Many of Einstein’s contemporaries testified that he was 
not unusually talented mathematically. Instead, what 
enabled him to make such tremendous advances was a 
driving need to understand the logic of nature, tied to a 
breathtaking creativity and a fierce intellectual inde-
pendence. One can cite many examples showing that 
big advances in physics come when unusually creative 
and intellectually independent individuals ask new 
questions and forge new directions.    361
Here we see an important aspect to grasp with reference to the potential of using the 
creative mind without concern for security. Within structured inequality, the need for 
security is so prevalent, that creative and independent thinking is consistently extin-
guished in society, the workforce, and tradition. If we understand that Einstein used 
his creative and independent thinking abilities, it might be understood that these are 
what strengthen the genius mind, and can be further established within gameplay. 
Kant defines genius as the following, “Genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind 
(ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.”   Thus, it is beheld that ge362 -
nius is a natural force and can be deepened further when a person has deep desire to 
understand more. 
 With respect to the concept of discovering genius within creative thinking, the 
topic of education can be addressed. In his text, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière 
discusses the teacher Joseph Jacotot, who comes upon the duty to teach a subject in 
which he has no knowledge. If we look at the system of education and reverse our 
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tracks back to Plato, we might notice that creativity, perceptual awareness, self-em-
powerment, nor a positive mindset have not been given high precedence in most sys-
tems of knowledge. While the premise that reading and mathematics are crucial to 
one’s development is understood, we might, perhaps, look to creative thinking as an 
educational tool to enhance independent thinking further. If all people are given equal 
access to creative and independent thought, perhaps, more instances of genius would 
be found. Rancière states: 
 Public instruction is the secular arm of progress, the 
way to equalize inequality progressively, that is to say, 
to unequalize equality indefinitely. Everything is still 
played out according to a sole principle, the inequality 
of intelligence.    363
While there are various methods to educating using the creative mind that are not as 
conventional, the majority of common education can be seen to keep the general pub-
lic in a state of constant injustice.   It can be seen within virtual play that creative 364
modes are necessary to re-initiate genius. 
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 Chapter Seven 
 Ethical Implications 
 Computer games have pioneered virtual reality, and within ten years—
but probably more like five—these will be totally convincing, full-
immersion virtual realities, at least for the visual and auditory senses, 
and there will be some simulation of the tactile sense. To fully master 
the tactile sense we have to actually tap into the nervous system. That 
will be a scenario within 20 years. We’ll be able to send little devices, 
nanobots, into the brain and capillaries, and they’ll provide additional 
sensory signals, as if they were coming from your real senses. You 
could for example get together with a friend, even though you were 
hundreds of thousands of miles apart, and take a virtual walk on a vir-
tual Mediterranean beach and hold their hand and feel the warm spray 
of the moist air in your face. 
       ––Ray Kurzweil, 
       How the World Will Change 
Effects of the Virtual 
 Philosophical thinking has become more attainable for individuals today due 
to ease of access to information via the virtual. Because of the attainable access to 
interpretations of truth, more people are in search and discovering it. Plato's cave has 
never been more poignant then a time like this. It has been discussed throughout the 
dissertation that people have the ability to leave the cave and witness truth. Many 
people, however, fear leaving the cave. They are additionally apprehensive to go back 
and reveal to the cave-dwellers for concern that the others will not believe. The world 
of the virtual offers the ability to perceive and absorb––truth, authenticity, and free-
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dom. With the ability to access forms of truth, more people have larger capabilities to 
expand their imagination.  
 Thus, the world of the virtual can be seen as a space that is just as important as 
the real. Both worlds are inhabited by humans––through mind, spirit, and essence. 
The virtual allows one to experience and meditate upon micro and macro relation-
ships to the self and the world. An article by contemporary writer, Annie Murphy Paul 
in the New York Times points out, “There is evidence that just as the brain responds 
to depictions of smells and textures and movements as if they were the real thing, so 
it treats the interactions among fictional characters as something like real-life social 
encounters.” Further, she discusses recent psychological studies, “Individuals who 
frequently read fiction seem to be better able to understand other people, empathize 
with them, and see the world from their perspective.”   Here, we might understand 365
better the grand responsive effects through fiction and imagine the effects magnified 
due to the intensity of the virtual.  
Fragments of Death 
 On one’s own, the creative mind is able to visualize other worlds, instances, 
and essences of being. With assistance through the virtual, the creative mind can in-
teract with the origins of thought and further visualize all. Creative mind through 
imagination easily invents and forms any thought that is conceived––and the virtual is 
an aid in discovering truths. By visualizing and understanding time and essence, the 
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individual can access more effortlessly concepts in reference to the soul, mortality, 
and death. In The Republic, the main concern of Socrates was the care-taking of one’s 
immortal soul. He illustrates this concept through the story of Er. Interestingly, 
Socrates (Plato) believes that poets focus on the impure elements of the soul in order 
to retain their readers, and thus, poets corrupt all souls.   This spirit of caution can be 366
likened to what many people are skeptical about within virtual play. 
 Within this context, it is understood that people use the immersion of video 
games as an aid to explain reason behind repulsive acts. Fingers can be pointed in any 
number of areas to blame or understand why people become enraged, addicted, or 
violent, as accountability and personal responsibility have largely been removed from 
the locus of the individual. Ironically, Plato states that the artist leads people away 
from the ideal search for truth, and the only poetry that should be allowed in the State 
are “hymns to the gods and praises of famous men.”   It may be seen that this way of 367
thinking contributes to a conformed effect of society rather than an empowered and 
independent model of thinking. In Plato's view, the arts inhibit the ability to truly ap-
preciate nature by filtering and altering human perceptions. The fear of distorting 
truth is a valid point, though art as a distortion that should be banned is a misguided 
approach. Art, poetry, and games in the virtual can be found as further awakenings on 
a view of a subject. Thus, while it can be said that art does have the capacity to distort 
reality, the fear-based mentality of the loss of self and state would not be conducive to 
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a flourishing culture that has the ability to possess immense heights of perception and 
imagination.  
 Further addressing the issues of the virtual and technology in more of a ni-
hilistic sense, media theorist Friedrich Kittler is looked upon. In his text, Gramo-
phone, Film, Typewriter, Kittler comments that life is becoming a purely digital expe-
rience. He says, “Media determine our existence.”   He does not believe in art, be368 -
ing, sacredness, or the human. For Kittler, subjectivity does not exist and the human 
is most certainly de-centered. Kittler believes that technology has effectually replaced 
the subject. For Kittler, there is not even a point in discussing freedom, as there is no 
subject to free. He sees the powers of the patriarchy are and have been using humans 
as testing specimens. Kittler sees that humans will no longer know death or fear––as 
they will become infinite through technology. The human is not the center of the uni-
verse––the human is way past the point, Kittler believes.   Interestingly, there is truth 369
to be found in Kittler’s theories. While it may be biting to think that technology 
looms over humanity as an overpowering formation, it can also be seen that technolo-
gy does have the ability to transcend more fragile states of being. 
The Virtual is Real 
 The power that people can create what they perceive is such a dynamic con-
cept though it is rarely informed. Thus, most individuals are taught to be resourceful 
with a deficient mentality, rather than with a creative-based understanding. It is clear, 
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when understood, that people can be just as resourceful with a prosperous conscious-
ness. In his The Psychology of Imagination, Jean-Paul Sartre asserts: 
 The consciousness appears to itself as being creative, 
but without positing that what it has created is an ob-
ject. It is due to this vague and fugitive quality that the 
image-consciousness is not at all like a piece of wood 
floating on the sea, but like a wave among waves. It 
feels itself to be a consciousness through and through 
and one with the other consciousnesses which have pre-
ceded it and with which it is synthetically united.    370
When society understands “the role of the image in mental life” has the ability to con-
trol one’s consciousness, the interconnectedness between image and intention will be 
seen.   When it becomes known that the virtual is just as integral as the real, the 371
question whether the virtual will control people becomes irrelevant. Viewing the vir-
tual in terms of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl speaks of perception, conscious-
ness, and the presence of temporal-spatial objects: 
 If we produce in free phantasy spatial formations, 
melodies, social practices, and the like, or if we fantasy 
acts of experiencing of liking or disliking, of willing, 
etc., then on that basis by “ideation” we can see various 
pure essences originally and perhaps even adequately: 
either the essence of any spatial shape whatever, any 
melody whatever, any social practice whatever, etc., or 
the essence of a shape, a melody, etc., of the particular 
type exemplified. In this connection, it does not matter 
whether anything of the sort has ever been given in ac-
tual experience or not.   372
Thus, as mentioned previously, the mind feeds off of experiences and fantasies. If 
humans connect to story, interaction, and image, it is clear that occasions in the virtu-
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al can strengthen awareness of various realities. Considering the connections between 
the virtual and the engagement in reading books, contemporary writer Anne Lamott 
responds: 
 Writing and reading decrease our sense of isolation. 
They deepen and widen and expand our sense of life: 
they feed the soul. When writers make us shake our 
heads with the exactness of their prose and their truths, 
and even make us laugh about ourselves or life, our 
buoyancy is restored. We are given a shot at dancing 
with, or at least clapping along with, the absurdity of 
life, instead of being squashed by it over and over 
again. It's like singing on a boat during a terrible storm 
at sea. You can't stop the raging storm, but singing can 
change the hearts and spirits of the people who are to-
gether on that ship.    373
Regarding virtual games and reading fiction simultaneously, the affirmative aspects 
for the player and reader can be seen. It is a tool that can accelerate humanity to un-
derstand life and the world. Just as through the book, the player can learn and under-
stand concepts of reincarnation, infiniteness, eternalness, and renewal. In the video 
game, the player has the ability to understand structures and consciousness, and how 
one’s thoughts constructs one’s life. 
Need for More   
 Turning to past artists who look to artistic expression to help them understand 
life and purpose more clearly, both Vincent van Gogh and Paul Gauguin confessed to 
loved ones that they were lonely and longed for artistic community.   Their art prac374 -
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tice gave them some sense of purpose that they desired though they still anguished for 
connection to a group. Paul Gauguin’s search for meaning can be echoed in humanity 
today, whether aware or not. In Gauguin’s paintings, he seeks truth. In his paintings, 
he asks, “Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?”   In his 375
text, Noa Noa, he states, “All the joys—animal and human—of a free life are mine. I 
have escaped everything that is artificial, conventional, customary. I am entering into 
the truth, into nature.”   This quote can be looked upon as the seeming paradox be376 -
tween his experience entering his life in Tahiti and living in truth and nature while 
painting. To correlate this to the video game, the player too retreats from the “artifi-
cial, conventional, and customary” of contemporary society into a virtual living and 
breathing space where the player can have time to enter into her interpretation of 
truth.  
 It may further be pointed out that there is a need for outlet via Marxian theory, 
as it can be seen that humans have a need for communal harmony. To rid oneself of 
alienating aspects of common day-to-day work life, the person seeks to become self-
actualized and find a new way toward a natural state of communal essence. There is 
also a need for purpose and belonging. The worker further feels compelled to work 
toward something that is larger than her self. Even if she works in alienated circum-
stances and does not partake in creative endeavors during the workday, she is free to 
engage in the communal aspect of the gaming world in which she not only feels that 
she belongs, but also feels that she is contributing to something larger. If the player 
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continues to save needy characters, defeat villains, recreate villages, or turn into a su-
per-hero, she will feel a sense of purpose whether these acts occurred in physical or 
virtual reality. When involved in playing a virtual game, it is rare for the player to be-
lieve the fantasy is truly occurring. The player does, however, have her needs met in 
that she feels quite accomplished in saving and protecting. Whether it is virtual or not, 
the satisfaction remains. This is just as simple as the release the writer feels when 
crafting stories, lands, dialogue, and heroes. The writer knows this space is virtual yet 
she gains immense joy from the creative process. Further, people have had psycho-
logical issues for thousands of years. Violent or troubled youth is not a new concept. 
Narcissism 
  
 Considering the struggle for identity in reality, we can further review artists 
who are continually painting portraits and self-portraits. This can be seen as narcis-
sism for sure, though the subject of narcissism runs quite deeper in Lacanian and 
Freudian terms. The one who believes herself to be at the center of the universe can 
be seen as narcissistic. Further, we can combine the Greek myth of Narcissus together 
with immersion in the virtual. In the classical myth, Narcissus drank water by a lake 
and was enamored by his beautiful reflection in the water. He died because he could 
not physically access his beauty in his reflection. To turn the myth of Narcissus over 
to today, along with Lacan’s narcissistic-based theory of the mirror stage, we see now 
in the virtual that the player can see her reflection and change, alter, and metamor-
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phose her appearance throughout the game. In turn, she can realize this capability 
outside of the game. Here, this concept alone can be seen as a saving grace for the 
virtual. The player becomes the center of her universe and sees that she has the ability 
to attain the appearance and shift it however she pleases. Interestingly, Lacan speaks 
about narcissism, Freud, and his reasoning behind the mirror stage theory: 
 It all happens so differently in man’s world, whose 
structuration is seemingly highly neutralised, excep-
tionally loose in relation to his needs. Well, then, the 
Freudian notion of narcissism gives us a category which 
enables us to understand to what extent there is none-
theless a relation between the structuration of the ani-
mal world and that of the human world. What did I try 
to get across with the mirror stage? That whatever in 
man is loosened up, fragmented, anarchic, establishes 
its relation to his perceptions on a plane with a com-
pletely original tension. The image of his body is the 
principle of every unity he perceives in objects. Now, 
he only perceives the unity of this specific image from 
the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because of 
this double relation which he has with himself, all the 
objects of his world are always structured around the 
wandering shadow of his own ego. They will all have a 
fundamentally anthropomorphic character, even ego-
morphic we could say. Man’s ideal unity, which is nev-
er attained as such and escapes him at every moment, is 
evoked at every moment in this perception. The object 
is never for him definitively the final object, except in 
exceptional experiences.   377
 Within the concept of narcissism, the individual is at the center, and all seems 
to revolve around the person in her mind. The notion of personality disorders can be 
examined as well, in reference to narcissism and the virtual game. For, if a person is 
confronted with many personas to utilize, some may not have the necessary cognition 
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to understand that choosing a persona is about self-empowerment. In psychological 
interventions, therapists will work with people who have personality disorders by uti-
lizing Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) and Cognitive Therapy (CT). Importantly, 
within these therapies, the psychologists address any detrimental core beliefs about 
the inner self, outer self, and ideas about the world. Cognitive therapists, then, work 
on the core awarenesses and comprehensions of their patients.   My claim, however, 378
is that these dysfunctions and disorders are so prevalent that it is bound to occur that 
personality disorders do and will exist. However, the issue is not about making them 
worse through the virtual game, but assisting the player in learning about her core 
truths that have always been with her. Just as Rancière states in The Ignorant School-
master, people are all born with equal freedom. All individuals do not necessarily 
need a teacher or therapist to teach them core beliefs necessarily.   What is needed is 379
to come back into contact with the individual core beliefs to deconstruct and replace 
with healthier concepts of reality. Dialectical Behavior Therapy and Cognitive Thera-
py might be obtained through play in the virtual. 
 A counter-argument to my stated argument could be that the misunderstanding 
of self is situated within concepts of self-directed desire, self-absorption, and conceit. 
My contention is that it has become necessary for individuals to come into this place 
of being for higher self-awareness. It is imperative for people to become absorbed in 
the self and learn to self-direct to a point that is empowering. Of course, any tipping 
point above the need will be too much. Over-indulgence of anything will not be con-
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ducive to success. Thus, maintenance of self-belief is not a negative concept. Howev-
er, living in victimization and absence will never lead to a higher self-awareness. The 
best place to begin, then, is to recognize where we are today and move forward to 
where we can go. Through learning confidence and self-awareness, self-worth and 
self-value are taught. Mainly want and oppression are subtly taught and outright dis-
played. It is not made straightforward enough for a person to discover their self-worth 
on their own––to an extremely high and independent degree. Thus, the virtual game 
becomes a stepping stone to create that self-awareness that is not commonplace in 
contemporary society. 
Catharsis and the Virtual 
  
 To illustrate further the fine arts regarding similarities and the virtual, the still-
life genre, vanitas, can be thought upon. These paintings place symbols of known 
physical destiny which allows the player to contemplate eventual physical mortality. 
This concept coupled with the notion of catharsis makes sense when discussed re-
garding violent games. While the common attitude is that virtual games portray vio-
lence and death, it might be a contrasting notion to look at the video games in terms 
of the vanitas concept. Thus, by way of the vanitas, the symbols of death might evoke 
an understanding that is necessary for the individual. 
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 Aristotle proposes that people seek to imitate and represent various objects. 
This may occur through conscious creating or while unaware. A pertinent question is 
whether the nature of a story has a corrupting or cathartic influence on its audience. It 
can be said that virtual games will provide catharsis to players, as catharsis is defined 
as a purification or purging of emotions. As it has been discussed, the virtual game 
has the ability to act as a vessel for the player to become purified and grow into more. 
Aristotle believes that humans are instinctually led to rhythm and imitation, as the 
rhythm makes the tragedy more pleasurable. Thus, tragedy is seen as imitation and is 
the most sophisticated development of poetry, says Aristotle. Here, action is connect-
ed with purification, and is known as catharsis.   Aristotle sees emotions as neces380 -
sary and mature.  
 Aristotle’s beliefs are completely opposed to Plato’s belief that emotions 
should be suppressed––as Plato sees that artistic expression gives the chance for a 
person to become out of control.   Thus, as it has been discussed, Plato sought to 381
banish art and emotion from the state due to its potential lawless behavior that can be 
left behind, while Aristotle sought to promote art, specifically drama. Primarily, Aris-
totle looks upon high dramatic arts because of the cathartic benefits to the viewer. The 
virtual game can be seen similarly to the Platonic view that the game will take hold of 
the player and cause her to become uncontrollable in her physical life. However, my 
claim is on the side of Aristotle’s held thesis that catharsis heals the overload of emo-
tions. Aristotle maintains that the act of catharsis will leave emotions more balanced, 
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due to the effect of tragedy removing any excess loss of force.   Thus, the argument 382
that playing the virtual game too often will lead to corrupt behavior can be seen as 
groundless when using the theory of Aristotle.  
Addicted to the Virtual 
 Contemporary French theorist, Paul Virilio, claims against technology concen-
trate upon the impending loss of physicality with others. It may be looked upon that 
varying age groups are addicted to virtual games, but it cannot be said what will make 
them behave a violent way. There are people who enjoy playing video games and 
watching action movies because they are entertaining media. However, those who do 
not understand reality from fantasy, may not have been taught the difference. Anyone 
who over-uses or abuses anything can be seen as addicted. The underlying reasons as 
to why the addiction has occurred, however, do not largely stem from the virtual 
game itself. The stimulating effects are quite clearly taking the place of a human need 
that is not being nourished. It is a delicate line to determine how a virtual game can 
affect an individual who has no prior receptivity to violence or an unstable mindset. 
Thus, just as it can be said that an individual can, in effect, become addicted to any-
thing, it can also be held that a human can become addicted to playing video games. 
Quite clearly, the virtual offers outlets for humanity that have wonderful benefits. The 
cause of addiction, though, primarily stems from far larger issues.  
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 It is often said that video games are being structured and created to be persua-
sive, manipulative, and specifically allow for higher rates of addiction in order for the 
player to keep buying. However, there is great hope for the potential of the virtual to 
enable people to become empowered through the virtual. While manipulation may be 
a factor in mainstream video games, awareness of the fact will be important. While 
Virilio critiques the state of the nation and sees much doom ahead, he also discusses 
the brooding theme of fear that prevails over the world. He states that this sense of 
terror is, “a purely media phenomenon.”   Virilio discusses the mute sense of mass 383
panic that is spread without calling attention to it, akin to what Rancière calls the 
“politics of protection.”   Thus, the general public becomes powerless by believing 384
they are insecure and need to be protected. Virilio explains that we have “reached a 
high degree of “soft” stupor, we simply contented ourselves with ticking off the 
events, with enumerating the unfortunate victims of our scientific reverses, our tech-
nical and industrial mistakes.”   Virilio considers how we have lost traces of our 385
senses and inner wisdom through each passageway of technological or mass-repro-
ductive invention.   I claim that we have also lost these traces through non-creative 386
modes of living. 
Forgetting 
 The concept of forgetting arises with Virilio, Arendt, Derrida, and Nietzsche. 
Arendt says that those who do choose to conduct evil or “immoral” deeds during their 
life will force themselves to forget what they did. Virilio mentions that people who go 
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through traumatic experiences will fall into “a forgetting, or a paramnesia.”   Inci387 -
dentally, in Derrida’s Of Grammatology, translator Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
comments upon the concept of essential forgetfulness in reference to the philosopher:  
 This continual risk-taking is the affirmative play in Ni-
etzsche that Derrida will often comment on. “I do not 
know any other way,” Nietzsche writes, “of associating 
with great tasks than play.” “Wisdom: that seems to the 
rabble to be a kind of flight, an artifice and means for 
getting oneself out of a dangerous game; but the gen-
uine philosopher––as he seems to us, my friends?––
lives ‘unphilosophically’ and ‘unwisely,’ above all im-
prudently, … he risks himself constantly, he plays the 
dangerous game.” This imprudence, constantly attempt-
ing to bypass the prudence of stabilizing through “in-
terpretation,” is amor fati, the love of what Derrida calls 
“the game of chance with necessity, of contingency 
with law.” This is the dance of the Over-man, a dance 
Nietzsche describes in terms of himself with a certain 
poignancy: “How wonderful and new and yet how 
gruesome and ironic I find my position vis-a-vis the 
whole of existence in the light of my insight!… I sud-
denly woke up in the midst of this dream, but only to 
the consciousness that I am dreaming and that I must 
go on dreaming lest I perish––Among all these dream-
ers, I, too, who ‘know,’ am dancing my dance.” The 
“knowledge” of the philosopher places him among the 
dreamers, for knowledge is a dream. But the philoso-
pher “knowingly” agrees to dream, to dream of knowl-
edge, agrees to “forget” the lesson of philosophy, only 
so as to “prove” that lesson. …It is a vertiginous 
movement that can go on indefinitely or, to use Niet-
zschean language, return eternally. This precarious 
“forgetfulness,” “active forgetfulness,” is what Derrida 
emphasizes in Nietzsche’s Over-man.   388
Thus, we see that this flow of knowing, forgetting, and eternal return is a necessity in 
order to grow, and to transcend toward what Derrida calls, “The truth of Being.”  389
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This forgetfulness, Spivak comments, is both a protective limitation and a way to re-
main out of a trap of certain knowledge: 
 Like everything else in Nietzsche, this forgetfulness is 
at least double-edged. Even in his early writings “for-
getfulness” makes its appearance in two opposed forms: 
as a limitation that protects the human being from the 
blinding light of an absolute historical memory (that 
will, among other things, reveal that “truths” spring 
from “interpretations”), as well as an attribute boldly 
chosen by the philosopher in order to avoid falling into 
the trap of “historical knowledge.”    390
The states, then, of knowing, remembering, and forgetting become renewed paths to 
finding truth. Of further interest, we look directly to Nietzsche and his correlation to 
the need for alone-ness to allow a better understanding of the individual self. The fol-
lowing passage from On the Genealogy of Morality encapsulates this conscious no-
tion of forgetting and slipping into quiet in order to re-discover the inner self quite 
nicely: 
 To shut the doors and windows of consciousness for a 
while; not to be bothered by the noise and battle with 
which our underworld of serviceable organs work with 
and against each other; a little peace, a little tabula rasa 
of consciousness to make room for something new, 
above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for 
ruling, predicting, predetermining (our organism runs 
along oligarchic lines, you see)––that, as of mental or-
der, rest and etiquette: from which we can immediately 
see how there could be no happiness, cheerfulness, 
hope, pride, immediacy, without forgetfulness. The per-
son in whom this apparatus of suppression is damaged, 
so that it stops working, can be compared (and not just 
compared––) to a dyspeptic; he cannot ‘cope’ with any-
thing… And precisely this necessarily forgetful animal, 
in whom forgetting is a strength, representing a form of 
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robust health, has bred for himself a counter-device, 
memory, with the help of which forgetfulness can be 
suspended in certain cases…   391
Thus, it is seen that Nietzsche calls for a conscious forgetting that can be utilized at 
will, though always is coupled when needed with memory. This deliberate act of for-
getting can be further linked to Freud’s theories of repression in that people repress 
their true desires when in civilization. Can, then, the use of the virtual game offer a 
person the chance to unleash and re-open her ultimate desires in a space that requires 
no former neuroses to be covered? It is at this point where one can consider the need 
to understand these concepts in order to create new channels for human evolution.  
The Will 
 Furthermore, Nietzsche ponders over the will to power prevalently throughout 
his writings. Nietzsche's disdain for the past and his time period was predicated upon 
the belief that people no longer used their own will to power––they lost ambition. The 
people believed what they were told. He sees immense promise if only the people 
would awaken and claim their individual truth. Nietzsche sees that if the person 
would become aware and claim her inherent will to power, perhaps she would be-
come a larger being through her self-creation.   392
 In order to have that degree of control over the future, 
man must first have learnt to distinguish between what 
happens by accident and what by design, to think 
causally, to view the future as the present and anticipate 
it, to grasp with certainty what is end and what is 
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means, in all, to be able to calculate, compute––and be-
fore he can do this, man himself will really have to be-
come reliable, regular, necessary, even in his own self-
image, so that he, as someone making a promise is, is 
answerable for his own future!   393
Nietzsche’s view of the time he was in––and it can be assumed all the more so now––
was seen as a ground of fertile change for the people to create their lives how they 
wish. Nietzsche foretold a time such as now. Once humanity sees that they hold their 
own power, a shift may occur.   It is important to understand as well that Nietzsche 394
sees humans as artists of their life in a metaphorical sense. He does not say that all 
people are visual artists or creative writers or dancers. His conjecture runs deeper than 
the obvious––rather, he believes people can be artists of their personal life––creators 
of their identity. In his text, Nietzsche As Philosopher, Arthur Danto remarks on this 
enigmatic inference: 
 “Art,” then, has both a wide and a narrow use in Niet-
zsche's writings, and the wide use takes its meaning 
from the narrow one. Because we know what artists in 
the narrow sense distinctively do, we are able to see 
how we, in other activities, are artists as well. Nietzsche 
thus means to claim that our original and most funda-
mental involvement with experience is artistic and 
transforming, that we spontaneously seek to express, in 
images and apposite cadences, the way in which we feel 
and perceive the world. He speaks of a “primal faculty 
of human fantasy” through which the human individual 
functions essentially as “an artistically creating 
subject.”   395
  
 Living-with-myself 
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 In her text, Responsibility and Judgment, Hannah Arendt discusses the notions 
of moral conduct and the self.   Arendt responds to the idea of the human con396 -
science, which can be connected to the conversation within the virtual game––and 
ideas between violent and transcendent behaviors. Arendt discusses the concepts of 
“living-with-myself” and humans as “two-in-one” in their thoughts.   Arendt states: 397
 Thinking in its non-cognitive, non-specialized sense as 
a natural need of human life, the actualization of the 
difference given in consciousness, is not a prerogative 
of the few but an ever-present faculty in everybody; by 
the same token, inability to think is not a failing of the 
many who lack brain power but an ever-present possi-
bility for everybody––scientists, scholars and other spe-
cialists in mental enterprises not excluded. Everybody 
may come to shun that intercourse with oneself whose 
feasibility and importance first discovered. Thinking 
accompanies life and is itself the de-materialized quin-
tessence of being alive; and since life is a process, its 
quintessence can only lie in the actual thinking process 
and not in any solid results or specific thoughts. A life 
without thinking is quite possible; it then fails to devel-
op its own essence––its is not merely meaningless; it is 
not fully alive. Unthinking men are like sleepwalkers. 
For the thinking ego and its experience, conscience that 
“fills a man full of obstacles” is a side effect. No matter 
what thought-trains the thinking ego thinks through, the 
self that we all are must take care not to do anything 
that would make it impossible for the two-in-one to be 
friends and live in harmony.   398
What she states through Kant, Plato (Socrates), and Aristotle is that each person lives 
with their self and speaks with their self. This two-in-one can, of course, be seen as 
the conscious and subconscious. Thus, the conscious and subconscious can be looked 
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upon when addressing the relationship one has to her self when playing the virtual 
game. While the person is playing the game, the other self is always there. 
 Arendt says that one will fear losing her self in that she will no longer be able 
to talk with herself since she is always in the company of herself. Thus, she says, the 
way we behave with others has to do with the way we behave with our self.   Fur399 -
ther, in her The Life of the Mind, she discusses the conversations that occur between 
the self and the other self in the mind, which can be seen as conscience. These ideas, 
again, offer much to the concepts of the conscious mind and subconscious mind. The 
thoughts and directions an individual creates in her life ultimately have to do with 
whether the individual wants to stay friends with the other self in her mind.   Thus, it 400
can be considered that most players will not commit violent crimes due to the sug-
gestions of video games, as people unconsciously know they have to live with their 
other self. They only have their self to talk to in their minds, and might understand 
that they need to be their best friends and ally internally (in the mind). 
 It may be said with assurance that actual violence and peer pressure will cre-
ate more violent criminals than a video game. I argue that life circumstances and the 
absence of integral mindful education will create more harm than any influence from 
the virtual. Thus, physical life experiences will dictate one’s life deeper than violent 
video games. I claim, then, that violence in the virtual is more of an effect than a 
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cause. It is difficult to make the video game a cause for violence, rather than a cathar-
tic release to remove violence from previous scars.  
Death Drive 
 Violence can be examined in the virtual game as a method to release possible 
pent-up aggression. It is essential, too, to discuss the topic of the death drive with ref-
erence to virtual games. The term “death drive” is also known as thanatos. The death 
drive is the drive in humans that propels them toward chaos and self-destruction. 
Freud discusses the death drive, as well as the polar counterpart, life drive or pleasure 
principle, which is also known as eros or the instinct for survival and procreation. The 
death drive motivator in the virtual game, however, is akin to the qualities of catharsis 
as Freud sees the death drive as a libidinal form of expressing aggression.   Freud 401
states: 
 If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception 
that everything living dies for internal reasons—be-
comes inorganic once again—then we shall be com-
pelled to say that ‘the aim of all life is death’ and, look-
ing backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed before 
living ones.’    402
Thus, Freud states that humans have an underlying desire to return to the original 
state. Freud says that we desire to become inanimate and will invent ways to end liv-
ing. Freud looks to both eros and thanatos as paradoxes in life, that move in and out 
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of one another in an individual. Similarities can be found within the paradoxical ener-
gies of Apollo and Dionysos. Freud asserts: 
 On the basis of theoretical considerations, supported by 
biology, we put forward the hypothesis of a death in-
stinct, the task of which is to lead organic life back into 
the inanimate state; on the other hand, we supposed that 
Eros, by bringing about a more and more far-reaching 
combination of the particles into which living substance 
is dispersed, aims at complicating life and at the same 
time, of course, at preserving it.   403
Here, Freud sees these dual forces at work within the individual––and these forces 
can be seen as well in the individual today. If Freud’s theories are assumed, it may be 
seen that the player may have these tendencies toward self-destruction, and perhaps, a 
beneficial mode to outliving the death drive is to simulate the death experience. Thus, 
an interesting hypothesis is that the virtual offers the fulfillment of the death drive if 
unconsciously desired––thus, extending physical life. 
 Lacan, too, speaks of the death drive and catharsis in The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan: Book XIV: The Logic of Phantasy. Lacan states that catharsis is purifying as  it 
relates to a form of discharge that enables the individual to return to a renewed state 
of normalcy. Further, he says that the aim of tragedy is catharsis––the expelling of 
fear and pity.   Within these concepts of the death drive and a purging catharsis, it 404
might seem relevant that the virtual game offers these forms of atonement to the play-
er who desires the chance to be renewed. 
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 Furthermore, with reference to death and the individual, Heidegger does not 
view death in terms of morbidity. Rather, he sees the inevitability of death as what 
might make the individual live a more authentic life, as she is always aware of her 
impending death. Heidegger sees the understanding of death as a possibility or as a 
“not yet.” The experience of being and becoming authentic has come to the under-
standing that death is possible, and the inauthentic always holds fear as if the death is 
occurring.   As such, it makes sense that living as an authentic presence will cause a 405
higher sense of self to be reflected. The experience, then, of playing violent virtual 
games, may be time spent that is necessary to understand what is hidden to the psy-
che, though after playing repetitively it does come time to realize that a cathartic ex-
perience is beneficial. Interestingly, the conflict between acceptance of life and death 
can be seen to bring about destruction and chaos, though also can be redeemed by the 
ability to bring meaning and a more connected focus to human endeavors. Contempo-
rary philosopher and author Simon Critchley states in reference to Heidegger’s con-
cept of being-towards-death:  
 Being is time and time is finite. For human beings, time 
comes to an end with our death. Therefore, if we want 
to understand what it means to be an authentic human 
being, then it is essential that we constantly project our 
lives onto the horizon of our death. This is what Hei-
degger famously calls “being-towards-death.” If our 
being is finite, then an authentic human life can only be 
found by confronting finitude and trying to make a 
meaning out of the fact of our death. Heidegger sub-
scribes to the ancient maxim that, “To philosophise is to 
learn how to die.” Mortality is that in relation to which 
we shape and fashion our selfhood.    406
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Thus, interestingly enough, Heidegger speaks about the necessary states of anxiety 
and the confrontation with the nothing. With both anxiety and the nothing, humans 
discover their self. Heidegger states: 
 The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us 
in anxiety oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. 
In the slipping away of beings only this “no hold on 
things” comes over us and remains. We “hover” in anx-
iety. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging because 
it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This 
implies that we ourselves––we humans who are in be-
ing––in the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. 
At bottom therefore it is not as though “you” or “I” feel 
at ease; rather, it is this way for some “one.” In the al-
together unsettling experience of this hovering where 
there is nothing to hold onto, pure Da-sein is all that is 
still there.    407
As seen here, Heidegger maintains that anxiety and the nothing are essential for the 
authentic self. Anxiety is a form of awareness. It is a moment of awakening. Heideg-
ger says, “Original anxiety can awaken in existence at any moment. It needs no un-
usual event to rouse it.”   Thus, anxiety is the state of confronting the nothing. While 408
Heidegger also claims that it is humorous that both mind and science do not even take 
much note of the nothing, it can be seen that the virtual is an embodiment of the noth-
ing––as it is always slipping away. It is not an object to be held. It is continually dis-
appearing. Heidegger aptly states, “The question of the nothing puts us, the question-
ers, in question. It is a metaphysical question. Human existence can relate to beings 
only if it holds itself out into the nothing.”   409
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Unnecessary Bodies 
 Twentieth century French philosopher, Jean-François Lyotard, discusses the 
concepts of the active memory and technologos. He identifies the technological age 
as what helps to actively select on a more decisive plane. Lyotard observes the use of 
technology to be a benefit, similar to language, as it works as a type of scanning. He 
further distinguishes the scanning aspect as a “conquest of the unknown.”   Lyotard 410
states, “God, nature, destiny too are “scanned”.”   He says:  411
 It is clear that with techno-science in its current state, it 
is a power to ‘put in series’ that is at work on planet 
Earth, and that the human race is its vehicle much more 
than its beneficiary. The human race even has to ‘de-
humanize’ itself, in the sense that it is still a bio-cultural 
species, so as to rise to the new complexity, so as to be-
come tele-graphic. The ethical problems raised by tech-
no-science are there to prove that the question has al-
ready been raised.    412
Furthermore, Lyotard tells us that French poet Guillaume Apollinaire wrote, “More 
than anything, artists are men who want to become inhuman.”   This statement can 413
easily liken the player in the virtual to the artist in the studio. Both understand the 
power of creating and both tap into the notion of the self beyond common terms. 
 Many philosophers look to free past concepts of identity and outdated senses 
of what it is to be a human. Deleuze and Guattari examine inside out the concept of 
the body without organs. They say that the body without organs or what they abbrevi-
ate as BwO is “what remains when you take everything away.”   There is no way to 414
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attain the body without organs, Deleuze and Guattari explain, though people are al-
ways in search of the elusive and transcendent subject. They see that people should 
not relate with their bodies as much––as they are just bodies. People can indeed live 
without organs and many body parts. They ask, how far can one go, then, with a dis-
organized body if the body is just the body. What is the limit? Deleuze and Guattari 
comment further: 
 We are continually stratified. But who is this we that is 
not me, for the subject no less than the organism be-
longs to and depends on a stratum? Now we have the 
answer: the BwO is that glacial reality where the allu-
vions, sedimentations, coagulations, foldings, and re-
coilings that compose an organism.   415
Thus, these thoughts raise important questions about the body, the need for the body, 
and the limits of the loss or addition of body parts in order to become an actual identi-
ty. Thinking of the body without organs within the concepts of the virtual, we can 
again turn to the concept of the artist or poet who is able to disconnect from the con-
cept of the physically grounded self and play with many forms of possible self––
without feeling severe attachment to the concept. Nietzsche states:  
 Yet this ‘I’–ness is not the same as that of the waking, 
empirically real human being, but rather the only ‘I’–
ness which truly exists at all, eternal and resting in the 
ground of things, and through the images which are 
copies of that ‘I’ the lyric genius can see down to that 
very ground of all things.   416
As it might be seen, when the I or authentic sense of identity is looked upon as both 
the everything and nothing, the self may begin to play. 
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 Contemporary critic and theorist N. Katherine Hayles discusses the concept of 
the posthuman in her text, How we Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernet-
ics, Literature, and Informatics. In Chapter One of her text, entitled “Toward Embod-
ied Virtuality,” Hayles first quotes Ihab Hassan: 
 We need first to understand that the human form––in-
cluding human desire and all its external representa-
tions––may be changing radically, and thus must be re-
visioned. We need to understand that five hundred years 
of humanism may be coming to an end as humanism 
transforms itself into something that we must helplessly 
call post-humanism.   417
This statement sets up the concept that a shift is clearly on its way. Hayles discusses a 
book that brought her horror as a child that described how it would one day “be pos-
sible to download human consciousness into a computer.”   Hayles discusses how 418
(1) Information lost its body (2) The cyborg was created as a technological and cul-
tural icon after World War II (3) The human is becoming a new construction that is 
called the posthuman. Hayles states: 
 In the posthuman, there are no essential differences or 
absolute demarcations between bodily existence and 
computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and bio-
logical organism, robot teleology and human goals. To 
elucidate the significant shift in underlying assumptions 
about subjectivity signaled by the posthuman, we can 
recall one of the definitive texts characterizing the lib-
eral humanist subject: C. B. Macpherson's analysis of 
possessive individualism. “Its possessive quality is 
found in its conception of the individual as essentially 
the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing 
nothing to society for them. The human essence is free-
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dom from the wills of others, and freedom is a function 
of possession.”    419
Hayles discusses Macpherson’s analysis and says that he sees the new and free self as 
a market-produced self, whereas the natural self has been removed within the 
posthuman. Hayles goes on to discuss the impossibility that the natural human cannot 
be found, as it is always-already connected to the will of an other. Hayles discusses 
the disembodiment of information and questions the cybernetic construction of the 
posthuman. Hayles claims: 
  Interacting with electronic images rather than with a 
materially resistant text, I absorb through my fingers as 
well as my mind a model of signification in which no 
simple one-on-one correspondence exists between sig-
nifier and signified. I know kinesthetically as well as 
conceptually that the text can be manipulated in ways 
that would be impossible if it existed as a material ob-
ject rather than a visual display. As I work with the text-
as-flickering-image, I instantiate within my body the 
habitual patterns of movement that make pattern and 
randomness more real, more relevant, and more power-
ful than presence and absence.    420
Further, Hayles comments on self-possession and self-control, which go hand in hand 
with concepts that can be found when playing in the virtual. As such, films can be 
looked upon as examples that put forth ideas of the loss of self, absence of subject 
due to a robotic formation or discovering that one is being controlled by a power larg-
er than what could be comprehended.   In these films, the very real idea that one can 421
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lose their traction with the real portrays a sensibility that does seem that it could in-
deed be a possibility. 
  Contemporary theorist and philosopher Wolfgang Schirmacher dis-
cusses similar concepts and sees that, if these artificial possibilities might be accept-
ed, the entrance into virtual can become more of a natural movement in society. 
Schirmacher contends: 
  Truth is a gift of Dasein, which is our place and activity 
in the world's process. As artificial beings by nature, 
our body as well as our mind is “a happening of truth at 
work” every lived-through moment. Even in the most 
inhumane enterprises, truth is still at work in humanity 
as a silent cry toward its absence. According to Heideg-
ger, truth is not about being right or wrong but accept-
ing “aletheia,” the powerful interplay of revealing and 
concealing, which shapes humanity's destiny.    422
Schirmacher takes an empathetic view on the subject and sees that the truths that peo-
ple are living in are what they need to contemplate and understand who they are as a 
people. Schirmacher says, “It is within this cultural environment that we decide how 
we should act, what we hope for, and, finally, what it means to be a human being.” 
Affirmatively, Schirmacher believes media and virtual reality might be seen as mani-
festations of humanity. He sees the beauty of truth even in extreme situations, as in 
these instances, we notice the beauty that is not there. Schirmacher replies:  
 A philosophical challenge without precedent lies in dis-
covering and reinforcing those traits already in accord 
with this new type of being. We could not have discov-
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ered gene technology or virtual reality as a human ca-
pability if it did not belong to our nature and if it were 
not a characteristic of our life technology. If we under-
stand homo generator not as an extreme case but as the 
norm, one of our conjectures about humanness is then 
strengthened, one which has long determined us sub-
consciously but is uttered only with great aversion. If 
we penetrate all the dissemblance and tear away the last 
veil of analogy between human and animal, it then be-
comes irrefutable: we are but artificial beings among all 
other beings, our bodies are artifacts by nature. Homo 
generator's body politics is to see/hear/smell/touch/
taste/think before you act, it claims aesthetic perception 
as the basis of comprehending and interaction. Homo 
generator has no fear of his or her mistakes, for they are 
inseparable from his or her succeeding––as body poli-
tics teaches us. Responsibility also means being able to 
assume one's guilt and to reject blame for anything you 
have not caused yourself. Homo generator is a substan-
tial beginning, unique but not original, self-care without 
egotism.    423
The above passage is quite crucial to contemplate in reference to this dissertation and 
the state of the virtual today. As Schirmacher states in the second sentence, the virtual 
would not even occur if it was not a form of human evolution. Technology is not a 
glitch in humankind––nor is it an assault on nature. It is a service that aids in univer-
sal progression. If the virtual is seen as natural, and not alien, further progress may be 
made. The virtual can teach what it is to be human. However, it will take a higher 
form of maturity for people to see the virtual as an ally. As it has been said throughout 
this writing as well––the ego will need to step aside in order to recognize the potential 
in the virtual. 
Reconstituting the Self 
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 When reconfiguring the notion of the self in the virtual, the concept of the re-
flection is important to consider. In the reflection, a person encounters double mean-
ings. Thus, by reflecting the self, the person reflects the other. Through this double 
contemplation, the individual discovers her self. While it can easily be argued that 
technology destroyed chance, it can be viewed slightly different and understood that 
the underlying structure beneath technology offers improved forms of chance. Per-
haps, then, the structure of the virtual has been a necessary base to “become” more 
extraordinarily. Through the virtual, a new form of art is beheld that will allow one to 
have a greater understanding of her self and humanity. 
 The main complication in finding the true self in the virtual lies within the im-
portance placed on the ego-self. As long as an individual allows the inauthentic other, 
and what Heidegger calls the “they” to dominate her mind, she no longer has control 
of it.   Others or the “they” (Das Man) will not allow freedom of mind if the individ424 -
ual is unaware of her own power. Once the individual is cognizant of her creative 
mind, she reinstates her self. The virtual game can be considered as a necessary vehi-
cle to return back to the origins of what makes a human “human.” My argument is not 
based on the notion that children or all people should connect to the virtual. Rather, I 
argue that the ability to utilize the virtual indeed offers new ways to respond to the 
world and re-create the self––and it is available to anyone who is motivated to do so. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Virtual in Reality 
 We consider the system of our ideas, not in its being, but in its becom-
ing. Philosophy becomes genetic; that is, it allows the whole necessary 
series of our ideas to arise and take its course, as it were, before our 
eyes. From now on there is no longer any separation between experi-
ence and speculation. The system of nature is at the same time the sys-
tem of our mind, and only now, once the great synthesis has been ac-
complished, does our knowledge return to analysis. 
       ––Friedrich Schelling  
       Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature 
 As it has been covered, within the virtual, there is room to play. The premium 
component of the virtual experience is based on emotion where the feeling of action 
is sensed, even through simulation. This cache of perception is largely unused 
amongst humanity, and it is not well understood. Within my writing, it has been 
shown that the Metaverse within the virtual offers unlimited pathways to form the 
authentic self. The appreciation of the power of the creative mind is important for an 
evolution in creative thinking and becoming. Through the application of philosophi-
cal methodologies and exploration of historical views of subject formation, we dis-
cover why and how the virtual can be seen as a new form of creative expression. 
 As mentioned, Heidegger stated that only a God can save humanity now. 
When asked about this new God and a declaration of an absolute technological state 
in an interview from 1966, Heidegger responds with the following:  
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 The world cannot be what and how it is through human 
beings, but neither can it be so without human beings. 
In my opinion that is connected to the fact that what I 
call “Being,” using a traditional, ambiguous, and now 
worn-out word, needs human beings. Being is not Be-
ing without humans being needed for its revelation, 
protection, and structuring. I see the essence of technol-
ogy in what I call the construct. This name, on first 
hearing easily misunderstood, points, if it is properly 
considered, back into the innermost history of meta-
physics, which still determines our existence [Dasein] 
today. The workings of the con-struct mean: Human 
beings are caught [gestellt], claimed, and challenged by 
a power that is revealed in the essence of technology. 
The experience that humans are structured [gestellt] by 
some-thing that they are not themselves and that they 
cannot control themselves is precisely the experience 
that may show them the possibility of the insight that 
humans are needed by Being. The possibility of experi-
ence, of being needed, and of being  prepared for these 
new possibilities is concealed in what makes up what is 
most modern technology’s own. Thinking can do noth-
ing more than to help humans to this insight, and phi-
losophy is at an end.   425
Heidegger predicts a liberating experience in which humans can re-think the future 
through potential forms of technology. He says that the new age has only begun––
through thinking––and forms of cybernetics are ways to come to new understanding. 
Despite Heidegger’s claims, however, he further states that he does not know exactly 
what will change the future, but a new form of thinking in preparedness will likely 
pave the way.   We can see, then, the open path through the virtual might allow entry 426
into new ways of thinking. Heidegger says, “We come to know what it means to think 
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when we ourselves try to think. If the attempt is to be successful, we must be ready to 
learn thinking.”   427
 Nietzsche states, “It returns, what finally comes home to me is my own Self 
and what of myself has long been in strange lands and scattered among all things and 
accidents.”   The sense of freedom found within the virtual, then, answers the origi428 -
nal question I set to answer in the thesis, What is the saving grace of technology to-
day? Thus, the answer is that the virtual allows the individual a free state to enter, 
learn, and become. Through no objective purpose in the game, the player comes out 
with greater purpose due to the previous sense of anxiety that has been lessened in the 
virtual. 
 Furthermore, due to the knowledge that obtaining more is not necessarily a 
better situation––and addiction is easy to come by through both and real and virtual 
worlds––it is clear that finding the inner self is important. As what might be under-
stood through Nietzsche’s notion of the herd mentality, we can see that the power of 
the individual is missing from society. Nietzsche states:  
 A traveller who had seen many lands and peoples and 
several of the earth’s continents was asked what quality 
in men he had discovered everywhere he had gone. He 
replied: ‘They have a tendency to laziness.’ To many it 
will seem that he ought rather to have said: ‘They are 
all timid. They hide themselves behind customs and 
opinions.’ In his heart every man knows quite well that, 
being unique, he will be in the world only once and that 
no imaginable chance will for a second time gather to-
gether into a unity so strangely variegated an assort-
ment as he is: he knows it but he hides it like a bad con-
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science––why? From fear of his neighbor, who de-
mands conventionality and cloaks himself with it. But 
what is it that constrains the individual to fear his 
neighbour, to think and act like a member of a herd, and 
to have no joy in himself? Modesty, perhaps, in a few 
rare cases. With the great majority it is indolence, iner-
tia, in short that tendency to laziness of which the trav-
eller spoke. He is right: men are even lazier than they 
are timid, and fear most of all the inconveniences with 
which unconditional honesty and nakedness would bur-
den them. Artists alone hate this sluggish promenading 
in borrowed fashions and appropriated opinions and 
they reveal everyone’s secret bad conscience, the law 
that every man is a unique miracle; they dare to show 
us man as he is, uniquely himself to every last move-
ment of his muscles, more, that in being thus strictly 
consistent in uniqueness he is beautiful, and  worth re-
garding, and in no way tedious.   429
Thus, it is seen that the herd mentality keeps humanity stuck in the mob thought––or 
way of inauthenticity. In order for humanity to re-discover their authenticity, then, 
more need to retreat into the meditative and aesthetic state in order to redefine their 
actual self. The virtual, then, can be seen as necessary to arrive at an authentic under-
standing of the self. To look at the world of virtual play as a stain on society is not a 
viable option to move forward. It is important that independent designers continue to 
create games that offer individuals greater promise in their life. Perhaps the history of 
the creation and attainment of the self should be taught to people at this time.  
  
 I claim that the virtual is a conduit to better understand and live the real. 
Through the negative, a positive aspect to the real is revealed. Through losing the self, 
one finds the self. Through the mirror, one discovers possibilities. Through the screen, 
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the world is seen. By experiencing the nothing, the quench for living is born. Fur-
thermore, an inner authenticity grows when the physical world is silenced. The player 
retreats from the physical––and enters the spiritual through the virtual. The inner 
identity, then, may evolve through these forms of meditative interactivity in the virtu-
al––where one learns how to think and react independently of any other realm of exis-
tence.  
 Through conscious levels of self-awareness, the player arrives at a new state 
of self-thought. While discourse keeps us going, it can also stop progress. The con-
cept of becoming is crucial. Mindfulness is enhanced and the player moves into 
ephemeral states of transcendence through the engaging experience of play. The pur-
poselessness discovered is the reward in the game. An object as compensation is not 
necessary to receive at the end of the game. The pure state of free play is the benefit. 
When it is understood that there is not one essential pure state, the importance to be-
come creative and work with a compounded approach is imperative. To understand 
that addiction is not a problem in reference to the culture of video games––but rather, 
it is a human matter––is significant. Heidegger can be looked upon further when he 
says: 
 We all still need an education in thinking, and before 
that first a knowledge  of what being educated and une-
ducated in thinking means. In this respect, Aristotle 
gives us a hint in Book IV of his Metaphysics. It reads 
esti gar apaideusia to me gignoskein tinon dei zetein 
apodeixin kai tinon ou dei. “For it is uneducated not to 
have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof, 
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and when this is not necessary.” This sentence demands 
careful reflection. For it is not yet decided in what way 
that which needs no proof in order to become accessible 
to thinking is to be experienced. Is it dialectical media-
tion or originary intuition or neither of the two? Only 
the peculiar quality of that which demands of us above 
all else to be admitted can decide about that. But how is 
this to make the decision possible for us before we have 
not admitted it? In what circle are we moving here, in-
evitably? Is it the eukukleos alethein, well-founded un-
concealment itself, thought as the opening?   430
 The imagination is an unbroached reserve for unlimited growth. The concept 
of play can be seriously considered as we move forward in the looming largeness of 
the virtual. The understanding of the foundations of creation remains essential today. 
Poetry, novels, fiction, fine arts, music––all tap into these larger forms of understand-
ing and expression. Combining and placing these elements together with interactivity 
are enormous benefits to the virtual. The belief that fantasy and imagination are swept 
away as the child becomes a teenager and adult are removed when engaged in play. 
Indeed, fantasy and imagination are readily available to all who wish to partake. One 
can remain mature and play. The stigma attached to playing as an adult can be re-
moved. While we cannot get out of the systematization of life, we can be aware of it, 
and, in a Derridean sense, use the systems in place to promote greater understanding 
of thought and being. Derrida states in relation to these concepts:  
 This limit is surpassed in productive imagination: self-
intuition, the immediate relation to oneself such as it 
was formed in reproductive imagination, then becomes 
a being; it is exteriorized, produced in the world as  a 
thing. This singular thing is the sign; it is engendered 
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by a fantastic production, by an imagination that shows 
signs of itself, making the sign (Zeichen machende 
Phantasie) as always, emerge from itself in itself.   431
While many critics look to the virtual as an enemy or something to be concerned 
with, I differ by saying that play in the virtual world is a needed component to move 
forward in a higher understanding of self-awareness. To be cognizant that play and 
becoming aware of the individual self is not egotism––but a needed precondition to 
authentic living––is imperative. Through these methodologies and philosophical 
means of grasping the underlying truths, new ways of thinking about higher self-
awareness may emerge. 
 When unraveling formerly told truths, we see that individual imagination has 
been veiled for quite some time. The capacity of the creative mind has become dis-
empowered. The need for further research regarding the imagination and the virtual as 
mechanisms to allow authentic growth is essential. Through the processes of becom-
ing, one can indeed create her ideal self. The virtual is needed today in order to per-
ceive the real. 
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